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Abstract
Despite the international consensus that climate change is a problem, few
substantive policies are being pushed forward at the national level to meet international
greenhouse gas reduction commitments under the Paris Agreement. The most significant
climate change policies are emerging at state public utility commissions (PUCs). While
PUCs were traditionally structured to regulate utilities, state PUCs are now finding
themselves at the hub for renewable energy, clean energy, and distributed energy
policies. Despite the increase in renewable and clean energy policies at state PUCs, there
is a noticeably small environmental and clean energy stakeholder presence at those PUC
proceedings. A similar gap is reflected in the state interest group and regulatory
literatures, as most scholarship has focused on federal regulatory agencies and industry
influence.
Based on the lack of knowledge of environmental and clean energy interest group
participation and influence at state PUCs, this study seeks to answer two interrelated
questions. First, what participatory mechanisms lead to greater levels of influence among
environmental and clean energy groups at public utility commissions? Second, what
effect do the social dynamics among stakeholder groups have on shaping a stakeholder’s
ability to be influential?
This dissertation advances a new model of access points and stakeholder
influence. The model proposes that participatory and inclusive mechanisms throughout
the PUC stakeholder process can provide distinct access points for environmental and
clean energy interest groups. These access points can shape their ability to influence the
i

rulemaking process and their behaviors towards other stakeholders. The benefits from an
inclusive stakeholder framework can carry over to subsequent proceedings in which
stakeholders can, at a minimum, have a mutual understanding of important issues and,
ideally, mutually beneficial relationships with one another.
This dissertation approaches the methodology in two phases. For the first phase of
the methods, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is employed (Ragin, 1987, 2000).
This dissertation utilizes QCA to examine stakeholder access points across energy
storage proceedings at state PUCs in California, Oregon, Nevada, New York, and
Virginia. The second phase of this dissertation’s methodology analyzes interviews with
stakeholders involved in Oregon’s energy storage proceeding. The coding software
NVivo is employed in conjunction with the qualitative approach, thematic analysis (TA),
to examine stakeholders’ perceived influence.
The QCA findings confirmed that the pre-proposal and the comment period were
crucial access points for stakeholder influence. In addition, the QCA findings highlighted
that environmental and clean energy stakeholders will be more influential when there are
more inclusive opportunities. Inclusive access points provide greater opportunities for
stakeholders to gain knowledge, coproduce important documents, and create issue and
network linkages.
The findings from the interview analysis discovered that stakeholders construct
their perceptions of influence based on implicit assessments of an individual’s expertise,
experience, group capacity, group reputation, and network. This dissertation encapsulates
this phenomenon in the model of implicit influence. The model of implicit influence
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explains how an individual’s level of implicit influence can affect how others perceive
them and subsequently, interact with them.
The dual models of access points and implicit influence provide meaningful
contributions to the state regulatory literature and interest group literature regarding
when, why, and to what extent stakeholders can be influential at state PUCs. In addition,
the findings from this dissertation are important to ensuring that environmental and clean
energy groups are being invited to the table and have equal opportunities to shape the
content of PUC proceedings. It is through these institutional changes that environmental
and clean energy groups can begin to advance energy policy that supports climate change
goals.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
The United States is currently the second-largest emitter of carbon dioxide
globally, with 14.69% of the world’s energy-related emissions and emissions from
deforestation (Climate Change Performance Index, 2014). Of particular concern is the
United States’ electric sector, which makes up 40 percent of the country’s total energy
consumption, of which approximately 60 percent comes from natural gas and coal (U.S.
Energy Information Administration, 2020). Emissions from coal and natural gas are
significant contributors to climate change. Coal-fired power plants are the single largest
contributor to man-made carbon dioxide, which has deleterious effects on global
temperatures, the environment, and the population’s health. Given the inextricable link
between rising global temperatures and the severe effects of climate change, the United
States must begin to transition away from fossil fuels and work towards integrating
renewable energy more predominately into its energy resource mix.
While the United States has recommitted to the Paris Agreement, it is far from
being on track to meeting its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction target.
According to a report by the Rhodium Group (2022), emissions in the United States
increased during 2021 by 6.2 percent relative to 2020 (although emissions did remain 5
percent below 2019 levels). The United States’ international GHG commitments are
further undermined by the lack of a viable national climate policy at home.
The United States’ national climate change policy has been at a standstill for well
over a decade. The partisan divide in Congress poses a major barrier to any substantial
climate legislation being enacted at the national level. It does not help the situation that
1

there has been a series of failed national climate bills in Congress over the course of three
decades. Therefore, the United States currently lacks the political will to see a unified,
national climate change policy emerge.
In the absence of any consistent national leadership on renewable energy or
climate change policy, states in the United States have taken the lead in developing
climate and renewable energy policies. Renewable portfolio standard (RPS) programs
have been perceived as a promising renewable energy policy as the cost of renewable
energy sources (i.e., wind and solar) becomes cheaper. As of 2021, 30 states and the
District of Columbia have passed RPS mandates, and many states are presently amending
them to make their targets more ambitious. In 2020, renewable energy in the United
States accounted for 20 percent of the country’s energy generation mix (BCSE, 2021). In
addition, global investment in clean energy transition amounted to $500 billion, of which
the United States invested $85 billion of that global total (BCSE, 2021). Therefore,
despite concerns that COVID-19 would decrease demand for clean energy and renewable
investment, the global trend shows steady growth and optimism.
However, the momentum feeding the current investment in renewable energy
policy in the United States will plateau unless there are concrete innovations in energy
storage technology. Volatility and oversupply problems make renewable energy
generation especially complex and inefficient within the current energy system. For
renewable energy policies to be effective, states need to integrate energy storage plans
with renewable energy policies.
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As of 2021, only nine states (California, Oregon, New York, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Nevada, Virginia, Connecticut, and Maine) have passed renewable energy
storage targets. Table 1.1 shows the energy storage targets of the nine states, their target,
and follow-through mechanisms to meet the target.

Table 1.1 State Energy Storage Targets
State
California
2010 bill
2013 regulation

Target
1,325 MW by 2020
(Target)

Follow-through
Required solicitations,
programmatic support,
progress reporting

Oregon
2015 bill

Minimum 10 MWh, up
to 1% peak load by
2020 (Mandate)
200 MWh by 2020,
1,000 MWh by 2025
(Target)

Legal mandate, utility
plan required, planning
reforms
Target
Utility plan required,
programmatic support

1,500 MW by 2025,
3,000 MW by 2030
(Target)

Progress reporting,
programmatic support

600 MW by 2021,
2,000 MW by 2030
(Goal)
1,000 MW by 2030
(Target)

Goal

Has not established
regulatory proceeding

Target
Utility plan required,
planning reforms

Biennial interim
targets

3,100 MW by 2035
(Mandate)

Legal Mandate
Interim targets

Requirement of at
least 35% procured
from third parties
PUC has not
completed
rulemaking

Massachusetts
2016 bill
2017 regulation
2018 bill
New York
2017 bill
2018 regulation
2019 bill
New Jersey
2018 bill
Nevada
2017 bill
2020 regulation
Virginia
2020 bill
2020 regulation
Connecticut
2021 bill

Others
Carve-outs by
segment (Tx
connected, Dxconnected).

Denotes target in
MWh

300 MW by 2024, 650
Legal Mandate
MW by 2027, 1,000
MW by 2030
(Mandate)
Maine
300 MW by 2025, 400
Legal Mandate
PUC has not
2021 bill
MW through 2030
completed
(Mandate)
rulemaking
Source: Modified from Burwen, Jason. (April, 24 2020). “Energy Storage Goals, Targets, Mandates. What’s
the Difference?” Energy Storage Association.
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It should be noted that only six of those states have implemented their storage
targets. New Jersey, Connecticut, and Maine successfully passed energy storage
legislation, but they have not started their regulatory process to date. It is only a matter of
time before other states begin to follow suit with legislative mandates for energy storage.
Yet it is essential to examine how and why specific energy storage rules and regulations
are created, given that energy storage is at the heart of a thriving renewable energy
market. One can see the differences among state energy storage policies by looking at the
distinction among their targets, goals, and mandates. On the less stringent side of the
spectrum is a goal, which “is a number without defined accountability” (Burwen, 2020).
In the middle of the spectrum is a target, which is a goal that possesses measures to
follow through (Burwen, 2020). The most stringent on the spectrum is a mandate, which
is a goal that possesses legal liability if not followed through (Burwen, 2020). These three
types of policies evoke important features such as transparency, accountability, learning,
flexibility, and monitoring.
While the legislation for renewable energy storage in the nine states has been
highlighted for its innovativeness, the most substantive component of the policy process
occurs during the regulatory stage, in which regulatory agencies implement, prescribe,
and interpret rules through proceedings such as rulemakings (Kerwin and Furlong, 2011).
In the case of energy storage rulemakings, state regulatory agencies (such as public utility
commissions) set specific targets and rules to meet the authorizing statute. Kerwin and
Furlong (2011, p. 7-8) highlight that “statutes provide the legal authority for rules and the
various processes by which they are made. Rules provide the technical detail so often
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missing in statutes, and rulemaking brings a capacity for adaptation to changing
circumstances that the letter of the law alone lack”. It is important to note that any rules
from the rulemaking process carry the force of the law (Cooper, 2006). The rulemaking
process in every state is slightly different, depending upon a state’s version of the
Administrative Procedure Act, the authorizing statute of the rulemaking, the
administrative agency handling the rulemaking, the current issue at hand, and state
policymaking structures. Thus, the scope and the content of a rulemaking can vary from
state to state.
It is also important to highlight that the rulemaking stage is the stage in the policy
process in which there are more significant opportunities for public participation due to
procedural rules that allow open participation and comment on the rule setting by any
individual or group. While participation rates during the rulemaking process vary
according to issue and level of government, organized interest groups perceive the
rulemaking stage as being just as critical of a stage in the policy process as the legislative
stage (Furlong and Kerwin 2004). The rulemaking process offers individuals and interest
groups a unique opportunity to participate and influence the final rules.
Much of the bulk of renewable energy policy has been funneled through state
public utility commissions (PUCs). State public utility commissions have traditionally
been responsible for overseeing energy, telecommunications, and water policy. However,
with the increase of state renewable energy policy, PUCs are entering new policy
domains that do not always match up well with their traditional economic spheres of
authority and jurisdiction.
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Tangentially to the new roles that PUCs have encountered with renewable energy,
PUCs are also seeking to institute more participatory mechanisms to combat the scars left
from years of scandal and corruption. However, it is unclear whether these participation
mechanisms effectively provide non-industry groups with more significant opportunities
to engage in the process actively.
The literature across multiple disciplines has noted the overwhelming influence of
business and industry in regulatory proceedings (Golden, 1998; Carley, 2009; Laird and
Stefes, 2009; Wiener and Koontz, 2010; Lyon and Yin, 2010). Industry groups are
defined as regulated entities (Crow et al., 2016). Industry groups are typically utility
companies and trade groups. In contrast, non-industry groups are defined as being
unregulated organizations and groups. Types of non-industry groups include
environmental groups, clean energy groups, advocacy groups, and citizen groups.
However, few studies have sought to examine the role of non-industry groups during the
state rulemaking process regarding their level of participation and ability to influence the
outcome of the rules. Non-industry groups possess diverse interests in the energy field.
Environmental groups are an especially underrepresented stakeholder during PUC
proceedings. Until the past decade, most state PUC proceedings were centered around
utility regulation and policy. However, the development of state renewable and clean
energy policy has altered the scope at state PUCs to the extent that electric and gas
regulation has significant environmental implications. Therefore, some environmental
groups have begun to seek a greater role at their state PUCs.
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While participation is not a unique challenge just to PUCs, PUCs traditionally
have high barriers to participation due to the technical and legal nature of their
proceedings. Many participants are not used to the legal nature of PUC rulemakings,
which makes it difficult for them to engage in PUC proceedings effectively. The process
is so intensive that industry stakeholders often hire attorneys to represent them at the
PUCs. This is a critical barrier to many environmental and clean energy interest groups
with scarce resources and staff. Many PUCs are working to break down barriers for
participation, so it is essential to examine whether these efforts have been effective and, if
they have not been, what are the factors that continue to hinder diverse participation.
Based on the lack of knowledge of environmental and clean energy interest group
participation and influence at PUCs, this study seeks to answer two interrelated questions.
First, what participation mechanisms at public utility commissions led to greater levels of
influence among environmental and clean energy groups? Second, what effect do the
social dynamics among stakeholder groups have on shaping a stakeholder’s ability to
influence the process and outcome? This dissertation argues that participatory and
inclusive mechanisms throughout the PUC stakeholder process will provide distinct
access points for environmental interest groups, which will shape their ability to
influence the rulemaking process and shape their behaviors towards other stakeholders.
These participatory and inclusive mechanisms directly effect on the ability of
stakeholders to engage and influence the rulemaking process, the tactics interest groups
employ to influence the process, the range of stakeholders involved in the process, and
opportunities for collaboration (or conflict) throughout the process.
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This study is unique for several reasons. First, this study takes a more focused
examination of the roles and influence of environmental and clean energy groups in
renewable energy policy than previous literature. The renewable energy policy literature
has largely overlooked the role of environmental interest groups in shaping policy
(Matisoff, 2008; Lyon and Yin, 2010; Carley, 2011; Carley and Miller, 2012; Berry,
Laird, and Stefes, 2015). In addition, while the literature acknowledges the critical role
that interest groups can exert during the policy process, it has been unable to draw
definitive conclusions about their actual influence over policy outcomes. This lack of
empirical knowledge is especially apparent at the state level. Little is known about
interest groups' actions and influence in state policymaking processes.
Second, this study is critical because it contributes to the greater theoretical and
empirical knowledge of PUCs. The interest group and renewable energy literatures have
largely overlooked the regulatory phase. The interest group and renewable energy
literatures have focused primarily on the policy adoption stage (Matisoff, 2008; Carley,
2009; Laird and Stefes, 2009; Wiener and Koontz, 2010; Lyon and Yin, 2010; Carley and
Miller, 2012; Berry, Larid, and Stefes 2015). In addition, there have been few studies on
state rulemaking but much less on stakeholder participation and influence at PUCs
(Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz, 2014; Roundtree and Baldwin, 2018; Crow, Albright, and
Koebele, 2016, 2020).
Finally, this study is essential to the climate change literature because energy
policy is at the core of any substantial mitigation policy. States need to transition from
fossil fuels if they want to lower their GHG emissions. State renewable energy policy is
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particularly important in the current environment, given the dramatic shifts in climate and
weather that we have witnessed in the past decade. In addition, given the lack of stringent
climate change policies (i.e., carbon pricing) at either the national or subnational level,
renewable energy policy is the next best solution to addressing climate change policy
goals of decarbonizing the economy and diversifying the national energy resource mix
with cleaner energy sources and practices.
This study seeks to bridge the theoretical and empirical gaps within the interest
group, rulemaking, and renewable energy literatures. The following section shows a
genuine need for clean energy storage innovations at the global, federal, and subnational
levels. Therefore, it is important to examine how the rules and regulations for energy
storage are created to understand how to best structure and plan the next wave of
renewable energy integration into the current energy system.

Outline of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2, I provide the background on the current state of energy storage
policy in the United States and how energy storage can mitigate many of the issues that
the energy sector is facing. I discuss the benefits and barriers to integrating energy
storage into the current electrical grid.
Chapter 3 reviews the renewable energy and the interest group literatures. I also
examine the importance of the rulemaking process and the increasing importance of
participation at state public utility commissions. This chapter shows that there is a
significant gap across the literatures regarding state studies on non-industry stakeholders.
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Few studies have examined environmental and clean energy stakeholders’ influence at
state PUCs. Chapter 4 develops this dissertation’s theoretical framework. Two models of
influence are presented: a model on stakeholder access points and influence and a model
on stakeholder perceived influence.
Chapter 5 takes time to explain the two methodologies that I utilize in this
dissertation. The first methodology is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). A
discussion of QCA as a research approach and QCA as an analytical technique is
presented. The chapter details the steps necessary for the QCA approach and how the
data was employed across those steps. The second phase of the dissertation is based on an
analysis of stakeholder interviews. A version of thematic analysis (TA) is used to
examine themes across stakeholder interviews that were conducted with eleven
stakeholders in Oregon.
In Chapter 6, the QCA results of the study and a review of the cross-case and
within-case conclusions from the QCA analysis are presented. These results are then
applied from the truth table to the state cases.
Chapter 7 compares the cases of Oregon and Nevada, which had similar processes
and similar outcomes for environmental and clean energy stakeholders. The energy
storage proceedings in these states only attracted a small number of stakeholders.
However, the stakeholders were subsequently able to come together to experience a
collaborative and deliberative process that resulted in consensus much of the time.
Chapter 8 takes a more in-depth examination of the background, stakeholders, and
process of the energy storage rulemakings in California and New York. These two cases
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are interesting because they have similar contexts and backgrounds, but the rulemaking
process in each state was very different for stakeholders. California’s rulemaking
provided inclusive and participatory opportunities for its stakeholders, while New York’s
rulemaking only provided participatory opportunities. Chapter 9 rounds out the state case
summaries and examines Virginia’s rulemaking. The Virginia energy storage rulemaking
had minimal participatory and no inclusive features, which resulted in a disappointing
stakeholder process. The chapter concludes by reviewing the important cross-case and
within-case implications for future energy storage rulemakings.
Chapter 10 examines how perceptions of influence can shape stakeholder
relationships and interactions with one another. Using interview data from key
stakeholders in Oregon, I generate a model of implicit influence to explain how
individuals construct their perceptions of influence for one another.
The Conclusion reviews the key findings from this dissertation and examines the
theoretical and policy implications. There is also a discussion on how the findings from
this dissertation can apply to future research. The chapter ends with an address of the
initial concerns of this dissertation: how environmental stakeholders can meet climate
change policy goals while participating at state PUCs.
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Chapter 2 Background: Energy Policy and Energy Storage
Introduction
The United States’ electrical grid is a network of varying levels of authority
across multiple jurisdictions. There are still many barriers to integrating energy storage
into this network despite the immense growth the energy storage industry has seen in the
past decade. At the beginning of this chapter, I provide a basic overview of the various
energy jurisdictions and how energy storage fits within this complicated network of
jurisdictions and authorities. I then explore energy storage’s potential to meet many of the
country’s grid and environmental concerns. Finally, this chapter addresses how energy
storage policy is a bridge to decarbonizing our world and an integral pathway to
mitigating climate change.

Balancing Multiple Levels of Authority and Jurisdictions to Overcome Barriers to
Energy Storage
Regulating Electrical Supply and Demand
At the basic level, the country’s electrical grid is composed of a complex web of
infrastructure relating to electric generation, transmission, and distribution. This trinity
ensures that customers receive electricity on demand: the power plant generates
electricity, the transmission lines carry electricity to transformers which then distribute
electricity to residential and commercial customers. What seems like a simple dynamic of
supply and demand becomes increasingly complex as different sources of energy
generation enter into the mix, transmission lines zigzag throughout and over state
12

boundaries, and customer social patterns change the daily demand for electricity. Yet, for
the purposes of this discussion, Figure 2.1 simplifies the nature of electrical supply and
demand.

Figure 2.1 Electricity Generation, Transmission, and Distribution

Source: National Energy Education Development Project (public domain)

The U.S. electric grid is divided into three interconnection regions. Each
interconnection connects thousands of power plants and millions of miles of power line
(high and low voltage) into a consolidated electric network. The purpose of these three
interconnection regions is for reliability and commercial purposes. There are three
interconnection regions in the lower 48 states: the Eastern Interconnection (Eastern), the
Western Interconnection (Western), and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT). These three interconnections operate independently, with little electric powersharing among them. The three interconnections are structured to help maintain the
power system by providing multiple routes for power to flow over the region and for
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power-sharing among generators to ensure that there is not a break in service should there
be any transmission or power plant failures.
Balancing authorities (BAs) operate the electric system within these three
interconnections. There are 66 balancing authorities responsible for maintaining the
balance of electricity within its jurisdiction. Often balancing authorities are utilities that
have taken on the responsibility of ensuring the supply and demand balance within their
operating area. Figure 2.2 depicts the various ISOs/RTOs and balancing authorities that
work to ensure the balance of electricity on a daily basis.

Figure 2.2 U.S. Electric Grid Interconnections, Balancing Authorities, and ISOs/RTOs
Western Interconnection
Eastern Interconnection

ERCOT
Interconnection
Source: Modified from the U.S. Energy Information Agency’s “Hourly Electric Grid Monitor”. (11/3/2021,
7 p.m. EDT.) US EIA.
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/gridmonitor/dashboard/electric_overview/US48/US48

14

In addition to balancing authorities, there are nine independent system operators
(ISOs) and regional transmission operators (RTOs) in North America that also ensure the
operation and reliability of the grid: California ISO, Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(ERCOT), Southwest Power Pool (SPP), Midcontinent ISO (MISO), PJM, New York
ISO (NYISO), New England ISO (ISO-NE), Alberta System Operator, and the Electricity
System Operator (IESO). States such as Virginia, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Maine, and
Connecticut are part of regional markets. Unlike the eastern states, the western states do
not have an RTO. California runs its own ISO, California Independent System Operator
(CAISO). In recent years, though, CAISO has operated the Energy Imbalance Market
(EIM), which has brought western state energy policy together more.
The operation of ensuring the supply and demand of electricity is complex. There
are many federal, regional, and state entities that work to supply electricity to customers
while keeping the grid balanced. However, as the next section highlights, there is just as
an intricate network of entities managing the sale of electricity, too.

Electricity Markets
Throughout most of the 20th century, electric utilities had a monopoly over the
grid: the utilities owned and oversaw the generation, transmission, and distribution of
electricity. This traditional electric model is known as being vertically integrated. It was
not until the late 1980s and 1990s that many states deregulated their electric and gas
sectors, which has had a sustained impact on state and federal energy policy.
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In deregulated states, electric customers have the option to choose their electric
supplier (customer choice), thereby creating competition in retail electricity prices among
utilities. California1, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and
Virginia are deregulated states. In a customer choice, competitive market, utilities do not
have monopolies over the electric system and must procure power from other generation
sites. Since utilities do not have a monopoly on the generation side of the electric system,
RTOs or ISOs were created to replace utilities as the grid operators and eventually the
operators of wholesale markets for electricity. In regional markets such as PJM and ISO
NE, the market operator is responsible for generation and transmission competencies,
leaving utilities only responsible for electric distribution.
In contrast, many southern and western states such as Nevada remain vertically
integrated. In vertically integrated regulatory systems, utilities have ownership and
operational control over all three elements of the electric system: generation,
transmission, and distribution. Utilities, therefore, have greater discretion to decide the
structures and operations of their energy systems. In vertically integrated states,
customers do not have a choice in where their energy comes from, which becomes an
important issue when subsets of the population are seeking cheaper electrical prices or
cleaner energy sources. PUCs continue to regulate generation, transmission, and
distribution to customers in vertically integrated states.

1

It should be noted that California’s notorious foray into deregulation in the early 2000s greatly impacted
its electricity deregulation in the subsequent years. California’s electric sector is not completely
deregulated, but has been “deregulated” in a piecemeal fashion through specific policies and regulations.
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Oregon has a hybrid market structure, in which utilities maintain a vertically
integrated monopoly structure for residential customers. Still, some commercial and
industrial customers may directly procure electricity from other competitive sources.
Regulatory agencies such as the Oregon Public Utilities Commission (OPUC) have some
authority to ensure that utilities follow the rules and regulations and ensure that utility
consumers are protected from unfair practices.
In addition to PUCs, there are multiple entities involved in regulating energy
policy at the federal and state levels. At the federal level, there is the Federal Energy
Regulation Commission (FERC). FERC is an independent agency that regulates the
interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil. At the state level are PUCs.
FERC derives its legal authority from the Federal Power Act, which directs the
agency to ensure wholesale rates are “just and reasonable” and not “unduly
discriminatory or preferential.” It is important to stress that FERC only regulates
wholesale electricity transactions and electricity transmission that cross state lines. In the
case of Texas, the state intentionally sought to avoid FERC regulation by containing all
transmissions lines within its state boundaries.
In 2006, FERC delegated authority to the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) to develop and enforce reliability standards of the grid by
monitoring the bulk electric system, assessing the future adequacy of the grid, auditing
owners and operators of the grid. In turn, FERC approves these standards and plans.
NERC oversees seven Reliability Entities and 16 Reliability Coordinators to meet its
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mission.2 These electric reliability organizations set mandatory reliability standards for
planning and operating power systems for grid operators. In addition, these reliability
organizations ensure that grid operators are monitoring the security concerns of critical
electrical infrastructure. Table 2.1 shows the different jurisdictions and authorities that
FERC oversees in contrast to state PUCs.

Table 2.1 FERC and State PUC Jurisdictions and Authorities
FERC
•

•

State PUCs
•

Regulation of rates and services for electric

Regulates investor-owned utilities to

transmission in interstate commerce

ensure they offer safe and reliable energy

Regulation of wholesale power sales in interstate

at reasonable rates
•

commerce

Regulates the distribution and sale of

•

Sets reliability standards for the bulk power system

•

Certification and decertification of “qualifying

•

Regulate utility rate design

facilities” (QFs) and oversight of QF-utility

•

Approves siting and construction electric

retail electricity to consumers

dealings.
•

Hydroelectric dam licensing and safety

•

Reviews certain mergers and acquisitions and

generation facilities
•

Approves construction of new
transmission lines

corporate transactions by electricity companies
•

Monitors and investigates energy markets

The complexities of state and federal electricity markets create distinct
implications for energy storage across these varying jurisdictions. As the next section

2

Some of the major NERC regions include Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC), Midwest
Reliability Organization (MRO), Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC), Reliability First
Corporation (RFC), SERC Reliability Corp. (SERC), Southwest Power Pool (SPP), Texas Reliability
Entity (TRE), and Wester Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC).
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shows, some regions and states have overcome key barriers to energy storage, but there is
still much to be done at the regional and state levels.

Benefits of Battery Energy Storage
While energy storage is often associated with renewable energy technologies such
as wind and solar, it is important to note that the most prevalent source of energy storage
is battery energy storage, which is not a renewable energy source: battery energy storage
a distributed energy resource (DER). DERs are small-scale energy generation or storage
technologies that are easily deployable, modular, and are usually only able to produce a
maximum of 10 megawatts (MW) of power (NREL, 2021). Examples of DER
technologies include wind turbines, photovoltaics (PV), fuel cells, microturbines,
reciprocating engines, and energy storage systems. This dissertation will refer to battery
energy storage as energy storage interchangeably unless it is discussing another type of
energy storage such as pumped hydro energy storage or fly wheel energy storage.
While energy storage is a nascent technology to the traditional electric grid, there
are many significant benefits of energy storage to the electric grid regarding generation,
transmission, and distribution. At the generation level, energy storage can store energy
during periods of low demand and then deploy it during periods of high demand.
This is especially important in renewable energy systems with storage. Renewable
energy such as solar and wind are intermittent resources, often producing large quantities
of energy during specific times of the day or in the season, but are not always easily
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deployed during peak demand times (e.g., in the evening after people come home from
work). Figure 2.3 illustrates battery energy storage’s wide range of services and uses.

Figure 2.3 Services Batteries Can Provide to Three Stakeholder Groups

Source: Fitzgerald, Garrett, James Mandel, Jesse Morris, Hervé Touati. (2015). “The Economics of Battery
Energy Storage”. Rocky Mountain Institute.

Energy storage can improve grid reliability by managing power flows when
energy storage is deployed at the transmission levels (Andersen et al., 2021). Storage as
transmission (SAT) involves an energy storage system being integrated into transmission
equipment, which can inject or absorb electricity to facilitate power flows during heavy
usage periods (Thomas, 2020). Many liken it to adding a lane to a highway for rush hour
traffic. Integrating storage on the transmission side saves utilities from building new
transmission projects and, therefore, quite a bit of money. Essentially, SAT offers
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congestion relief to the grid when there is insufficient transmission line capacity to
deliver electricity (Thomas, 2020). This can lower generation costs and increase system
reliability.
In general, energy storage benefits provide greater flexibility and scalability than
traditional energy resources. Most energy storage technologies can switch between
charging or discharging electricity quickly. In addition, many energy storage technologies
are scalable, in which they can be ramped up to meet the demand of many customers or
scaled down to meet the demands of a single customer (Thomas, 2020). Integrating
energy storage into the electric system this way mitigates energy congestion and voids
the need for increasing dirty natural gas peaker plants to meet load fluctuations
(Andersen, 2019).
Speaking to just the distribution side, weather is the primary disruption to
distribution services. Weather is attributed as the leading cause of failures and damages to
distribution power lines. Weather, especially severe weather events from climate change,
cause the downing of many trees and branches, which damage distribution power lines
and equipment. As hurricanes and storms become stronger, the damage to the distribution
side of the power grid becomes more extensive, which makes it harder for powerlines to
be repaired quickly on a massive scale.
Behind the meter energy storage can be a resilient resource for homeowners. The
sale of residential solar and storage systems jumped in states such as California, which
have experienced massive power outages and grid failures in recent years due to wildfires
and extreme weather (Stevens, 2021). In addition, energy storage is a smart resource for
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communities that have the capacity to install and run microgrids. Rural communities
would benefit the most from microgrids, as their power services are likely the last to
come back online when there are severe weather events.
Despite the many benefits of storage, energy storage continues to face many
institutional barriers that prevent it from being widely integrated on a larger scale. As the
next section highlights, many of these barriers to energy storage stem from the
inflexibility of the traditional grid.

Barriers to Energy Storage
There are four systemic barriers to energy storage: system resource planning,
transmission planning, distribution planning, and market operations (Andersen et al.,
2021). These barriers can vary based on the state and the region.
First, integrating energy storage systems into a state’s grid can be complicated
when their value is undefined. In states that are not part of a competitive market, utilities
utilize integrated resource plans (IRPs) to create long-term forecasts of what types of
energy sources they will need to deploy and invest in to meet customer demands.
Generally, energy planners analyze the electrical system on an hourly basis, given that
there are major fluctuations in renewable sources throughout the day and that demand
peaks at certain points in a day and seasonally. Thus, the traditional hourly IRP model is
unable to properly value energy storage given that at the front of the meter, it can be
deployed rapidly when necessary. However, when energy supply is behind the meter and
at the demand of individual customers, it is difficult to quantify or rely upon. Therefore, it
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can be difficult to forecast a long-term plan to balance the electrical grid with these
changing patterns of customer and utility use.
Second, there are no clear guidelines for how energy storage should be integrated
into the interstate transmission system. Federal regulation requires that utilities who own
interstate transmissions systems conduct regional transmission planning to identify
potential opportunities for regional projects that would be beneficial for all jurisdictions
involved. Yet, when it comes to energy storage and other demand response resources,
FERC’s directive is unclear, as it does not provide specific guidelines as to how energy
storage can “fit” into transmission planning, much less regional transmission planning
(Andersen et al., 2021).
Third, the distribution of energy storage is complicated when one considers front
of the meter (usually utility or third-party owned) in junction with behind the meter
(customer-owned). While there is not a specific answer as to how to overcome these
challenges to meet load growth with DERs, the National Association of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners (NARUC) and the National Association of State Energy Officials
(NASEO) released the “Blueprint for State Action” to aid states in aligning aging
electricity planning processes with newer distributive energy policies and technologies
(Andersen et al., 2021).
Finally, integrating energy storage into the larger electrical market is incredibly
complicated when it is introduced into regional energy markets. Traditionally, the market
structures supporting regional RTOs and ISOs were served by large, centrally located
generators. Therefore, it is difficult for energy markets and operators to address the
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inclusion of smaller, variable, and more flexible resources such as energy storage that can
provide dual services of “load” and supply. Energy system operators shape the ability of
states to implement RPS effectively and efficiently and energy storage policy. For
example, PJM controls a large region, making it challenging to implement a uniform
energy storage policy across many states. In contrast, California and New York run their
own state ISOs, which makes coordination easier.
In a bold move to resolve the incongruencies across different jurisdictions, FERC
issued Order 841 (2018), which required regional markets to remove barriers to energy
storage and find ways to value energy storage within the system properly. In addition,
FERC Order 2222 (2020) leveled the playing field for energy storage systems by
requiring that energy storage located in front of or behind the meter be allowed to
compete alongside traditional energy resources in the regional electricity markets. These
are important steps at the federal level to ensure the standardization of energy storage
across state lines. A clear national energy storage policy is essential to a successful
integration of energy storage at all levels of the energy system.
At the heart of these barriers to energy storage is the difficulty of integrating a
multifunctional energy asset into an antiquated and rigid electric grid. The traditional
electricity grid and markets do not have the appropriate tools to value and deploy energy
storage to its full potential. Despite these barriers, there are many opportunities for
energy storage that extend beyond being a flexible source of energy deployment and
storage. Energy storage has the potential not only to be a bridge to mitigate climate
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change but also to be considered a flexible and resilient asset to secure the electric grid
from severe weather events caused by climate change.

Opportunities for Energy Storage
States are in a prime position to meet the challenges of decarbonizing and
diversifying their energy policies to meet the demands of mitigating the effects of climate
change. First, states have sole jurisdiction over the retail sales, generation siting, and fuel
choice of state energy sources. The federal government only has authority with regard to
interstate transmission and wholesale sales. Second, states are considered “laboratories of
democracy,” in which they are better suited to develop smaller-scale policies that meet
local conditions and needs (Carley, 2011). This is critical for energy policy, given that
each state faces different contexts and environments in developing renewable energy
sources. States are therefore able to craft energy policies that are economically,
politically, and environmentally feasible for them.
Carley (2011) highlights that states possess many promising energy policy tools,
which seek to diversify, decentralize, and decarbonize the electricity sector: renewable
portfolio standards (RPS), net metering, interconnection standards, tax incentives, and
public benefit funds (PBFs). While each energy policy tool has its advantages and
disadvantages, RPS programs have been perceived to be the most promising policy
instrument for renewable energy given that they are politically popular with little costs
(Carley, 2011). The majority of the cost burden is placed upon utilities, who carry over
the cost to consumers (Carley, 2011). RPS programs require that utilities meet a
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mandated percentage of generation or sales that come from renewable energy sources. As
of 2021, 30 states and the District of Columbia have passed RPS mandates, and many
states are amending them to make their goals more ambitious.
However, previous renewable energy literature has questioned the stringency of
states’ RPS commitments and their effectiveness at reducing greenhouse gases,
transitioning away from fossil fuel sources, and reducing energy demand (Carley 2009;
2011; Carley and Miller, 2012; Berry, Laird, and Stefes, 2015). Carley (2009; 2011)
notes that while states have met their RPS targets and have increased in-state renewable
energy generation, they have been less successful in significantly increasing renewable
energy percentage growth relative to the total state generation portfolio. RPS policy can
only be driven to a certain point before the incentives for further renewable energy
development plateau. Therefore, innovative energy storage policies must further
incentivize states with RPS targets and ambitions. Winfield et al. (2018, p. 573) notes that
complementary developments in renewable energy technologies, smart grids, and energy
storage will be able to “make better use of renewable, low carbon energy sources; be
more reliable and resilient through expanded roles for distributed and technologically
diverse energy sources; have improved ability to adapt to changing circumstances and
needs; and have the potential to offer more control to consumers.”
Energy storage is essential for renewable energy programs such as RPS given
problems of variability and oversupply with renewable energy sources such as wind,
solar, and hydropower. First, solar and wind energy often is in conflict with natural
climate and weather patterns. For example, in the Pacific Northwest, the problem with
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wind generation is its variability. Wind generation tracks poorly with seasonal load. Wind
peaks during months and hours when demand is already low (e.g., winter months and
during the morning and evening). Lazar (2016) highlights the difficulty of renewables
meeting peak seasonal and hourly energy loads (see Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4 California’s Duck Curve

Source: California Independent System Operator (2013)

Lazar describes this situation as the duck curve, in which “as more solar and wind
energy are added to the grid, the “net load” to be serviced from dispatchable resources
(the duck’s belly) sags in the middle of the solar day when solar generation is highest, but
the load to be served in the early evening after the sun goes down continues to grow (the
head) and the transition between the two gets more severe (the neck)” (2016, p. 6).
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Utilities must then rely upon other more reliable sources of energy such as coal or natural
gas during times of variability.
On the flip side of renewable energy development is the issue of oversupply.
Renewable sources such as wind and solar may be variable. Still, during peak periods,
they can produce an oversupply of energy, which can negatively impact their wholesale
cost relative to other forms of energy and cause the curtailment of wind and solar energy
production. The issue of oversupply is less of a concern presently, as it primarily affects a
small number of states (i.e., California, Hawaii, and Oregon). However, as renewable
energy generation increases, oversupply challenges may become more prevalent across
the country. Therefore, energy storage policies help bridge the gaps between renewable
energy generation and its variable output by mitigating problems of supply and demand
during high peak periods of energy demand and providing a means to store energy when
demand is low.
Energy storage technologies have been expensive in the past, which has made it
costly and risky for potential investors. Energy storage technologies have multiple
considerations that impact their deployment: energy/power density, lifespan, capital,
operating costs, storage capacity/duration, round trip efficiency, response time, and
technological maturity (Aneke and Wang, 2017). These factors have made it difficult for
energy storage technologies to establish themselves in the renewable energy market. In
addition, a key challenge to deploying energy storage systems is that each type of system
has differing characteristics and capacities, which makes it challenging to employ a
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single system across the board. However, there are emerging opportunities for energy
storage that are making them more economically feasible and more affordable.
There are four primary types of energy storage technologies that are best suited
for large-scale applications: mechanical (flywheel, pumped hydroelectric, and
compressed air), electrochemical (batteries and supercapacitor), chemical (hydrogen and
biofuel), and thermal. Mechanical energy storage such as pumped hydroelectric systems
and compressed air have been the most widely used energy storage technologies. Pumped
hydroelectric energy storage makes up approximately 99% of the global large-scale
energy storage installation (Aneke and Wang, 2016). Pumped hydroelectric stores extra
electrical energy by pumping water into upper reservoirs when it is not needed; when the
energy is needed, the water is then released to lower reservoirs which then drives a
generator to produce electricity. Pumped hydroelectric storage has relatively high
efficiency (65-85%) and can be reliably delivered in a short amount of time (Aneke and
Wang, 2016).
However, there are new developments in electrochemical systems such as
batteries (e.g., flow, lithium-ion, NaS), which have recently made these types of systems
appealing on a mass-scale, albeit on a smaller scale than hydroelectric storage. In
addition, the cost of batteries has gone down dramatically in recent years (especially with
regards to lithium-ion batteries), making them more cost-efficient and less of a financial
risk for investors. Battery storage is advantageous because it is “pollution free-operation,
high trip efficiency, flexible power and energy characteristics to meet grid functions, long
cycle life, and low maintenance” (Dunn, Kamath, and Tarascon 2011, p. 928). The
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innovations in battery storage have recently helped build up renewed interest in
renewable energy storage policy, particularly regarding their utility for electric vehicles
and use in remote areas. Battery storage has been further popularized by significant
investments by companies such as Tesla, which has been behind the development of
battery packs. A pivotal moment for the battery industry was when the California Public
Utilities Commission approved a plan by PG&E in November 2018 in which three
retiring gas plants would be replaced by energy storage (Bade, 2018). Battery storage is
no longer a theoretical concept. It has gained a tangible space in states’ energy resource
planning. As Figure 2.5 shows, the spread of large-scale battery storage installations in
the United States has begun to take on a more significant presence in many of the regions
in the country.

Figure 2.5 U.S. Large Scale Battery Storage Capacity by Region

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-860M, Preliminary Monthly Electric
Generator Inventory; U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-860, Annual Electric Generator
Report.
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CAISO and PJM have especially attracted the most large-scale battery systems in
recent years due to their favorable market rules for energy storage. However, it is
important to note that even though energy storage systems such as battery storage have
gained support and popularity over the past few years, they still are just a tiny percentage
of the total energy mix in the United States. Therefore, energy storage mandates are an
essential tool for stimulating the infant energy storage trends we are witnessing in the
present.
At the federal level, FERC passed Order 841 in 2018, “Electric Storage
Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and
Independent System Operators (ISOs).” Order 841 has the potential to create new
opportunities for renewable energy storage within RTO and ISO markets. The Order
requires RTOs and ISOS to include participation models that encourage the integration of
electric storage resources into the system. The FERC’s findings noted that electric
storage resources are disproportionately disadvantaged. Most markets are designed for
traditional resources, which has implications for tariff rates and how energy storage
systems are deployed to meet energy system needs (or not). Therefore, FERC’s Order
841 will help even the playing field for the emergence of competitive energy storage
projects. It should be noted that increased market access through Order 841 would not
necessarily lead to more energy storage projects. Yet, given the multi-utility of energy
storage systems, many investors and even utilities are open to integrating them into the
current grid to increase grid resiliency and flexibility while maintaining costs.
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At the state level, while there are only nine states with energy storage mandates,
there is an increasing amount of state activity, ranging from exploratory studies and
investigations on energy storage to the installation of energy storage sites. Other states
like Colorado are continuing to work to pass energy storage legislation. In addition, there
is a strong movement in other states to implement energy storage policy even without
state-mandated energy storage targets. States such as Arizona are pursuing energy storage
policies through less stringent measures, such as clean energy initiatives and aspirational
targets. As Figure 2.6 displays, there are many different types of state actions on energy
storage currently going on across the United States, which is only feeding the momentum
for energy storage.

Figure 2.6 State Energy Storage Actions in 2021

Source: North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center. (July 2021). “The 50 States of Grid
Modernization: 2021 Review and Q2 2021 Quarterly Report”.
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It is important to note that even though there is an increased amount of activity
around energy storage in the United States, legislative mandates for energy storage are
considered the most stringent and effective policy tools for integrating energy storage
into state and regional energy systems. There are market-based energy storage initiatives
and projects that hold much promise to spread the installation of energy storage.
However, their deployment of energy storage on a larger scale is not guaranteed, given
that there is little incentive or coercion to make energy storage a priority. It is among
these reasons why the focus of this study is purely concentrated on legislatively mandated
energy storage policy rather than all types of energy storage policy.
Figure 2.7 shows, global investments in energy storage have risen dramatically.

Figure 2.7 Global Investment in Energy Storage by Region

Source: BloombergNEF “Energy Transition Investment Trends: Tracking global investment in the lowcarbon energy transition”. Bloomberg NEF.
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Given the growing support for energy storage, it is likely that battery storage will
only continue to become more mainstream and integrated into current energy systems
within the United States and even globally. In 2020, The United States saw an increase in
investment of $1.2 billion towards energy storage projects (BloombergNEF, 2021).
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the Americas saw record investment in energy storage
at a rate of $1.2 billion (BloombergNEF, 2021). While the Americas (AMER) and AsiaPacific (APAC) began a sustained effort to invest in large energy storage projects around
2015, Europe is making strides in EMEA (Europe, the Middle East, and Africa). While
energy storage investment went down in 2020 in Europe, investment in renewables rose
by 67 percent (BloombergNEF, 2021). The rise in renewables will likely be matched by
similar investment rates in energy storage.
However, while there is a clean energy technology and access gap between
developed and developing countries, there have been some significant investments to
ensure greater equity among the world’s regions. The World Bank pledged $1 billion in
September 2018 towards energy storage deployment for developing and middle-income
countries. The World Bank President Jim Yong Kim noted that the development of
energy storage in remote communities would be a major game-changer, allowing lowerincome countries to “leapfrog to the next generation technology, expand energy access,
and set the stage for much cleaner, more stable energy systems” (World Bank, 2018). In
addition, the World Bank agreed to finance $465 million towards the Regional Electricity
Access and Battery-Energy Storage Technologies (BEST) Project, which seeks to build
energy storage capacity and grid connections in West Africa. There is a strong drive by
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subnational, national, and global entities to transition towards energy storage systems.
While the motivations for transitioning to energy storage systems vary, their integration
into current electric grids will help continue to decarbonize and diversify the world’s
energy.
Thus, many exciting developments are occurring for renewable energy storage at
state, federal, and global levels. However, it should be noted that despite optimistic
projections, renewable energy and energy storage remain just a tiny percentage of the
overall energy mix compared to fossil fuel sources. There is still much that needs to be
done to ensure that these renewable energy and renewable energy storage policies and
good practices continue to develop across the states to decarbonize and diversify
America’s energy resource mix.

The Political and Economic Feasibility of Energy Policy Instruments for Climate
Change Mitigation
Energy policy in the United States holds many opportunities for mitigating the
effects of climate change. However, previous literature (Nelson, 2008; Rabe, 2008;
Carley, 2011) has noted that energy policy instruments are not climate change
instruments. Carley (2011) notes, “energy policies are less cost-effective for carbon
mitigation because they do not directly address the market failures associated with
climate change, but also because the manner in which they are currently used is fraught
with inefficiencies associated with carbon leakage” (p. 289). Carley (2011) argues that
more cost-effective carbon mitigation policies should place a specific price on carbon,
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which would encourage utilities to find cheaper alternative sources of energy and
immediately shift consumers’ behavior to reduce their use of electricity. The two primary
climate policy instruments are cap-and-trade programs and carbon pricing. However,
optimal climate change policy instruments such as carbon pricing and cap-and-trade
programs are politically and economically unfeasible in the United States currently.3
First, cap-and-trade programs place a cap on the allowable emissions from
participants (e.g., utilities) and allow trading of emission allowances among participants.
During the 2000s, there were several regional cap-and-trade programs in the United
States: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) (10 Northeastern states), the
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA) (6 Midwestern states and one
central Canadian province), and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) (7 Western states
and four provinces in Canada). While states were quick to adopt regional cap-and-trade
programs, many states were also quick to drop them. Rabe (2016) notes that the MGGRA
and the WCI collapsed due to the lack of political resiliency over the long term and the
lack of constituency support. While the RGGI and the state of California (in the fallout of
the WCI) have been successful cases for cap-and-trade, it seems unlikely at the present
moment that other states will attempt for a second time to implement statewide cap-andtrade programs.
As Rabe (2016) highlights, many states lacked the enduring political capacity that
cap-and-trade programs require. In many cases, non-compliant states left the cap-and-

3

Adopted from the feasibility framework in Phillip Cooper and Claudia María Vargas, Implementing
Sustainable Development: From Global Policy to Local Action (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 28.
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trade when there was political turnover (i.e., the governor and their administration that
spearheaded the policy left and was replaced with a successor who opposed it). In
addition, in many of the states, the legislation passed along tight partisan lines, which
highlighted the controversial nature of the cap-and-trade. Therefore, while cap-and-trade
remains an economically feasible option for many states, it currently lacks political
capacity.
Second, carbon pricing faces economic and political challenges. At the state level,
carbon-pricing policies face opposition from industry groups. For example, the state of
Washington attempted to pass a carbon tax ballot measure during the 2018-midterm
elections that would have required industry to pay for their carbon emissions. This ballot
measure faced intense pressure from the fossil fuel industry and failed to pass, receiving
only 44 percent of the vote (Berton, 2018). Therefore, even in environmentally friendly
states, it can be challenging to institute carbon-pricing policies.
In addition, optimal climate change instruments like carbon pricing are
economically unfeasible given the current state of the energy market. 4 While renewable
energy sources have gained a greater share of the energy market in recent years (20
percent in 2020), they remain at a disadvantage to fossil fuel energy sources. While coal’s
command of the national energy mix has dramatically decreased between 2018 and 2020,
it is expected to see new gains beginning in 2021 due to increased oil prices (IEA, 2021).
Gas-fired power plants continue to maintain a firm hold on state energy resource mixes

4

The regional cap-and-trade programs in the United States were implemented during a special policy
window between 2000-2008. As the section above argues, it seems unlikely that states will readopt capand-trade policies in the current political and economic climate.
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(IEA, 2021). Regarding government investment, federal subsidies (i.e., tax expenditures,
direct expenditures, research and development, and DOE loan guarantees) for renewable
energy decreased dramatically from $15 billion in 2013 to $6.7 billion in 2016, a 56
percent decrease (US EIA, 2018b). Some of the reductions in funding were due to the
expiration of certain renewable energy provisions of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The Biden Administration will likely reinstate and
create new federal subsidies for the clean energy sector. However, presently, those
investments have not come to fruition. Therefore, clean energy continues to be at an
economic disadvantage to fossil fuels.
Another reason why it is economically unfeasible for climate policy instruments
to be effective at the federal level in the current economic and political environment is
that the price of fossil fuels remains cheap. Domestic supplies of coal, natural gas, and oil
are abundant and have become easier to extract through processes such as fracking. There
are not enough compelling economic incentives to transition away from a cheap, readily
available source of energy. Therefore, the energy market makes it economically
unfeasible at the present to shift policy towards placing an added economic burden on
decarbonizing the economy.
It is important to recognize that while current DER and clean energy policies
instruments are not optimal for mitigating climate change, they are the most
economically and politically feasible instruments that states possess in light of the
gridlock at the national level. Clean energy’s policy goals to diversify, decarbonize, and
decentralize domestic energy sources are similar policy goals for climate change policies.
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Given that energy is at the core of our economic and social activities, energy policy
should be a natural partnership with climate policy. While market-based instruments such
as carbon pricing monetize social behaviors in hopes of changing behavior (i.e., use less
energy), clean energy policies transform the way society perceives their relationship with
the environment and energy, which is a more enduring strategy to influence social
behaviors. Clean energy policies possess a normative component that can potentially
trump the fluctuating economic incentives of market-based policies.
In addition, recent innovations in DER and clean energy technologies make them
an economically and technically attractive alternative to more stringent carbon reduction
policies. As noted previously, the price for clean energy sources such as wind and solar
have become more affordable in recent years. In addition, the recent innovations in
energy storage have made wind and solar power a more realistic source of energy for the
long term.
From a theoretical and empirical perspective, climate change and clean energy
policies are different and should not be considered interchangeable. However, from a
policymaking perspective, the public and policymakers have inextricably linked the two
as the same. Clean energy policies are perceived to be the panacea for rising emissions in
global climate change even if they have been proven not to be as effective of a policy tool
for lowering carbon emissions as carbon pricing (Nelson, 2008; Carley, 2011).
Policymakers find it easier to champion clean energy policies than carbon pricing
policies. Setting accessible renewable energy targets provides easy reputation benefits for
policymakers with little of the risk or costs associated with imposing stringent carbon
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reduction policies. In addition, carbon-pricing policies are more controversial than
renewable energy policies, as the example of Washington’s failed carbon pricing ballot
measure highlights. There is strong opposition by the fossil fuel industry against carbon
pricing policies, which makes it especially difficult to implement in the current political
environment. Therefore, while it is clear that clean energy policies are not climate
policies, they have become the next best option to mitigate rising levels of GHG
emissions in the face of poor energy and climate change leadership at the national level in
the United States.

Conclusion
This chapter has provided an introductory background on the critical issues and
challenges facing the implementation of renewable energy storage and its overall effect
on climate change policy. While many exciting energy storage developments are
occurring at the state, federal, and international levels, there are still many political and
economic challenges that make it difficult to effectively decarbonize and diversify the
United States’ energy resource mix.
The next chapter examines previous literature on energy storage policy, especially
as it relates to the creation of energy storage rules and regulations at state public utility
commissions.
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Chapter 3 Review of Literature
Introduction
This chapter reviews the previous literature on the stakeholder process at state
public utility commissions during the regulatory stage. There has been a robust
examination of interest groups and regulatory processes at the federal level, but less so at
the state level. There is even less information at the state level on whether interest groups
can influence the regulatory process. This chapter seeks to fill these theoretical and
empirical gaps by examining stakeholder influence throughout the regulatory process.

Overlooking the Regulatory Stage of the Policy Process
The regulatory process has been overlooked across the renewable energy and
interest group literatures. The main bodies of the literatures have primarily examined the
legislative branch. The renewable energy literature has mainly focused on the internal
and external state factors that drive renewable energy policy innovation and diffusion
(Matisoff, 2008; Carley, 2009; Laird and Stefes, 2009; Wiener and Koontz, 2010; Lyon
and Yin, 2010; Carley and Miller, 2012; Berry, Larid, and Stefes 2015). For example,
political ideology, state affluence, and state ideological affinity have been major drivers
of the adoption and diffusion of renewable energy policy (Matisoff, 2008; Lyon and Yin,
2010; Carley and Miller 2012; Yi and Feiock, 2012; Berry, Larid, and Stefes 2015).
However, to this author’s knowledge, the literature has not addressed the importance of
energy storage policy, much less in the context of the regulatory process. This
scholarship deficiency stems from the fact that energy storage legislation is relatively
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new (California was the first to pass an energy storage mandate in 2010), and only nine
other states have passed energy storage legislation in the past decade (although many
state legislatures have considered the issue).
However, the regulatory process is just as important if not more so than the policy
adoption stage given that it produces the substantive part of the policy. It is important to
highlight that much of the regulatory processes produce rules and regulations that carry
the force of the law.
Following the authorizing statute, there are three main types of regulatory cases
that can be employed: non-contested, contested, and rulemakings. Non-contested cases
do not require testimony or briefs by intervenors. Much of the record consists of just
stakeholder comments. The commission relies purely on the record to make
determinations. Contested cases require testimony and briefs. This is the most formal and
legal type of case. In contested cases, the commission does not interact with any of the
stakeholders or staff and makes determinations purely based on the record produced for
them. Rulemakings are considered to be the most flexible type of PUC case and grants
the commission the greatest amount of flexibility to make discretionary decisions.
At the federal level, the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 guides
rulemaking procedures. The APA defines rulemaking as the “agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule” (5 U.S.C. §551(5)). Under section 555(4), the
APA defines a rule as,
mean[ing] the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
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law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of
valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the
foregoing.
Section 553 of the APA describes the rulemaking process. Section 553 was novel at the
time of its creation because it requires that for all significant federal rulemaking
procedures, federal agencies provide: some opportunity for public participation during
the process; clear and advance notice of the contents of the new rule; and a comment
period (Cooper, 2006). At the time, the APA promoted unprecedented opportunities for
participation for external groups and individuals (interest groups and ordinary citizens)
and channels for accountability and credibility for federal agencies. The Model State
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 similarly guides rulemaking at the state level.
The state and federal rulemaking process is unique given its institutional
mechanisms that seek to foster greater public participation, openness, and transparency.
However, these institutional mechanisms are not consistent across states or issues
(Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz, 2014). The institutional mechanisms in the rulemaking process
are context dependent. Often, the institutional mechanisms for rulemaking are first
guided by the state level APA, then the authorizing statute, and finally by the tasked
administrative agency.
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First, each state agency is guided by their state administrative procedures act
(SAPA). Each state’s SAPA has distinct requirements, however, in general, the
requirements for public participation, notification, and stakeholder engagement in state
PUC rulemakings are similar. There are requirements for public notice and public
comment with specific timelines. In addition, many states have implemented greater
access to stakeholders by allowing parties to call in to public meetings. It is important to
note again that the state versions of the APA often vary from one another, although the
core procedures of the rulemaking are often similar to that of the federal rulemaking
process.
Second, the authorizing statute has a great influence in shaping the scope and
purpose of a rulemaking. The authorizing statute can determine the type of rules or
actions that are to be authorized, the timeline for the rulemaking, and resources to be used
throughout the rulemaking. The authorizing statute may also indicate which stakeholders
or agencies must be included in the process. For example, in many energy rulemaking
mandates, the authorizing statute specifically names electrical utilities that must submit
proposals to the state agency.
Finally, agency procedures (administrative procedures and rules), agency culture,
and resources can shape the rulemaking and the ability of interest groups to influence the
overall outcome (West and Raso, 2012; Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2016). Even
though all state regulatory processes are governed by their SAPAs, state regulations for
the rulemaking process differ from state, policy issues, and even across state agencies.
For example, Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz (2014) note very different agency approaches to
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participation in developing fracking rules. In particular, Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz (2014)
highlight that New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation (NY DEC) had a
good history of inclusion during the rulemaking process, upholding New York’s good
government model. The good government model sought greater transparency and
responsiveness by having an “open door policy” and by taking extra consideration into
the public comments submitted to the agency. However, when it came to the issue of
fracking, the NY DEC was notably exclusionary during the pre-proposal stage of the
process due to possible agency resource and capacity problems (Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz,
2014). Therefore, in many instances, regulatory agencies will have some degree of
discretion in determining the procedures that may or may not increase democratic
practices pertaining to legitimacy, accountability, effectiveness, transparency, and
responsiveness (Jewell and Bero, 2007).
Taking a closer look at the process, a rulemaking can be broken down into three
primary stages: (1) the pre-proposal stage, (2) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
and comment period, and (3) the final ruling (Kerwin and Furlong, 2011). There also
instances in which there will be an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM),
which is a formal invitation by the PUC to participate in drafting the proposed rule. The
rulemaking process is important for three reasons. First, the rulemaking process produces
the bulk of rules and regulations. It is estimated that more than 90 percent of American
law stems from administrative rules created by government agencies, not from statutory
law passed by the legislative branch (Warren, 2004). Furlong and Kerwin (2005)
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highlight that many interest groups perceive lobbying during the rulemaking process to
be just as important as lobbying Congress.
Second, rulemaking provides a remarkable opportunity for public participation
that is not provided in any other stage of the policy process. The most popular type of
rulemaking is hybrid rulemaking, which requires the expansion of the following:
notification, the notice and comment period, public participation, and the rulemaking
record (Cooper, 2006). Of particular importance to interest groups is the requirements for
the notice and comment period of the rulemaking process and the expanded efforts to
increase public participation during the notice and comment period. The comment period
allows any group or individual the opportunity to submit their opinion on the rule or
regulation of interest. The participatory structure of the notice and comments period is
beneficial for weakly organized groups that may not possess the resources to effectively
lobby during the legislative process.
The increased rulemaking record further incentivizes the agency to take
meaningful consideration of participants’ comments. The docket’s record requires that
the agency note whether the submitted comment led to a change in the rulemaking or not.
This transparency mechanism holds the agency to be more accountable to the comments
of all participants. However, it should be noted that not all state agencies require
stakeholder comments be addressed in the final record. Nonetheless, the record is
invaluable documentation of stakeholder comments and actions.
In addition, increased participation by a diverse range of external actors is likely
to provide a greater range of information for the agency to utilize to determine the rules
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(Woods, 2009). However, it should be noted that there are often disparities in group
participation and openness even though the rulemaking process possess structural
elements to promote these objectives. Of particular importance to the structure of the
rulemaking process are the requirements from its authorizing statute (Cooper, 2006). The
statute will indicate the timeline and scope of the rulemaking process. In the case of state
energy storage polices, the authorizing statute can provide strict requirements that have
tight deadlines and specific targets; or it can provide a loose structure, in which it
requests the regulatory agency to research the feasibility of the policy over a period of
years and report back to the state legislature.
Finally, the rulemaking process provides multiple opportunities for participants to
directly influence the content of the rules. While the notice and comment period is
structured as the key mechanism for influencing the content of the rules, the pre-proposal
and the ANPRM stages also provide interest groups opportunities to shape the content of
the rules. For example, Yackee (2011; 2015) highlights the importance of lobbying
during the pre-proposal stage in which the draft rule is initially created. During the preproposal stage, the leading agency may decide to create an advisory group in which they
invite outside groups to lend their expertise and information in the drafting of the rule. It
is important to highlight, though, that not all rulemakings will include a ANPRM and that
the pre-proposal stage is not always open to all stakeholders.
In some situations, the authorizing statute mandates the participation of specific
groups from the beginning. For example, in Oregon’s energy storage mandate, the statute
mandated that Portland General Electric and PacifiCorp to provide specific proposals that
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would meet the required minimum of 5 MWh of energy storage in service by January 1,
2020. Therefore, the participation and potential to influence the rules of these two groups
was established even before the beginning of the rulemaking process. It is during the preproposal stage that interest groups are often able to engage with government officials exparte, or off the record.
The rulemaking process is an important component of the policy process, but is
often overlooked. At a minimum, the rulemaking process provides stakeholders
opportunities to submit comments on proposed rules and regulations, and at best, shape
the final rules. The following section takes a deeper examination into the importance of
participation at state public utility commissions and whether stakeholders can
successfully influence the process and final rules.

Participation and State Public Utility Commissions
Much of the bulk of clean and renewable energy policy has been funneled through
state public utility commissions (PUCs). State public utility commissions have
traditionally been responsible for overseeing energy, telecommunications, and water
policy. However, PUCs are entering unchartered energy domains that do not always
match up well with their traditional economic spheres of authority and jurisdiction. PUCs
face new challenges due to changes in customer demands, public policy goals, and
emerging technologies.
PUCs guiding objectives are to balance consumer interests (safe and reliable
service and affordability) and utility interests (right to reasonable return and timely
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recovery of costs). PUCs have traditionally embraced only an economic role. However,
PUCs are increasingly being asked to make decisions on energy infrastructure
modernization, electricity system transition, energy system resilience, energy policy
goals, energy equity, and the intersection of utility regulation with innovative economic
sectors that push beyond the agency’s traditional purvey. PUCs are beginning to face the
need to modify their statutes to enable them greater regulatory authority to consider
environmental issues in conjunction with economic considerations given that clean
energy issues are gaining a larger share in state energy generation and distribution.
There are select PUCs that are breaching the divide between economic and
environmental considerations. Washington D.C. and Connecticut have expanded their
PUC’s mandate to consider climate change issues. In 2008, Washington D.C. passed the
Clean and Affordable Energy Act which directed the PSC to “consider the preservation
of environmental quality” in its decision-making. This Act paved the road for 2018’s
Clean Energy Omnibus Act, which added on considerations for “global climate change
and the District’s public climate commitments”. Connecticut’s Public Utility Regulatory
Authority (PURA) embedded climate change issues through the Global Warming
Solutions Act, which requires PURA to focus on how the state’s Comprehensive Energy
Strategy, Integrated Resources Plan (IRP), and Conservation and Load Management Plan
(C&LM) can meet its binding climate targets. Despite the promising changes from these
states, there are many more states that continue to struggle with the rapid changes to the
power sector.
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Amongst the policy community, there has been a growing consensus that PUCs
need to evolve to address these new challenges and expectations (De Martini et al. 2016;
Bilimoria et al., 2019; Cross-Call et al., 2019; McAdams, 2021). Traditional regulatory
approaches and processes are not sufficient to handle the complexity and intersectionality
of the new energy issues that PUCs are being tasked to manage (Cross-Call et al., 2019).
De Martini et al. (2016) argues that the traditional regulatory approach of resolution
through adjudication is underequipped to ensure a balanced and long-term solution.
Figure 3.1 depicts Cross-Call’s et al. (2019) diagram of the evolution of the regulatory
process design.

Figure 3.1 Evolution of Regulatory Process Design

Source: Cross-Call, Dan, Cara Goldenberg, and Claire Wang. (2019). Process for Purpose: Reimagining
Regulatory Approaches for Power Sector Transformation, Rocky Mountain Institute.
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The diagram highlights the differences between traditional regulatory processes
and the emerging regulatory processes and reflects the utility regulatory reforms seen
across ten states.5 California was among the first states in 2014 to initiate a docket to
address a regulatory framework for distributed energy resources (DERs). Many of these
states initiated regulatory reform to update regulatory structures to better meet the new
developments in the power sector. However, these reforms have major implications for
how PUCS will meet the challenge of adapting their stakeholder frameworks to
accommodate the large influx of energy market participants.
De Martini et al. (2016, p. 2-3) highlight that proactively engaging stakeholders
provides three primary benefits. First, a robust stakeholder process provides a forum for
information sharing and education, which can create a common vocabulary and
knowledge platform for participants. This is especially important when policy issues are
technical and complex. Second, stakeholder focused processes can create an environment
that encourages collaboration, resolution, and even consensus as opposed to the
traditional regulatory environment that often resulted in adversarial relationships. Finally,
stakeholder focused processes can lead to productive, long-term relationship benefits
among parties. These relationships are reinforcing to the entire stakeholder process by
encouraging communication, trust, and common ground.
At the heart of a stakeholder focused process are the concepts of inclusion and
participation. Quick and Feldman (2011) make a distinction between participation and

5

States included in the Cross-Call et al. (2019) study and the year: California (2014), New York (2014),
Minnesota (2014), Michigan (2016), Arkansas (2017), Illinois (2017), Ohio (2017), Oregon (2017), Rhode
Island (2017), Hawaii (2018).
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inclusion. Participation seeks to increase input for decisions. Democratizing participation
can occur through increased public scrutiny, public notification, and access mechanisms
(Woods, 2015). Concrete changes would include inviting more groups to be involved in
the processes, ensuring the process is broadly accessible to the public, and collecting
community input to influence policy decisions (Quick and Feldman, 2011, p. 274).
Quick and Feldman (2011) emphasize that their conceptualization of inclusion is
distinct from the process of ensuring diverse participants. Rather, inclusion seeks to make
connections among people and provide an “expansive and ongoing framework for
interaction that uses the opportunities to take action on specific items in the public
domain as a means of intentionally creating a community engaged in an ongoing stream
of issues” (Quick and Feldman, 2011, p. 274). Quick and Feldman (2011) advance three
features of inclusive practices: engaging in multiple ways of knowing, coproduction of
the processes and content of decision making, and sustaining temporal openness (p. 282).
These three features of inclusion can be integrated into the deliberative processes at
PUCs.
First, engaging in multiple ways of knowing embraces bringing in varying values,
perspective, and ideas. From this perspective, deliberative practices can be part of an
inclusive process when the emphasis of that deliberation is to build a “community that
can work together to adapt to implementation challenges and pick up new issues” (Quick
and Feldman, 2011, p. 285).
The second feature of inclusion is coproducing, which is entails multiple parties
collaborating to produce procedural or written work together. Coproduction of the
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process and content can reinforce deliberation when participants are on equal playing
fields with one another. The practice of consensus during coproduction ensures that there
is a balance of power among each of the participants. Quick and Feldman (2011) note
that deliberation is not inclusive when the process and content are predetermined prior to
the coproducing process.
Finally, deliberation can be inclusive if it sustains temporal openness. The
concept of temporal openness embodies processes that encourage connections over time
and issues. The practice of temporal openness does not stop when the initial outcome is
achieved. Temporal openness emphasizes processes that encourage the development of
relationships over iterative opportunities.
It is important to note that the absence of inclusive processes can reinforce
divisions among groups. Already the PUC process engenders a “winners” and “losers”
dynamic that incentivizes group divisions. Group divisions can breed distrust and
animosity among groups (Quick and Feldman, 2011). Reluctance to share information
and perspectives is detrimental to the process as a whole and can stymie the pace and
progress of the work. Therefore, it is in the interest of PUCs and stakeholders to embrace
more inclusive practices to ensure the effectiveness of the process.
Inclusive practices at PUCs could include the creation of stakeholder working
groups, technical meetings, consensus building, discussion papers, party briefs, and
network policy linkages. Per Quick and Feldman (2011), each of these stakeholder
engagement practices embody engaging in multiple ways of knowing, coproduction of
the processes and content of decision making, and temporal openness. For example, PUC
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working groups and stakeholder meetings encourage stakeholders to share information,
values, and perspective with other stakeholders. The comment periods are also a time to
share information and reflect on the perspectives of other stakeholders. In addition, the
emphasis on stakeholder interactions at meetings and working groups create connections
among groups, issues, and processes that extend to future interactions and proceedings.
Finally, the stakeholder meetings and extensive comment periods potentially give
stakeholders the opportunity to coproduce content for the final rules or order.
However, like any process, there are potential benefits and drawbacks with
increasing participatory and inclusive practices at state PUCs. With regards to benefits,
regulatory proceedings have a greater likelihood of being perceived as transparent, fair,
and equitable when there are more opportunities for stakeholders to participate in the
decision-making process. In addition, stakeholders can provide novel knowledge,
information, ideas, and opinions that the PUC may not have considered or been
knowledgeable about. This is particularly important when the policy issue is new, as
energy storage was for these cases.
However, increasing stakeholder participation can also be costly and timeconsuming. A large stakeholder pool may make it harder for stakeholders to achieve
consensus with one another on important issues. Increasing the range of interests and
preferences can make it difficult to find an outcome that is acceptable for all parties. In
addition, opening up the process to new stakeholders does not necessitate that they will
have credible opportunities to have a meaningful role in the decision-making.
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The regulatory literature has provided mixed results on public participation in the
regulatory setting. Yackee (2005) highlights that written comments during the notice and
comment period can have a noticeable impact on the final rule, however she also shows
that often the individuals are able to exert the greatest influence over the final rule during
the pre-proposal stage. Similarly, Roundtree and Baldwin (2018) discover that
meaningful participation is limited to expert stakeholder groups, especially those that
have ties to decision-makers and formal processes. Roundtree and Baldwin (2018) noted
that stakeholders with less expertise and experience with PUCs were often frustrated by
the process and felt that their participation throughout the process was superficial.
Baldwin (2018) found that increased stakeholder participation through
deliberative approaches can lead to more environmentally favorable outcomes. However,
Baldwin (2018) cautions that her results may only apply to certain policy contexts in
which there is not a high level of knowledge about the issues. This is in line with Stokes
(2015), who advances the dynamic of the ‘fog of enactment’, in which innovative
renewable energy laws had the opportunity to pass during moments of crisis and
stakeholder division. Utilities were unable to forecast how these policies will impact
them.
In addition, Stokes (2015) emphasizes that environmental groups can exert greater
influence when there is greater division or distraction by the opposing coalitions. This is
similar to Falkner (2008), who advances the business conflict model. The business
conflict model highlights how conflict and discordance among business and industry
stakeholders can weaken their power position, thus providing an opportunity for
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environmental policies to develop independent of the full pressure of the opposing
coalition.
Despite the indeterminant nature of participation on regulatory outcomes, at the
center of each of these studies is the inherent understanding that without outside
participants, rules will be heavily influenced by the regulated industries. Opening
regulatory proceedings to stakeholders provides increased opportunities for other groups
to participate and promotes greater accountability and transparency of the agency.
Accountability and transparency are essential features to ensuring that an agency
maintains its organizational mission and upholds the public’s interest justly and equally
in its decisions and actions.

Stakeholder Influence
Conceptualizing Influence
There is the perception that influence is pervasive throughout any policy process.
However, it is difficult to conceptualize and even prove. Influence is a heavy-loaded
concept in any context but especially during the rulemaking process when there are
multiple avenues and periods when influence can occur.
Influence is often considered the ability of a group to control the outcome of a
policy (Lowery, 2013). However, there is then a need to conceptualize control and its
various gradations. At the extreme end, the concept of control in the regulatory process
often manifests as the notion of agency capture (or regulatory capture), in which interest
groups are able to control, or “capture”, the agenda of the government agency tasked to
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regulate it (Stigler, 1971; Sabatier, 1975). Therefore, the interests of the public that the
agency is supposed to be looking after are effectively undermined in favor of the
powerful interest group.
Carpenter and Moss (2013) note that agency capture has often been
misunderstood because it has lacked a clear definition. Carpenter and Moss (2013, p. 13)
define regulatory (agency) capture as “the result or process by which regulation, in law or
application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest toward
the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself”. Of
particular importance to this definition of agency capture is the conceptualization of
public interest and intent. First, in order for there to be a clear instance of agency capture,
the public interest must be clearly defined; secondly, it must be shown that there was a
clear policy shift away from the public interest and toward the industry interest; and
finally, there must be the intent and action by the industry to push regulation away from
the public interest (Carpenter and Moss 2013, p. 15).
While it cannot be doubted that interest groups would like to control the entire
rulemaking agenda, the notion of agency capture is extreme in the current context of most
of these regulatory proceedings. The intention and action by interest groups to control the
agency in direct opposition to the public interest is difficult to prove, even in the case of
industry groups. In the case of energy storage policy, regulated utility groups and trade
groups have a direct relationship with the public interest through consumer and market
exchanges and interactions. While industry groups are concerned with profits and their
shareholders, the consumer remains an integral component of their broader interests.
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Yackee (2013, p. 9) provides a more nuanced definition of agency capture “as the
control of agency policy decision-making by a sub-population of individuals or
organizations external to the agency”. From this definition, one might note that utilities
have historically “captured” state public utility commissions, as they have possessed a
high level of control over the agency. Yet, Yackee (2013) emphasizes that influence and
control are two very different concepts. An interest group can be influential without
controlling the regulatory process of the decisions of agency members (Gormley, 1982 as
cited in Yackee 2013, p. 9). In this context, influence is a necessary, but not sufficient
condition of agency capture (Yackee, 2013). Therefore, a group’s influence over the
rulemaking process is conceptually distinct from a group’s ability to control an agency
and its decision-making abilities through agency capture. Any group could then be
influential from this conceptualization of influence, as long as one could show that the
group had made a definitive change or action to the decision-making process.
It is important to note that interest groups often engage in the policy process with
different goals for success or even effectiveness that preclude absolute control over the
final outcome of a policy. Some interest groups will be satisfied with small changes in the
framing of an issue, incremental changes, or building or blocking parts of the policy
language. In addition, some groups may be content to simply be included in the process,
in hopes of future inclusion and influence. Therefore, influence and control are not
absolutes throughout the process. There is an ebb and flow of influence and control by
various groups at different moments of the process. The ensuing discussion highlights
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how previous literature on interest group influence has examined these phenomena at the
federal and state levels.

Previous Interest Group Influence Literature
The study of interest group influence is popular in the literature, however much of
the literature is concentrated on interest group influence at the federal level in the US
Congress with regards to lobbying, mobilization, and group tactics and strategy. The
findings of the federal literature are mixed, in which some studies have noted interest
group influence to be limited (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Burstein and Linton, 2002
Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki et al. 2012), and others have found that interest groups
are able to influence the policy process only in certain contexts (Rosenthal, 2001; Berry
and Wilcox, 2008).
The federal rulemaking literature is much smaller than that of the legislative
literature. The federal rulemaking literature is divided mainly between examining interest
group participation (Golden, 1998; Furlong and Kerwin, 2004; Woods, 2009, 2015),
interest group tactics (Knownes and DeAlejandro, 2009; Nelson and Yackee, 2012) and
to a lesser degree, interest group influence during the rulemaking process (Baumgartner
et al. 2009; Yackee, 2011; 2015; Yackee and Yackee, 2006).
Across the federal interest group and rulemaking literatures, it has been noted that
business and industry groups are often perceived to have a stronger influence over the
policy process (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Golden, 1998; Rosenthal, 2001; Yackee and
Yackee, 2006). Often resources determine an interest group’s influence: financial assets,
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organizational capacity, number of staff, membership numbers, and clientele (Rosenthal,
2001). Therefore, it is not surprising that well-organized business and industry groups
often dominate the policy process given that they possess the staff and monetary
resources to maintain a strong presence throughout the entirety of the process. Rosenthal
(2001) highlights that often lobbyists from powerful interest groups will be more
effective in their endeavors primarily as a result of the group that they are representing.
With regards to rulemaking, Yackee and Yackee (2006) highlight that there is a
bias towards business interests during the notice and comment period of the rulemaking
process. However, the renewable energy literature has found mixed evidence that the
presence of fossil fuel industry groups in a state will negatively impact a state’s support
for renewable energy policies. The majority of the renewable energy literature notes that
states that possess strong coal and petroleum interests are less likely to support renewable
energy development (Carley, 2009; Laird and Stefes, 2009; Wiener and Koontz, 2010).
Similarly, utilities that rely on natural gas will also be more opposed to renewable energy
policies (Lyon and Yin, 2010). However, Mastitoff (2008) and Lyon find little
significance for the correlation between the presence of fossil fuel groups in a state and
their renewable energy development. States that possess a large potential for renewable
energy (e.g., wind, solar, and hydropower) will be more apt to support renewable energy
policies. In addition, there has been little examination on the role of environmental and
civil society groups in shaping renewable energy policies. While it may be that industry
interests do dominate the policy process, there are still areas in which non-industry
groups can exert change or influence.
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While the literature on federal rulemaking and lobbying has begun to gain greater
attention (Golden, 1998; Kerwin and Furlong, 2011; Yackee and Yackee, 2006; Yackee,
2011), there remains less known about state rulemaking, regulatory agencies, and the
subsequent roles of state interest groups during the process. Aniza (2019) is critical of the
lack of attention that subnational policy studies have received and notes that this is likely
due to empirical design challenges and the dearth of easily accessible data at the
subnational level. Aniza (2019) argues that interest groups likely do have more influence
at the subnational level than the national level due to challenges of group competition,
partisanship, and ideology at the national level.
One reason why researchers have neglected the study of interest groups at the
subnational level is because of the challenges of too much variability. The variability of
state contexts, groups, and conditions is high and difficult to control. It is also often
problematic to make generalizations across so much variability as no two states are alike.
Subnational scholarship does attempt to address this variability by making general
connections amongst states based on demographics, size, political culture, and other
similar factors.
The scholarship that has explored subnational interest group influence has
confirmed much of the findings from the federal literature with regards to: (1) at which
point in the regulatory process stakeholders are most influential and (2) the factors that
affect stakeholder participation.
First, Crow, Albright, and Koebele (2016) found that industry groups have a
particularly pronounced role during the pre-proposal phase, which enables them to work
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with agencies to define and frame the issues. Similarly, Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz (2014)
similarly note that the pre-proposal stage was a critical point in which interest groups
could exert the most influence. In addition, Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz (2014) highlight that
state agencies are integral in shaping the boundaries of the debate and in determining
when and how interest groups engage in the rulemaking process. Second, with regards to
stakeholder participation, Roundtree and Baldwin (2018) concluded that stakeholder
groups that are able to participate the most effectively at PUCs have: (1) a strong
knowledge about the issues; (2) the resources to engage in the process for the long-term;
and (3) a long-standing relationship with other stakeholders and decision-makers.
Although there has been substantial development in the state rulemaking and
interest group influence literatures, there are few studies that have sought to determine
the level of influence of influential interest groups. The primary challenge of determining
a group’s influence over a policy outcome (or set of policy outcomes) is that the
researcher must first accurately determine the policy position of the group, and secondly
the position of the policy output (Pritoni, 2014).
Scholars have attempted to determine policy positions from political documents
from handing-coding and from computer-based text analysis programs (WORDSCORES,
WORDFISH) (Laver, Benoit, and Garry, 2003; Proksch and Slapin, 2008). There is also
the qualitative data analysis software, such as NVivo, which helps researchers organize,
analyze, and discover themes and patterns within and across primary and secondary
documents.
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Even once a researcher is able to determine interest group policy positions, it is
difficult to determine the policy output as there is an inherent problem of endogeneity
with this approach. As Baumgartner and Leech (1998) concede, the status quo policy
already embodies the preferences of influential groups. So not seeing any changes to the
policy output does not necessarily reveal that groups are not influential. It may very well
signify the enduring influence of already powerful groups. It is therefore difficult to
assess interest group influence from this approach.
In addition, with these methods, one must assume that a group’s policy position
and preferences will remain constant, which is not always reflective of the real process.
This is especially true when decisions are being made in a social setting where
collaboration and compromise can occur (e.g., working groups and committees). In
addition, policy positions can be difficult to determine in situations where the policy
outcome is complex. For example, across the five energy storage proceedings, there were
many policy outputs as opposed to a single rule on a single issue to determine.
Also, the shift in one policy point outcome may in turn shift a group’s collective
policy preferences. Therefore, policy preferences and policy positions will not always
remain constant over the period of the rulemaking. This was true in the case of
California. In the beginning of the rulemaking, many stakeholders, and even staff, were
hesitant about the novelty of California developing an energy storage market. However,
once there was a transition to a more progressive clean energy commissioner, there was a
sharp shift among stakeholders towards accepting the imposition of specific energy
storage targets.
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Another method for determining influence is through preference attainment, in
which groups can indicate whether the policy outcome met their policy preferences.
However, this method can be problematic, too, as it relies upon the responses of
individuals as measures of influence. Individuals are often likely to inflate their success
and ability to influence the process (Rosenthal, 2001). This is understandable given that
interest groups seek to exert influence and will seem ineffective if they are unable to
provide some support for their existence. There is a distinction between a group’s
strategic policy and its real policy position.
Previous rulemaking literature (Yackee and Yackee, 2006; McKay and Yackee,
2007) has measured influence based on a 3-point scale of the difference in direction
between the draft rules and the final rules: (+1) more government involvement; (0)
remained the same level; or (-1) less regulation. The authors note that this method
simplifies the complexity of interest group politics, but it enables them to distinguish core
positions and changes in the final rules. Yet, given the wide array of interest group
preferences in the energy storage proceedings, such a simplification of interests is not
robust enough to explain environmental and clean energy group influence. In addition,
this method risks the same problem of endogeneity of the policy output that was
discussed above from Baumgartner and Leech (1998). Therefore, it has been a challenge
to conceptualize and measure influence across multiple disciplines. Influence is a
complex and multifaceted concept.
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Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the previous literature on the importance of the
regulatory phase in the policy process, the role of participatory mechanisms at public
utility commissions, and interest group influence during the regulatory phase. In general,
there has been few studies that have specifically examined stakeholder participation and
influence at state PUCs. The literature on interest groups, rulemaking, and energy
policies have taken a piecemeal approach to examining the scope of an interest group’s
ability to influence the policy process. It is clear from the findings of interest group
influence at the national and state levels that there are unexplored linkages and causal
explanations that do not fit neatly into models.
The following chapter builds upon what the previous literature has provided to
construct a model to explain stakeholder participation and influence.
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Chapter 4 Theoretical Framework
Introduction
This dissertation advances a causal model of access points to explain stakeholder
participation and influence during state energy storage proceedings. This dissertation
argues that participatory and inclusive mechanisms throughout the PUC stakeholder
process will provide distinct incentives or constraints for environmental interest groups
which will shape their behaviors towards other stakeholders and ultimately their ability to
be influential. These participatory and inclusive mechanisms have a direct effect on the
access points for stakeholders to engage and influence the rulemaking process, the tactics
groups employ to influence the process, the range of stakeholders involved in the process,
and opportunities for collaboration (or conflict) throughout the process.
However, given the theoretical and empirical complexity of untangling the causal
relationship between stakeholder participation and stakeholder influence, this dissertation
explores these connections in two phases. The first phase of the dissertation examines
how stakeholders are able to successfully maximize access points throughout the
regulatory proceeding to influence the final rules. The second phase of this dissertation
analyzes stakeholder perceptions of influence throughout the entire proceeding.
While the distinction between the two conceptualizations of influence seems
unnecessary, this dissertation seeks to highlight that influence is multidimensional.
Influence can present itself at different moments in the rulemaking process and through
different group behaviors. It is important to note that influence is not absolute. Rosenthal
(2001, p. 213) notes that the perception of influence and the ability to get stuff done is at
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times held with higher regard than a group’s actual effectiveness. Therefore, the
perception of influence can hold much power in explaining group dynamics and,
subsequently, the outcome of policies.
Conceptualizing influence also as perceived influence, accounts for the bias of
respondent’s perception of influence. While this dissertation attempted to determine the
level of influence as objectively as possible (as described in the research designs section
in the next chapter), it is amiss to ignore the importance of stakeholders’ perception in
what is a social process. Again, it is imperative to note that perceptions shape influence.
Actual influence and perceived influence are two very different constructs.
The following discussion is split into two sections to address the distinct
frameworks that examine stakeholder influence on multiple levels.

67

Phase 1: Access Points and Influence During the Regulatory Processes
Contextual Factors that Shape the Stakeholder Process
There is a myriad of contextual factors that shape the context of a rulemaking.
This dissertation focuses on the guiding role of the authorizing legislation, issue salience,
and information ambiguity. First, the authorizing legislation provides specific directives,
requirements, or timelines to the state regulatory agency (i.e., PUCs). The authorizing
legislation can be very specific or open to the PUC’s interpretation. This, in turn, can
have a great impact on the scope and intent of the process. If the authorizing legislation is
not prescriptive, PUCs will have greater discretion over the rulemaking process and
scope. However, prescriptive legislation provides greater legal certainty that the PUC
must comply with the legislation’s original intent, as the legislation is codified into the
state law (e.g., statutes).
In addition, the authorizing statute can instill aggressive timelines or deadlines for
specific commissioner decisions. In the case of energy storage, the authorizing statutes
for all five states were quite different from one another. Some authorizing statutes had
specific directives and requirements that PUCs must follow. The most critical directive to
come out of the energy storage legislation was the mandate for specific energy storage
targets. Out of the five states in the first wave of energy storage legislation, only Oregon
and Virginia specified the energy storage target level. However, the legislatures of the
newest states (Connecticut and Maine) passed specific energy storage targets, which may
be indicative of an encouraging trend in energy storage legislation.
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Second, issue salience is a key context for any policy. Issues with little salience
will likely not attract as many stakeholders as issues with greater salience. Stokes (2015)
highlights that there is a greater likelihood that environmental groups can exert greater
influence when policy issues are new and have little saliency. In addition, the level of
issue salience will impact which groups decide to prioritize the energy storage proceeding
over others. At any moment, there are many legislative and regulatory proceedings
occurring simultaneously. No matter what their resource and staffing capacity, most
interest groups will have to decide what policy issues to pursue or not. Therefore, issue
salience can greatly impact the stakeholder process.
Finally, connected to issue salience is the challenge of issue ambiguity. Issue
ambiguity is loosely defined as being a policy issue that does not have clear boundaries
regarding its definition, functionality, and domain. When California became the first state
to pass energy storage legislation in 2010, there was very little real-world application or
knowledge of energy storage systems. Even experienced energy and clean energy interest
groups had little understanding of the complexity and multi-uses of energy storage. There
was confusion on how and to what degree energy storage should be installed into
traditional electrical systems regarding its generation, distribution, and transmission.
Throughout these periods of issue ambiguity, some groups can shape the
dialogue, definitions, and agenda of the issue. This can be a very powerful opportunity
for stakeholders. While defining issues may seem small, defining what energy storage is
and its applications were pivotal moments for each of the early states’ proceedings.
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In addition, when there is issue ambiguity, often there will be divisions among
interest groups, thereby preventing the formation of powerful coalitions that can be a
barrier to progressive policies. Faulkner (2008) notes that interest group divisions among
traditional powerful interest groups (i.e., industry and business) environmental groups are
able to navigate the process more successfully, as they are not encountering such a bloc
of powerful resources. Concurrently, Stokes (2015) highlights that some powerful interest
groups may be distracted with other issues or not perceive the issue to be a priority until
it is too late to intervene.
Therefore, context matters in structuring the scope and timeline of a regulatory
proceeding. The authorizing legislation, issue salience, and issue ambiguity each had a
major role in the context of the five state energy storage proceedings. As the next section
highlights, the policy context can be integral in shaping how the stakeholder process is
conducted.

Stakeholder Access Points and Influence
There are multiple stages throughout the regulatory process in which stakeholders
are allowed to participate. These stages provide access points for stakeholders to
potentially influence the content and the process of the regulatory proceeding. Access
points are critical to how effectively and how often stakeholders can influence the
process and the content of the rules (Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2016). There are
potentially four key access points during a rulemaking: before the advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), the pre-proposal stage, the notice of proposed rules
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(NOPR) in which there is a formal notice and comment period, and the final rules.
Interest groups that are able to exploit these access points have a greater likelihood of
influencing the regulatory process through tactics such as lobbying and issue definition
(e.g., agenda building and agenda framing). It is important to highlight that not all PUCs
will facilitate a ANPRM or the pre-proposal stages. The number of formal access points
often depends upon the authorizing statute and the discretion of the agency.
The first access point is right after the legislation has passed. After the legislation
has passed, stakeholders involved with the legislation still have much work to complete
to see their legislative efforts continue into the regulatory phase. Not all interest groups
involved in the legislative phase will carry through to the regulatory phase; however,
some groups will. This was especially the case in California, in which two important
groups, Vote Solar and the California Energy Storage Association (CESA), were heavily
involved in the legislation and throughout the beginning of the energy storage
rulemaking.
During this gap period between the passage of the legislation and the
commencement of the regulatory proceeding, stakeholders have an opportunity to engage
with staff from the PUCs, legislative members, and other interest groups. Much of this
engagement is informal, although it can be quite fruitful as PUC staff begins to collect
information for the regulatory proceeding. Often staff will actively seek outside expertise
to help shape the beginning of the proceeding. Therefore, stakeholders that possess
expertise on the issue can be quite influential during this phase. In the California case,

71

CESA was integral in helping the CPUC staff understand the technological aspects of
energy storage and helped write up key documents.
This informal stakeholder engagement can bleed into the second stage, the preproposal stage. Not all rulemakings will have a pre-proposal stage. This is the stage in
which stakeholders are invited to help inform the docket and share their comments on
what rules or regulations should be included before a draft has even been written. In the
case of New York, there was not a pre-proposal stage as the rules had essentially been
written before the rulemaking had even begun.
Yackee (2011; 2015) highlights the importance of lobbying during the preproposal stage, in which interest groups are able engage with government officials exparte, or off the record.6 Interest groups are allowed to engage with the agency’s staff
throughout the rulemaking process and the commissioners at a limited capacity within the
confines of the agency rules of conduct. Lobbying can come in many forms, from
providing information to the agency to directly influencing the rules. It should be noted,
though, that ex-parte lobbying has greatly diminished after decades of PUC
commissioner scandals. Nonetheless, these access points provide multiple opportunities
for some interest groups to influence the rulemaking process.

6

It is important to make a distinction between Yackee’s (2011, 2015) meaning of ex-parte and ex-parte in
PUC regulatory proceedings. In Yackee (2011, 2015), ex-parte just refers to the informal lobbying of
agency members and staff. This is considered a customary form of strategy by stakeholders and is not
considered to be controversial. In contrast, the ex-parte communications with PUC commissioners or law
judges are considered to be tenuous after decades of scandals and undue influence. In most PUC cases, exparte is allowed, but stakeholders must report when and what was discussed with the official. Ex-parte
communication is considered to less common in recent years.
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The regulatory agency has some discretion over who they allow to participate
during the pre-proposal stage. However, in some situations, the authorizing statute may
mandate the participation of specific groups from the very beginning. For example, in
New York, the legislation mandated that the New York Department of Public Service and
the New York Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) work together
to formulate an energy storage roadmap. As the New York case will show, this had a
large impact on the stakeholder framework.
The pre-proposal stage is important regarding the potential for agenda-setting,
agenda building, agenda blocking, and framing (Kamieniecki, 2006). Agenda building
entails a group’s ability to introduce information for the agency to consider, define policy
problems, and develop the content of the proposed rules (Yackee, 2014). Much of the
rulemaking literature (Rinfret, Cook, Pautz 2014; Yackee, 2011; Crow, Albright, and
Koebele, 2016) has noted that the pre-proposal stage is a critical juncture in the process,
in which key interest groups and agency personnel work together to build and block key
issues in the rules. Crow, Albright, and Koebele (2016) noted that an open stakeholder
process during the pre-proposal stage encouraged collaborative relationships at times
among the interest groups. These processes can make for a more expedited rulemaking
process and provide opportunities for compromise and collaboration.
However, in many circumstances, even before the notice and comment period is
conducted, a minority of stakeholders have determined the final rules. Previous literature
(Roundtree and Baldwin 2018) has noted that utilities often have an upper hand in
crafting plans and programs in PUC regulatory proceedings. Non-utility stakeholder
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participation is therefore reactive, in which they are only able to respond to the proposal
with written comments during the formal comment period.
In addition, agenda blocking, the ability to block specific rules, is an important
indicator of group influence. The power of “no” is just as strong as the power of “yes”, if
not more so in some instances. Rosenthal (2001, p. 68) notes that business groups are
often more likely to block policies rather than attempt to create good policy, in which the
power of “no” preserves the status quo for them.
The third stage, the notice and comment period, traditionally attracts the most
stakeholder involvement, as any group or individual can submit comments to the
regulatory agency. It is also an important stage of the process for expert stakeholders, as
this is when they can build up the record to formalize their perspectives, evidence, and
facts. The commission must consider the record to inform their decision. However, in
many cases (e.g., rulemakings), the commission can use their discretion (in accordance
with the administrative rules of the state and regulatory agency) as to how receptive they
may or may not be towards the submitted comments.
The fourth stage, the delivery of the final rules or orders, is not always a key
access point, as often the rules have already been finalized by the agency and the
commission. It is possible to submit comments on the final rules to express one’s opinion,
but few meaningful changes can be made at this point. Yet, comments on the final rules
or orders may help set up stakeholders for future proceedings with the PUC or other
stakeholders.
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Finally, contextual and institutional factors may provide other access points for
interest groups to seek out. For example, PUC working groups provide greater
opportunities for interest groups to inform, shape, and influence the final outcome.
Working groups may also spill over from other policy issues and proceedings.
While there are potentially four key access points in which stakeholders have the
opportunity to influence the process and the rules, this dissertation argues that the type of
access can greatly affect how effective a stakeholder will be or not. Access can either
facilitate stakeholder participation or inclusion. To review, participation mechanisms
increase input for decisions, which can include broadening stakeholder participation and
making it more accessible (Quick and Feldman, 2011). Participatory mechanisms will
often be found most often during the comment periods and even for public meetings.
Inclusive mechanisms build community capacity and seek to build “connections among
people, across issues, and over time” (Quick and Feldman, 2011, p. 274). Quick and
Feldman (2011) note that inclusion can incorporate deliberation, so long as deliberation
embodies three criteria: multiple ways of knowledge, coproduction, and temporal
openness. Inclusive mechanisms in a PUC stakeholder framework might include
stakeholder working groups, workshops, intentional agency policy linkages, and the
establishment of institutional norms for consensus.
Inclusive measures encourage stakeholder deliberation with one another. Nabatchi
and Leighninger (2015, p. 15) define deliberation as the “thoughtful, open and accessible
discussion about information, views, experiences, and ideas during which people seek to
make a decision or judgments based on facts, data, values, emotions, and other less
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technical considerations.” It is the sharing of information and coming to mutual
understandings that makes deliberation an enduring facet of the stakeholder process.
Most PUC stakeholder processes seek to promote participatory stakeholder
processes. Yet not all PUC stakeholder processes are inclusive. This dissertation argues
that environmental and clean energy stakeholders will be more influential over the final
rules when PUC stakeholder processes are participatory and inclusive. Environmental
and clean energy stakeholders will have greater opportunities to deliberate with other
stakeholders and staff to advance their perspectives and share information. Table 4.1
details the various PUC activities that embody either a participatory or inclusive
framework for stakeholder participation.

Table 4.1 Participatory and Inclusive Mechanisms
Type of Stakeholder Engagement

PUC Activities
•
•
•
•
•

Participatory Mechanisms

Inclusive Mechanisms

•
•
•

Broad public participation
Multiple comment periods
Technical meetings
Public Meetings
Agency norms for stakeholder
consensus and deliberation
Stakeholder workshops
Coproduction of important documents
Agency emphasis on policy linkages
among PUC proceedings

As Table 4.1 shows, most participatory mechanisms at state PUCs involved
measures to include more stakeholders and make information more readily available. In
contrast, inclusive measures seek a deeper level of engagement, in which stakeholders
take time to deliberate and create connections with other stakeholder groups. The context
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and scope of the proceeding will determine which participatory and inclusive measures
will be employed. In addition, the organizational culture of the state PUC will also have
some role in which participatory mechanisms the PUC prefers to utilize.

A Model of Stakeholder Access and Influence
This dissertation advances a model of stakeholder access and influence. This
model provides a foundation for understanding at what points during the process
stakeholders are able to access to participate and whether that participation leads to
greater influence. The type and quantity of access points is important for stakeholder
influence. Figure 4.1 illustrates the key access points and conditions of interest
throughout the rulemaking process that stakeholders are able to exploit to influence the
final rules or order.

Figure 4.1 A Model of Stakeholder Access Points and Influence Over the Final Rules

•Context
• Salience
• Legislative
Mandate
• Issue
Ambiguity
Agency
Information
Gathering
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Comments
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Comments

Stakeholder
Comments

Stakeholder
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Pre-proposal access points
Notice and comment access points
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Stakeholder
Comments

•Final Rules

The model depicts the context of the proceeding in the first box, which shapes the
scope and PUC’s discretionary powers. The main boxes show the key stages of the
rulemaking: the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), the pre-proposal
phase, the draft proposal phase, the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), and the final
rules. The smaller boxes in gold and blue represent the access points in which
stakeholders have the potential to participate and influence the process.
The boxes in gold notate access points that occur during the pre-proposal stage. It
is during the pre-proposal stage that stakeholders will have the greatest level of influence
to define and frame the content of the rulemaking. The boxes in blue represent access
points during the formal notice and comment portion of a rulemaking. It is important to
note that not all of the rulemakings have all of these stages or opportunities for
stakeholder engagement. For example, many rulemakings do not have an ANPRM or a
pre-proposal phase that is open to all stakeholders.
At the heart of this model of stakeholder influence is a stakeholder’s ability to
access points of potential influence throughout the process. The model advances that
stakeholders will be more influential when they are able to access the pre-proposal phase,
attend multiple stakeholder meetings, and submit multiple rounds of comments. As this
model shows, the greater number of access points, the greater chance a stakeholder will
be able to influence the outcome. The model also highlights that contextual factors (i.e.,
salience, the legislative mandate, and issue ambiguity) can have an impact on the
stakeholder process, and thereby the number of access points that are available to
stakeholders.
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Table 4.2. articulates the key propositions for the model of stakeholder access
points and influence.

Table 4.2 Propositions for Stakeholder Access Points and Influence

Propositions: Access Points and Influence
Proposition 1a: How a PUC addresses the challenge of issue ambiguity will shape the scope of
the stakeholder framework.
Proposition 2a: Environmental and clean energy stakeholders that participate during the four
major access points (the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, the pre-proposal phase, the
draft proposal phase, and the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)) will be more likely to be
influential over the Final Rules.
Proposition 3a: Environmental and clean energy stakeholders will be more influential over the
Final Rules in states that provided more than the minimum requirement for stakeholder
comments.
Proposition 4a: Environmental and clean energy stakeholders will be more influential over the
Final Rules in states that hold stakeholder technical workshops and meetings.
Proposition 5a: Environmental and clean energy stakeholders will be more influential over the
Final Rules in states that included stakeholders during the pre-proposal process.

These propositions create the foundation for exploring the social dynamics of
stakeholders and how that can lead to varying levels of perceived influence. The next
section develops the conceptual framework for analyzing the concept of perceived
influence.
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Phase 2: Stakeholder Group Dynamics and Perceptions of Influence
As the previous section discussed, inclusive stakeholder frameworks can create
mutually beneficial relationships for stakeholders. Inclusive stakeholder frameworks
provide opportunities for groups to have positive interactions with one another in an
iterative process. These positive (or negative) interactions can spillover to future
proceedings and even have reinforcing effects on inter-group dynamics. Ultimately, these
interactions and experiences shape an individual’s perception of influence of themselves
and of other stakeholders.
At the heart of the second phase of this dissertation is the desire to examine the
factors that shape an individual’s perception of influence, and how those perceptions
affect their actions and relationships with other stakeholders. This portion of the
dissertation is exploratory and conceptual, given the difficulty of quantifying social
interactions and individuals’ perceptions of one another.
This dissertation draws from the findings by Roundtree and Baldwin (2018).
Roundtree and Baldwin (2018) explored how and why stakeholders participate in
regulatory proceedings. Much of their study is informed by stakeholder interviews that
describe stakeholders’ perceptions on how to successfully participate and even influence
the regulatory process. Their key findings provide a strong foundation for exploring the
social dynamics of stakeholder groups:
(1) Agency culture and stakeholder experience can affect how and when specific
stakeholders are allowed to participate.
(2) Stakeholders seek multiple formal and informal avenues for participation.
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(3) Stakeholders are often playing the long game, in which they will seek to build
relationships with other stakeholders and agency members to further their
agenda.
While Roundtree and Baldwin’s (2018) findings provide a greater understanding of
stakeholder perceptions of participation and influence , their study offers only a cursory
description of stakeholders’ and agency members’ social connections and relationships.
This portion of the dissertation seeks to provide a richer examination of the social
dynamics of these important groups and how those relationships can shape their
perceived level of influence among one another. The following section goes into greater
detail on how these themes of stakeholder experience, agency culture, multiple avenues
of participation, and stakeholder networks can be constructed to examine stakeholder
perceptions of influence.

Stakeholder Experience and Familiarity with Agency Culture
Stakeholder experience and familiarity with PUC culture takes time and poses a
steep learning curve for many individuals to master. Experience is only achieved after
many years of active participation. Addressing the capacity and experience factors around
group participation in PUC proceedings helps provide context on group power
imbalances and exclusion and equality issues (Quick and Bryson, 2016).
First, an interest group’s ability to participate in a PUC regulatory proceeding is
often predicated by its capacity (e.g., organizational resources, staffing, and finances).
Some of these PUC proceedings are lengthy and require a great amount of time and
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resources. A traditional rulemaking will usually last approximately six months.
Stakeholders are expected to write up informed comments, attend meetings, attend
hearings, and engage with other stakeholders. This can be a time-consuming and costly
process that may deter groups from participating at all. In addition, most stakeholders are
involved in multiple policy proceedings, which adds further strain to an interest group’s
capacity for funding and staff.
Second, there is a minimum level of knowledge and experience of PUCs required
to participate successfully. As previous sections have emphasized, there is a steep
learning curve at state PUCs. The PUC proceedings are often very technical, legalistic,
and saturated in industry language and logic. Therefore, successful stakeholders are often
organized entities that have the resources to keep up with the job’s information and
technical demands along with a history of intervening.
Previous literature has noted the importance of PUC experience and the status that
experience brings to certain groups. Crow, Albright, and Koebele (2016; 2020) note the
difference in influence between “insider” and “outsider” groups. Crow, Albright, and
Koebele (2016; 2020) highlight that a group’s “status” as an insider or outsider affects its
ability to influence the proceeding. Similarly, Roundtree and Baldwin (2018) use the
distinction of “lay” and “expert” stakeholders.
In both instances, expert (i.e., insider) stakeholders are regulars around the PUC.
These stakeholder groups are often industry groups that have a history of participating at
the PUC and understand the formal and informal mechanisms to succeed in PUC
proceedings (Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2020). These expert stakeholders have a
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reputation that has been accrued over the years due to interactions with other stakeholders
and agency members and through their organization’s history with the PUC. Often expert
stakeholders will be familiar with PUC staff due to working closely with them over the
years. All of these reputational and experience factors can give expert stakeholders an
advantage at the PUC.
Crow, Albright, and Koebele (2016) emphasize that relationships can develop
among stakeholders and the regulatory agency over time from previous rulemaking
iterations, which subsequently leads to the regulatory agency inviting those stakeholders
to participate in other pre-proposal workshops. These staff invitations to participate
during the pre-proposal phase are important for stakeholders. The pre-proposal stage is a
major access point in the process in which stakeholders can influence the rulemaking by
creating or blocking specific rules (Yackee, 2012).
In contrast, lay or outsider stakeholders are often advocacy groups or citizens that
have little experience with the PUC. They will often lack the expertise and capacity to
participate to the level that expert stakeholders are able to participate. Previous literature
has also noted that despite formal public notification requirements, there is very little
public media attention and notification informing lay stakeholders and citizens to
participate in the proceedings. Often stakeholders must be on a PUC list server or aware
of the PUC to keep up to date with what proceedings are happening. Therefore, unless it
is a contentious mainstream issue such as fracking, citizens will not be aware of these
proceedings occurring or even what the PUC is.
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Experience and familiarity with the PUC culture are important facets of
stakeholder influence. As the state rulemaking literature has noted (Crow, Albright, and
Koebele 2016; 2020; Roundtree and Baldwin, 2018), there is a stark difference in success
between expert stakeholders and lay stakeholders. Experience matters and can open
access to other opportunities at the regulatory agency.

Formal and Informal Avenues for Participation
Roundtree and Baldwin (2018) highlight that expert stakeholders will seek
multiple formal and informal avenues for participation to increase their “impact on
decisions.” These avenues for participation cross over multiple PUC proceedings and
provide issue and network linkages for stakeholders. As the previous sections noted,
expert stakeholders often have a long history of interacting with PUC staff and other
expert stakeholders. These relationships can be beneficial in formal settings (e.g.,
stakeholder meetings and commission hearings) and informal networking. Sharing
information and finding common ground among stakeholders can create a more
productive platform for future negotiations and interactions (Roundtree and Baldwin,
2018). In particular, informal avenues for participation or networking have been noted as
especially advantageous.
Previous literature has noted the importance of coalition building (Gray and
Lowery, 1998; Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; McKay and Yackee, 2007; Baumgartner et
al., 2009; Nelson and Yackee, 2012; Crow et al., 2019). Coalition building is a key
component of the lobbying literature. At the federal level, coalitions offer many benefits
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to members with regards to groups sharing skills, information, and resources
(Baumgartner et al., 2009). Nelson and Yackee (2012) find that lobbying coalitions in
Washington D.C. are able to influence the content of policies. Nelson and Yackee (2012)
found that coalition success is predicated on group consensus and coalition size and
composition. Crow, Albright, and Koebele (2019) discovered that environmental
advocacy groups with few resources and less capacity formed alliances with professional
groups that possessed greater expertise in the policy area.
Therefore, it is clear that maintaining and nurturing relationships with regulatory
agencies and other stakeholders is important for interest groups that want to be invited to
the table. In addition, forming coalitions (even if they are brief) can help create network
connections and relationships that will carry over to future proceedings. Having social
influence with other stakeholders can be advantageous for group deliberations,
bargaining, and negotiations.

Playing the Long Game
Finally, Roundtree and Baldwin (2018) note that many expert stakeholders are
“playing the long game.” This is an important finding because it explains stakeholder
patterns of behavior. When stakeholders perceive themselves as being in the long game,
they will behave in certain ways to ensure their longevity in that “game.” Stakeholders
will work to create coalitions and allies that will endure past the current proceeding.
Stakeholders will be cautious in how they act towards opposing groups, as their past
actions will often affect how they are received later on.
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Playing the long game, the right way, can ultimately lead to reputational benefits
for a stakeholder and their organization. These reputational benefits (or detriments) are
social signals for other stakeholders and agency members. Stakeholders with good
reputations will be held in greater esteem than those with bad reputations. That esteem
and respect can lead to greater formal and informal opportunities throughout the PUC
process. Thus, the concept of “playing the long game” possesses a host of reputational
and social advantages that can be observed over time throughout multiple proceedings
and interactions. The experience gained from playing the long game reinforces the
perceived influence of those stakeholders, too.

A Conceptual Model for Perceived Stakeholder Influence
Based on the three themes discussed above (i.e., experience, group tactics, and
playing the long game), I advance a model for exploring perceptions of stakeholder
influence. This model of perceived stakeholder influence provides a framework for
explaining why some stakeholders are perceived as more influential than others. Rather
than a single driver for influence, this model proposes multiple facets of influence
relating to capacity, experience, reputation, expertise, and networking.
It is important to note that most of these facets of influence are fluid, given that
they exist within a social environment. These conditions are difficult to quantify, which is
why they have not been fully examined in previous literature. This dissertation
recognizes that the PUC process is a social process. Therefore, these fluid facets need to
be addressed to provide for a richer understanding of the stakeholders, processes, and
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behaviors observed at PUC proceedings. Table 4.3 lists the propositions that support the
conceptual model for perceived stakeholder influence.

Table 4.3 Propositions for Perceived Influence
Propositions: Perceived Influence
Proposition 1b (Capacity): Stakeholders whose organization possesses greater resource capacity (i.e.,
staff and finances) will be perceived as more influential.
Proposition 2b (Experience): Stakeholders who have a long history of experience and are more
familiar with formal and informal processes at the PUC will be perceived as more influential.
Proposition 3b (Expertise): Stakeholders that have greater expertise over an issue will be perceived
as more influential.
Proposition 4b (Intra-Group): Stakeholders that have a collaborative coalition with similar group
types will be perceived as more influential. In the inverse situation, stakeholders in a conflictual
relationship with similar group types will be perceived as less influential.
Proposition 5b (Inter-Group): Stakeholders that have a collaborative coalition with opposing group
types will be perceived as more influential. In the inverse situation, stakeholders that are in a
conflictual relationship with opposing group types will be perceived as less influential.
Proposition 5b (Network): Stakeholders with a wide array of network contacts (personal and
professional), will be perceived as more influential.

As this model depicts, there are multiple factors that contribute to an individual’s implicit
influence. Some of these factors are more tangible (e.g. resources), while others are more
fluid (social interactions with other individuals). The effects from these social
interactions and stakeholder relationships are pervasive across multiple proceedings.
87

Stakeholders are in a constant state of action and reaction with one another throughout
the entire PUC proceeding and into the next. An individual’s implicit influence can
therefore create opportunities or barriers to their ability to actually influence the process
and the outcome. While most of the following substantive chapters focus on stakeholder
access points and influence, it is important to continue to keep the model of perceived
influence in consideration as there are linkages between inclusive stakeholder
frameworks and perceived influence.
Conclusion
This chapter presented the dual models of stakeholder influence. During the first
portion of this chapter, the theoretical framework is built for the model of stakeholder
access points and influence. A stakeholder’s ability to influence the outcome of the
proceeding depends upon the type and the quantity of access points they can achieve. In
particular, the model advances that stakeholders will be more influential when they have
access to the pre-proposal phase, multiple stakeholder meetings, and multiple comment
periods.
The second portion of this chapter presented the model of perceived influence.
The model on perceived influence examines the factors that contribute to an individual’s
perception of influence of themselves and of other stakeholders. These perceptions of
influence are integral for how individuals are received by other stakeholders and the
engagement opportunities that they encounter (or do not encounter) throughout the
regulatory process.
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The next chapter provides a detailed discussion of the methodological approaches
utilized in this dissertation to support the dual models of stakeholder influence.
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Chapter 5 Methodology
Methodological Perspective
The scope of my research is an exploratory study that focuses on description and
theory building. The focus on thick description and theory building was an important
component for the research design give that there is a lack of prior scholarship on interest
groups influencing energy policy throughout the state rulemaking process. There is a gap
across the literatures regarding environmental and clean energy stakeholder influence at
state public utility commissions.
This dissertation seeks to remedy this gap by answering two interrelated
questions. First, what participatory mechanisms at public utility commissions lead to
greater levels of influence among environmental and clean energy groups? Second, what
effect do the social dynamics among stakeholder groups have on shaping a stakeholder’s
ability to be influential? This dissertation answers these questions in two phases.
Approaching the research question in two phases was necessary in order to offer a
cohesive and rigorous analysis of the complex processes and interactions of the
stakeholder experience at state public utility commissions.
In the first phase of the methods, the methodology called Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA) is employed. QCA was developed by Charles Ragin (1987; 2000) as a
middle ground between qualitative and quantitative methods. Unlike statistical linear
models that examine general associations or tendencies among variables, QCA analyzes
variables based on set relations (Ragin, 1987). Set relations enables the researcher to
examine the connections among causal conditions and outcomes. The software, fsQCA
90

3.0 (Ragin and Davey, 2016) is used to analyze the key conditions of interest. The output
from fsQCA 3.0 provides a detailed analysis of the causal relationships.
The second phase of the analysis is based on the interview analysis of key
stakeholders from the energy storage proceeding in Oregon. Interviews were conducted
with key stakeholders to explore the connections between stakeholders’ perceived
influence of themselves and of other stakeholders.
A codebook was developed prior to analyzing the interviews. Key themes and
conceptual frames were coded under each question and topic to be discussed in the
interview. With the help of the coding software, NVivo, a minimalist version of thematic
analysis was employed to the interview data to explore the key themes within and across
the interview data.
The rest of the chapter is divided into two sections. The first part of this chapter
provides a detailed explanation of QCA and how it was applied throughout this
dissertation. The next section presents a discussion of the six main steps in QCA while
also describing the unique output from this approach. The second part of this chapter
explains the interview process: the construction of the interview questions, the codebook,
and selection of participants. The following section reviews the steps to thematic analysis
and note its flexibility as an approach. This chapter concludes with a discussion on the
balance between inductive and deductive approaches within this dissertation.
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Introduction to Part I: Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Benefits of Qualitative Comparative Analysis
The objective of this first part of the dissertation is to examine what types of
access points environmental and clean energy stakeholders are able to take advantage of
to influence the final rules. This dissertation utilizes a methodology called Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) to examine the relationships between the cases. Cases were
determined based on four criteria: 1) legislative mandated regulatory process, (2) policy
issue type, (3) interest group type, and (4) led by the state’s public utility commission.
Across the five states, there were only 18 cases that fit the research design’s criteria. The
cases and states used in this dissertation represent the total population, as there have been
only five states that have conducted regulatory proceedings on energy storage targets.
Most quantitative methods that rely on statistical analysis are a poor fit for
research designs with a small quantity of cases. Therefore, most statistical methodologies
were not an option for the scope of this dissertation.
The natural solution to small case study research designs is through qualitative
methods. In particular, comparative case analyses is appealing given that it focuses on
rich explanations and is often supported by interviews from key actors involved with the
process or event. In comparative case analysis, researchers rely heavily on content
analysis to make inferences about the causal relationships among variables. However,
content analysis can fall easily to researcher bias, which impacts the reliability of the
research design. Concerns about content analysis were especially importantly in this
dissertation given that specific stakeholder positions were extracted to assess their level
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of influence from secondary docket materials (i.e., the Commission’s rulings and orders).
While researchers can work to create better reliability through more transparent practices
and records, it still remains a challenge to determine the validity of the study’s
conclusions.
A middle ground between statistical analysis and comparative case analysis is
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Ragin (2008) argues that QCA is a bridge
between qualitative and quantitative methods. Unlike linear statistical methods, QCA is
based on Boolean or fuzzy algebra. Boolean Algebra is based on set relations, in which
the researcher seeks to establish causality among the key conditions (i.e., variables)
through set relationships.
There are five main types of uses of QCA: summarizing data, checking the
coherence of the data, testing hypotheses or existing theories, quick test of conjectures,
and developing new theoretical arguments (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). QCA’s
methodology and overall objectives are a particularly strong match with this research
design given the theoretical and empirical limits of the cases and the desire to balance
thick description with concerns regarding the reliability and validity of the inferences.
QCA is an appropriate methodology for this research design over a statistical
design for four reasons. First, QCA is ideal for small to medium research designs (Ragin,
2008). The research design was inherently limited in the number of available cases to
examine given its narrow focus. Ultimately, there were only 18 cases spanning five
states. It would be difficult to infer any meaningful conclusions from such a small set of
cases using other quantitative methods based on regression. In addition, the framework of
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QCA helps address the inherent problem of over-specification, when there are too many
variables and too little cases to capture the patterns and connections among the data. The
QCA framework mitigates over-specification through several processes: minimizing
formulas, necessary and sufficient condition analyses, and the creation of causal
combinations. By the end of the QCA process, the researcher has been able to isolate the
key cases and causal relationships among the conditions of interest.
Second, QCA provides a rigorous method to examining complex causality (Ragin,
2008). This is especially relevant to this research given that the cases are context
dependent. As the previous section noted, the literatures have noted many factors that
contribute to a group’s ability to influence the rulemaking, but they have done so in
isolation of one another. The literatures have not taken the time to properly examine any
causal connections or interactions among the key factors. Therefore, QCA provides an
appropriate framework to explore the multiple findings from previous studies as a whole,
rather than piecemeal.
Third, the foundation of QCA is based on set theoretic relations (Ragin, 2008).
Set relations are preferential to correlational connections because they: “(1) involve
causal or other integral connections linking social phenomena, (2) are theory and
knowledge dependent, (3) are central to social science theorizing, (4) are asymmetric, and
(5) can be very strong despite relatively modest correlations” (Ragin 2008, p. 17).
Correlational research methods are particularly poor at providing clear conclusions when
the number of cases is small or medium, as in this dissertation. In addition, QCA’s set
relations are grounded in necessity and sufficiency conditions, which help to explain
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causal complexity. The necessary and sufficient framework is especially useful studying
interactions and patterns among condition, as in this dissertation, which seeks to examine
the interaction between institutional conditions and social conditions.
Finally, QCA bridges qualitative and quantitative analysis (Ragin, 2008). The
majority of the federal rulemaking literature has been primarily quantitative, which has
limited its ability to focus on the rulemaking process in its entirety. Often quantitative
rulemaking research has only examined single stages of the rulemaking process. In
addition, quantitative research has often been constrained in its focus on the actions of
single units of analysis (e.g., interest groups or the bureaucracy), rather than assessing
their roles and actions together as a whole. A QCA approach provides a more holistic
examination of the multiple causal factors and their interactions with one another which
quantitative research is unable to provide. Again, QCA is better suited to analyze the
complexity of fluid, social phenomena than a purely quantitative methodology provides.

Limitations of Qualitative Comparative Analysis
It is important to discuss the methodological limitations of QCA. First, not all
research questions will be suitable for QCA. QCA requires that the outcome and the
conditions be interval-based and grounded in the logic of a condition being present or
absent.
Second, QCA does not have a method to address missing data for a case. There
must be complete data for the cases and conditions to conduct a QCA analysis. This is a
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challenge when using interview data or conditions that do not have widely available data.
Entire cases must be dropped if there is missing data for a certain condition.
Another disadvantage of QCA is that it relies heavily on a researcher’s intimate
knowledge of the cases to construct the methods and then analyze the results. This risk is
especially high during the calibration of conditions, the minimization of the truth table,
and the analysis of the final solutions. There are inherent dangers of researcher bias in
these critical steps.
During the calibration stage, the researcher must create cut-off points based on
their knowledge of the condition. The calibration can sway the results if not done
carefully and in consideration of previous empirical cases and theory.
The minimization of the truth table also requires the researcher to use their
knowledge of previous empirical cases and theory. One of the inherent challenges of the
QCA process is that the truth table and the number of configurations become increasingly
complex as more conditions are added. Therefore, the minimization of the truth table
must be guided by knowledge and theory.
In the final stage of the analysis, there are often instances in which there are
multiple pathways to the final outcome (i.e., equifinality). The researcher must then use
their knowledge to determine the “best” configuration that explains their outcome.
Therefore, the QCA process can be a major challenge to the validity and rigor of one’s
research if not conducted transparently and within the boundaries of previous literature
and empirical cases.
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Despite these limitations, QCA provides more advantages than disadvantages.
Based on the scope of this dissertation, QCA provides the strongest methodology to
examine how and at what points in the regulatory process environmental and clean
energy stakeholders are influential. QCA can balance concerns regarding reliability and
validity of the data collection and analysis while supporting this dissertation’s goal to
provide a thick description of the stakeholders, processes, and causal mechanisms at play
across and within the five states.
The rest of the chapter provides a more detailed discussion of how QCA was
applied throughout this dissertation. The first section of this chapter examines the logic
behind QCA and what types of research designs it can be utilized for. It then summarizes
the rationale and calculations that went into performing the six steps of the QCA
methodology: (1) case specification; (2) selection and conceptualization of conditions; (3)
data collection; (4) conceptualization and calibration of membership scores; (5) analysis
of sufficient and necessary conditions; and (6) construction and analysis of a truth table.

Applications of Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Before proceeding to the methodology section of this chapter, it is important to
make the distinction between QCA as a research approach and QCA as an analytical
technique. As a research approach, QCA homes in on the qualitative aspects of a research
design through its iterative process of data collection, model specification, case selection,
and reconceptualization of the conditions and the outcome (Wagemann and Schneider,
2010). QCA as an approach utilizes a distinct vocabulary that differs from traditional
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quantitative methods. For example, rather than independent variables, QCA examines
conditions. Similarly, the dependent variable is called the outcome. In addition, rather
than measuring conditions, QCA calibrates conditions.
Complementarily, but not the same as the research approach, is QCA as an
analytical technique. As an analytical technique, QCA adopts its quantitative application
and examines empirical patterns in the data, usually with the help of software programs
(Wagemann and Schneider, 2010). QCA as an analytical technique utilizes computerbased and mathematical data analysis to determine causal relationships and a range of
possible configuration patterns from the cases. The research methods discussed below
reach their culmination in this final phase.
QCA can be utilized by itself as a research approach, but it cannot be relied upon
purely as an analytical technique. The foundation of the QCA approach is a strong
empirical and theoretical knowledge of the cases. This knowledge informs how the
researcher determines cases, conditions, outcomes, calibration points, and minimization
techniques. Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation, QCA is used foremost as a
research approach and then reinforced with QCA’s analytical techniques.
There are three types of QCA: crisp-set (csQCA), fuzzy-set (fsQCA), and multivalue (mvQCA). Crisp-sets QCA establish dichotomous distinctions that are qualitative
in nature (Rihoux and Ragin, 2012). The dichotomous values of [1] and [0] determine
membership for each condition. The value of [1] represents “fully in” membership for
that set while the value of [0] represents the condition being “fully out” of that
membership. For example, a crisp set condition could be whether an interest group
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submitted comments during the notice and comment period [1] or did not submit any
comments during the notice and comment period [0]. Table 5.1 shows the differences in
membership between crisp sets and fuzzy sets.

Table 5.1 Crisp Versus Fuzzy Sets

Source: Rihoux, B. & Ragin, C.C. (2012)

Multi-value QCA is an extension of csQCA, in which the main difference is that
mvQCA allows for multi-value variables rather than purely dichotomous variables
(Rihoux 2009). Multi-value QCA establishes subsets of the cases. For example, rather
than the dichotomous variable of submitting comments (a score of either [0] or [1]),
mvQCA might further distinguish this by creating three subsets: no comments [0];
submitted one to three comments [1]; submitted more than three comments [2]. In
practice, there is no limit to the number of subsets that mvQCA could use, as long as they
were grounded in theory or empirical work.
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The third type of QCA, fuzzy sets QCA, further distinguishes crisp-sets
membership by including intervals between [0] and [1]. Like the previous types of QCA,
a fuzzy membership score close to [1] indicates strong, but not full membership in a set
and a score closer to [0] but less than .5 indicate that the case is more ““out” than “in” a
set, but still weak members of the set” (Rihoux and Ragin 2012, p. 4). The score of .5 is
the anchor for maximum ambiguity, in which a case is neither in nor out of a set.
This dissertation utilizes fsQCA. This dissertation is well suited for fsQCA for
several reasons. First, the key conditions and outcome (i.e., influence) in this study are
interval based. The conditions of interest group influence are multidimensional and
cannot be reduced to dichotomous conditions, in which membership must either be fully
in (1) or fully out (0).
For example, the condition of level of participation cannot be configured to being
open or closed. Some stakeholders were able to participate fully throughout the entire
proceeding whereas other stakeholders only participated for a short amount of time.
There are multiple levels of participation from high participation to no participation.
Therefore, fsQCA is able to encompass the different intervals for each condition that
csQCA is unable to account for. Similar to the conditions of this study, the outcome of
this study is interval based, which precludes both csQCA and mvQCA. In order to utilize
either csQCA or mvQCA, the outcome must be dichotomous (Rihoux and Ragin, 2012).
Second, while fsQCA possesses quantitative characteristics of interval and ratioscale variables, it also enables rigorous qualitative analysis. The researcher must have a
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deep theoretical and empirical knowledge of the cases in order to effectively employ
fsQCA.
While QCA has been primarily utilized in comparative politics research, it has
many uses for different levels of analysis and across different units of analysis. This
dissertation employed the statistical software, fs/QCA 3.0 to analyze the results.7 This
software was developed by Charles Ragin and Sean Davey (2017). While there have been
critiques that the truth table analysis does not always put forth all the possible solutions,
this software was well-suited for this study. The researcher had in-depth knowledge of
the cases and the number of cases and variation among the cases is small. For a larger Nstudy, this discrepancy may be too large to oversee. However, the truth table results only
confirmed what had been analyzed by hand. The fs/QCA software was able to provide
more concrete numbers and causal associations that strengthen the dissertation’s
theoretical and empirical claims.
The following section goes into greater detail of how fsQCA was applied and
what the key steps are to the process.

Applying Fuzzy Sets to a Research Design
There are six distinct steps for fsQCA: (1) case specification; (2) selection and
conceptualization of conditions; (3) data collection; (4) conceptualization and calibration
of membership scores; (5) construction and analysis of a truth table; (6) analysis of

7

Ragin, Charles C. and Sean Davey. 2016. Fuzzy-Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 3.0. Irvine,
California: Department of Sociology, University of California.
For more information on the software, go to https://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml
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sufficient and necessary conditions. The six sub-sections below go into specific detail of
these steps and how to apply fsQCA and its logic to this study. Again, it is important to
recall that QCA is based on set relations and Boolean Algebra, which makes its
application, and even logic, different from other types of quantitative and qualitative
research designs.

Specification of Cases
One of the most important stages of QCA is determining the cases. QCA is case
oriented, which is distinct from variable oriented research that many quantitative methods
prioritize. The empirical setting for this dissertation is states since state level processes
are the being examined (i.e., state energy storage PUC proceedings). However the unit of
analysis is environmental and clean energy interest groups. It should be noted that there
were specific reasons for why interest groups are the unit of analysis for this dissertation.
Across disciplines, there are multiple terms that are used to describe groups or individuals
that engage with the political process (i.e., stakeholders, lobbyists, interest groups). For
the context of this study, the group is the unit of analysis.
It is important to emphasize that there is a distinction between interest groups and
stakeholders. There is a distinction between groups that participate in PUC proceedings
(i.e., stakeholders) and groups that do not participate (i.e., interest groups). In regulatory
proceedings, interest groups are referred to as stakeholders. In many instances, interest
groups must formally request to the PUC commission to be a party to a PUC proceeding.
There are few instances in which an interest group will not be allowed to be a party to the
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proceeding. Therefore, this dissertation uses the term interest group and stakeholders
interchangeably when referencing groups that are a part of the regulatory proceeding.
QCA not only provides the opportunity to examine the conditions within the
empirical setting of an interest group’s ability to influence the rulemaking process (i.e.,
within-case analysis), but it also provides an opportunity to examine interest groups
across the states to determine whether there are more general trends across the states that
can explain a group’s ability to influence the rulemaking process (cross-case analysis).
The following section goes through the steps that were taken to determine the
case selection for this dissertation.
Most Similar and Most Different System Designs. There are two main strategies
for determining one’s cases: “most similar” and “most different” system designs
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970). In instances of “most similar” system designs, cases are
compared that share many similarities (similar systems), but ultimately have different
outcomes (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009). The researcher seeks to control for most
of the variation among the cases to determine the conditions that differentiate the cases
from one another. “Most similar” system designs are usually most appropriate for smallN situations (2-4 cases) (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009).
In contrast, “most different” system designs “seeks maximal heterogeneity” in
which cases share few commonalities with one another, but have similar outcomes (BergSchlosser and De Meur 2009, p. 4). Given its focus on maximal heterogeneity, “most
different” system designs are most appropriate for mid-sized-N cases (15-25 cases)
(Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009).
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This dissertation utilized a “most different” system design. While the scope of this
dissertation is narrow regarding the type of issues and groups (as will be discussed more
below in the case criteria), the cases vary with one another given the different empirical
settings. Each state possesses unique state agencies and institutions, administrative and
procedural rules, legislative processes, and political cultures. In addition, the types of
clean energy and environmental groups can vary quite a bit across each state, in which it
is unlikely that the groups will have similar preferences, capabilities, or interests over the
policy outcome. Therefore, a “most different” system design was most appropriate for
this study.
Case Criteria. The cases in this research design are environmental and clean
energy interest groups that were involved in energy storage proceedings across five
states: California, Oregon, New York, Nevada, and Virginia.
Four criteria were employed to determine cases: (1) legislative mandates, (2)
policy issue type, (3) interest group type, and (4) led by the state’s public utility
commission. The first and most obvious criterion is that cases must come from states
whose legislatures have passed energy storage mandates. This criterion creates the
foundation for examining the behavior of interest groups during the rulemaking process.
The stipulation of legislative mandates is important because the regulatory process and
mechanisms for participation and notice can vary widely if the rules were promulgated by
a regulatory agency (non-legislative rulemaking) than by a legislative mandate (Cooper
2006).
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In addition, legislative mandates for energy storage are considered the most
stringent and effective policy tools for integrating energy storage into state and regional
energy systems. By focusing on just a single type of policy (legislative mandates), it was
easier to control the contextual variation of the empirical setting. While including a wide
array of different types of energy storage policies would increase the cases, it would also
be difficult to provide internal validity within the cases and external validity across the
cases.
Related to this first criterion is the second criterion, in which interest groups will
be chosen based on their involvement with the policy issue of energy storage. Interest
groups involved in energy storage proceedings must be organized entities. Individuals
must represent the interests of a specific organized group to be included as a case. In
addition, interest groups that were a sister organization or a front group for an industry
group were excluded. In some instances, industry or business groups will create smaller
interest groups to represent their interests so as not to draw attention to their greater
corporate identity
The third criterion was that the interest groups must be clean energy or
environmental interest groups. The focus on clean energy and environmental interest
groups is important given that these groups are often at a disadvantage in the policy
process as a result of the disproportionate influence of business and industry interests.
Industry groups are defined as regulated entities (Crow et al. 2016). Industry groups are
typically utility companies and trade groups. In contrast, non-industry groups (e.g.,
environmental, clean energy, and advocacy groups) are defined as being unregulated
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organizations and groups. Non-industry groups represent a more varied range of interests
in the energy field. Given the diversity of energy policy, it is likely that there is a wide
range of interests that defy the industry versus environment dichotomy of other
environmental policy areas.
Fourth, energy storage proceedings must occur at state public utility commissions.
This was an important criterion given that the most PUCs are required to provide a record
of regulatory proceedings, even if they are not specifically rulemakings. From a research
perspective, it is important to have a complete (or nearly complete) archive of the key
documents such as list servs, stakeholder comments, commission orders, stakeholder
meeting notes, and other regulatory documents.
The cases (i.e., clean energy and environmental interest groups) were selected
from five states that have conducted energy storage regulatory proceedings. However, the
other candidates, Massachusetts and New Jersey, were rejected from the case list due to
not meeting the key criteria noted above. Despite its legislative mandate to conduct a
rulemaking, New Jersey’s Board of Public Utilities (BPU) never commenced its
rulemaking. The NJ BPU was directed to respond to nine questions about energy storage
in a report by May 23, 2019.
The NJ BPU hired Rutgers University to write up the report, (“New Jersey Energy
Storage Analysis”). The NJ BPU was then required to launch an energy storage
proceeding six months after the report was released, however nothing has been initiated
by the NJ BPU. The NJ BPU has been fairly quiet as to why it has not commenced its
rulemaking for energy storage, but a BPU spokesperson did note that the agency’s top
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priority presently is the COVID-19 response despite the lapse in scheduling the
proceedings within six months from May 2019. Since New Jersey has not commenced its
regulatory proceedings, it is no longer eligible for this dissertation.
Massachusetts’s energy storage target proceeding was conducted not by the
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU), but by Department of Energy
Resources and the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center.8 Massachusetts has a unique
division of clean energy issues between the DOER and the DPU. While the DOER is
structured similarly to the DPU with regards to having the authority to create rules and
regulations, it is considered to be less of a traditional regulatory agency and more of a
policy advocacy agency for clean energy policy. The DOER possesses statutory authority
to manage renewable energy issues ranging from renewable portfolio standards to clean
peak standards. The DPU has authority to manage policies relating to utility regulation
and net metering. The DOER does not possess the authority to regulate the actions of
investor-owned utilities (IOUs), however it was authorized by legislative mandate to
establish energy storage targets.
The subsequent DOER process was not a rulemaking. Despite what was touted as
a major stakeholder process, the regulatory process was less formal than what would be
expected at the Department of Public Utilities. The process did not have distinct phases
that were documented. DOER staff also did not provide responses to stakeholder

8

In 2015, Governor Baker initiated the State of Charge energy storage study. The DOER and CEC were
put in charge of the study and provided $10 million in funds to facilitate a study on the potential benefits of
energy storage technologies. The DOER and CEC selected Customized Energy Solutions (CES) as the lead
to conduct the study. Four additional subcontractors were added to help CES with the final report. CES
utilized the modeling algorithms from Alevo Analytics.
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comments or about the procedure as PUC staff often do for most types of cases. Most
importantly, while at some point there were stakeholder documents, they were not
retrievable or readily accessed as required by state PUCs.
DOER proceedings are often stakeholder heavy and exceed the legal requirements
for public input. In the 2016 energy storage proceeding to determine whether to establish
an energy storage target, the DOER and CEC led a large stakeholder meeting that
included a wide array of stakeholder groups. The meeting facilitated workshop breakout
sessions whose aim was to create comprehensive responses to barriers and
recommendations. There was a follow-up online webinar, stakeholder survey, and
comment period. However, these materials were not available despite many requests to
procure them.
Therefore, while New Jersey and Massachusetts initially appeared to be potential
sources for cases, there were multiple challenges to incorporating them into this study.
The cases that I did identify and include in this study meet the four-criterion relating to:
1) legislative mandates, (2) policy issue type, (3) interest group type, and (4) led by the
state’s public utility commission.
Identification of Cases and Number of Cases. Key interest groups were
identified through several means. First, interest groups involved with the legislative
process and the rulemaking process were analyzed to ascertain which interest groups
were involved. The rulemaking docket was examined to determine the interest groups
that were involved in the energy storage proceedings.
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Cumulatively, there were 18 cases (i.e., clean energy and environmental) across
all five states. Table 5.2 lists the number of cases per state.

Table 5.2 Cases in Each State

State

Number of Cases
(environmental/clean energy groups)

California
Oregon
New York
Virginia
Nevada

9
3
3
2
1

There was a disproportionate number of cases in California compared to other states.
However, the level of participation among these groups provides interesting case details
that will be discussed in later chapters. In addition, Virginia had an environmental
coalition of eight environmental groups that formed joint comments. However, the eight
joint commenters never commented outside of the environmental coalition comments. In
order for parsimony, these groups were categorized as a single, joint stakeholder group. A
more in-depth analysis of this environmental coalition will be addressed in the
subsequent chapters.

Selection and Conceptualization of Conditions and Outcomes
Conceptualizing Outcomes. As noted in previous sections, measuring
stakeholder influence is difficult, as influence does not always culminate to a single
moment in time. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, influence was
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conceptualized at the most transparent point in the regulatory process: the comment
period. This is not an uncommon practice, as previous literature has measured
stakeholder influence over the final rules. Previous rulemaking literature (Yackee and
Yackee, 2006; McKay and Yackee, 2007) has measured influence based on a 3-point
scale of the difference in direction between the draft rules and the final rules: (+1) more
government involvement; (0) remained the same level; or (-1) less regulation. The
authors note that this method simplifies the complexity of interest group politics, but is
able to distinguish core positions and changes in the final rules. Yet, given the wide array
of interest group preferences in the energy storage proceedings, such a simplification of
interests is not robust enough to explain environmental and clean energy group influence.
The outcome for the QCA model is influence of clean energy and environmental
interest groups. Influence was calculated at the comment phase of the proceeding. I
measured influence by using content analysis of the comments and submitted documents.
I examined the written comments of the stakeholder and then compared them to the
commission staff’s response to stakeholder comments in the final order.
During most regulatory cases, commission staff is required to directly
acknowledge stakeholder comments in the final order. Stakeholder’s ability to influence
the commissioner’s final decision were measured by examining the key issues at stake for
that docket. For example, in Oregon, key issues in contention included debate on use
cases, definitions, the timeframe, and criteria, competition, granularity, and proposed
approach.
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Stakeholders received an additive score for the issues that they submitted
comments on during the comment periods. Scores reflected the level of influence from
high staff or commission concurrence (e.g., adopt, recommend) to low (e.g., disagrees
and supports the opposite action). Levels of influence ranged from a (-2) to positive (+2):
o (+2) Staff agrees and supports action (adopt, recommend)
o (+1) Staff agrees (recognizes, shares, etc.).
o (0) No objection or No response
o (-1) Staff disagrees, no action
o (-2) Staff disagrees and proposes to support the opposite action
If for some reason, Staff did not provide a proficient response to stakeholder comments,
stakeholder comments were analyzed relative to the Final Order. This was the case with
the majority of the stakeholder documents for the cases in New York. Generally,
stakeholder comments clustered around specific issues or sets of questions (e.g.,
comments to a straw poll, comments for sections to proposed order). The comments, draft
proposal, and final order were compared to elucidate whether the stakeholder was able to
impart language or ideas into the final order.
Finally, cut-off points were calibrated for stakeholder influence based on the high,
middle, and low raw scores. The issues were not weighted because this resulted in too
much researcher bias. What might have been considered a small concession over a
definition, could have actually been revolutionary for the entire docket. Therefore, it was
better to err on the side of caution by not introducing what could be considered undue
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researcher bias. The codebook in Appendix A provides a more in-depth discussion of
how stakeholder influence was measured and calibrated.
Conceptualizing Primary Conditions, Institutional Mechanisms, Group
Tactics, Group Capacity, and Inter-Group and Intra-Group Dynamics. One of the
problems of any small to mid-level research design is that of over-specification, when
there are too many variables. The section below addresses the primary conditions
highlighted from the literature. However, the framework of QCA helps address overspecification through several processes: minimizing formulas, necessary and sufficient
condition analyses, and the creation of causal combinations. This is a natural part of the
QCA process. Therefore, the problem of over-specification is not as serious of an issue as
it would be for other types of qualitative research design. The sections below will go into
greater detail of how these processes were integrated into the research.
There are three key themes across these conditions: institutional participation,
institutional inclusiveness, and procedural constraints or opportunities. First, institutional
participation was measured based on the agency’s opportunities for (1) public comment
(e.g. OPPCOM and PCOM), and (2) stakeholder access to technical meetings or
workshops (e.g., ACCESSM).
Next, institutional inclusiveness was measured by: (1) whether stakeholders were
invited to pre-proposal meetings (or were part of the pre-proposal phase) (e.g., PREPROP
and PALL), (2) whether stakeholders were part of working groups related to energy
storage or similar energy issues (e.g., WORKG). Institutional inclusiveness is an
important condition for a group’s ability to participate and potentially influence the
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rulemaking process. It matters who is invited to the “table” and who is not. Table 5.3
provides a complete list of the outcomes and conditions.

Table 5.3 Complete List of Outcome and Conditions

Outcome

Influence (influence over the Final Rule or Order)
RULEM (Indicates whether case was a rulemaking or not a rulemaking)
TARMAN (Indicates whether an ES target was mandated in the legislation or
not)
GOV (Indicates whether process was governor led or not)
GUIDE (presence of framing document)

Causal
Conditions

PREPROP (Stakeholder access to pre-proposal phase)
WORKG (Whether there were working groups on ES or similar)
ACCESSM (Amount of stakeholder technical meetings)
OPPCOM (Amount of stakeholder opportunities to comment)
PCOM (Stakeholder level of participation during comment periods)
PALL (Whether stakeholder was present throughout entire proceeding)
FINS (stakeholder group’s financial status)
EMCAP (stakeholder group’s staffing status)
RVIEW (Indicates whether Final Rules were required to be vetted by another
government agency or government entity)
CONADV (Indicates whether state had a consumer advocate or not participating
in the proceeding)

Third, contextual factors encompassed conditions that shaped stakeholder’s
opportunities and constraints to participate (e.g., GOV, TARMAN, RULEM, RVEIW).
The rationale behind whether a regulatory proceeding was led by a governor is that a
powerful governor will essentially mandate specific aspects of the policy to the PUC or
the legislature to follow-up on. This occurred in New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
and Virginia. The governors of these states made clean energy (and energy storage) a
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central part of their governor’s agenda. This was signaled overtly in their state of the state
addresses at the beginning of each year.
While the PUC is an independent body, separate from the governor’s office, the
Commissioner’s in these states are appointed by the Governor. So, while commissioners
will be independent, they will likely take on cues that they receive from the Governor. In
addition, governor appointed commissioners are likely to embody certain policy
preferences that the governor perceives to be important.

Collection of Data
Data was collected through primary and secondary sources. Secondary data was
collected through regulatory agency dockets (draft and final rules, public comments,
formal statements, and other documentation), interest group website information, and
state websites. Based on prior research and determinations, a protocol was created for
each relevant condition and outcome along with their create cut-off points.
Context analysis was used to determine the raw scores for the conditions and the
outcome. In some cases, it was a simple count or a determination of “yes” or “no” (e.g.,
compensation, had access to pre-proposal proceedings, submitted comments). In other
instances, data sets and grey literature were employed to measure certain condition.

Calibration of Membership Scores
A crucial step in being able to reliably determine the causal complexity of the
results of fsQCA is to calibrate membership thresholds for the conditions of one’s
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dissertation. A key concern for fsQCA is ensuring that thresholds are based on theoretical
and empirical foundations as calibrated member scores are vulnerable to researcher bias
or error. Table 5.4 below shows how the conditions and outcome were calibrated.
Appendix A provides a more complete discussion of how the outcome and the conditions
were calibrated.

Table 5.4 Fuzzy Set Calibration of Outcome and Conditions

OUTCOME

INFLUENCE
RULEM

1.0, .8, .6, .4, .1, 0
1.0, 0

TARMAN

1.0, 0

GOV

1.0, 0

GUIDE

1.0, 0

CAUSAL

PREPROP

1.0, 0

CONDITIONS

WORKG

1.0, 0

ACCESSM

1.0, .67, .33, 0

OPPCOM

1.0, .67, .33, 0

PCOM

1.0, .8, .6, .4, .1, 0

PALL

1.0, 0

FINS

1.0, .8, .6, .4, .1, 0

EMCAP

1.0, 67, .33, 0

Each of the conditions was calibrated dichotomously or through a four or six
value fuzzy set. It is important to note that the subset relation is the key to understanding
the causal relationships in one’s dissertation. However, it can be difficult to establish
causality in fsQCA because each case’s fuzzy membership scores may be unique, despite
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sharing a specific combination of conditions or outcomes (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). That
is why the calibration stage of fsQCA is so important.

Analysis of Sufficient and Necessary Conditions
This section will briefly discuss the important method of assessing necessary and
sufficient conditions and how this method is beneficial to determining complex causality.
A necessary condition “is a condition that must be present for the outcome to occur, but
its presence does not guarantee that occurrence” (Rihoux and Ragin 2012, p. 22). In
contrast, sufficient conditions must always produce the outcome in question (Ragin,
2000). Rihoux and Ragin (2012, p. 22-23) note that, “In general, a necessary condition
can be interpreted as a superset of the outcome, while sufficient conditions (usually
combinations of conditions) constitute subsets of the outcome”.
It is important to address necessary conditions prior to the construction of the
truth table given that the truth table is an analysis of sufficient conditions and
combinations of sufficient conditions. However, that just because a condition is a
necessary condition does not mean that it does not have any theoretical or empirical
value; it just indicates that its explanatory value is not strong enough to explain consistent
patterns of the outcome.
Ragin (2000, p. 91) notes that analyzing necessity and sufficiency is key to
addressing the problem of being able to generalize one’s empirical findings. Assessing
necessity and sufficiency of the conditions of interest established parameters around their
generalizability. Necessary conditions can be considered of import only in certain
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instances (with little generalizability), however sufficient conditions once established,
can be generalized to other like cases. Establishing generalizable conclusions with
sufficient conditions is important because it increases the validity of smaller studies that
might have been previously considered to possess low external validity. A necessary
condition test was conducted on fsQCA 3.0 to determine the necessary conditions.
The following results are highlighted in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Conditions

Consistency

Coverage

GUIDE

0.753623

0.40000

PREPROP

0.57971

0.44444

ACCESSM

0.863768

0.426019

OPPCOM

0.959420

0.451877

PCOM

0.971014

0.690722

FINS

0.826087

0.548077

EMPCAP

0.834783

0.508385

PALL

0.797101

0.610000

TARMAN

0.333333

0.460000

GOV

0.246377

0.340000

RULEM

0.594203

0.315385

There are two parameters of fit to consider in this test. First, consistency is a parameter of
fit in which the proportion of cases in the configuration are also in the outcome set, with a
score of 1.0 indicating a perfect subset relationship (Kahwati and Kane, 2020). A
minimum consistency for the necessary conditions test should be 0.90. The second
parameter is coverage, which measures the proportion of cases that the solution covers
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from the cases. Minimum coverage scores should be 0.60. The condition PCOM
(stakeholder’s level of participation during the comment period) was the only condition
that reached the minimum thresholds for consistency and coverage. Therefore, PCOM is
a necessary condition. The identification of this necessary condition is important when
presenting the final results of the fsQCA analysis in the following chapter.

Construction of Truth Table
Once the data was collected and each case was assigned membership scores, the
truth table was constructed to analyze the results. The truth table is culmination of this
dissertation’s results. Truth tables are an important tool for analyzing causal conditions
and outcomes, in which the researcher can determine whether certain combinations of
conditions share similar outcomes (Ragin 2009). The truth table lists all of the different
possible combinations of causal conditions. This helps determine condition sufficiency
by logically simplifying patterns of the causal conditions in the truth table.
The truth table consists of the calibrated membership scores of the key causal
conditions and the outcome. There are three main operations on fuzzy sets that enable the
analyze of the complex causality among the conditions and the outcome: negation,
logical AND, and logical OR (Rihoux and Ragin, 2012). These three operations will be
especially useful to analyzing the truth table given the complex interactions that I have
predicted among the institutional and social conditions.
First, negation reverses scores so that they are the inverse of themselves. For
example, the outcome label of “influence” (with [1] being highly influential and [0] being
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no influence) would be negated to being “no influence”. Interest groups that are labeled
to have high influence (close to [1]) would then be negated to have a score closer to [0]
and vice versa for interest groups that were originally labeled to have little to no
influence. The operation of logical AND is best understood as the set intersection, in
which two or more compound sets are combined (Rihoux and Ragin, 2012). Finally, the
operation of logical OR is the union of sets, in which two or more sets are joined. These
operations determine the causal combinations among the key conditions of interest and
the outcome. The following chapter on the truth table results delves into the intricacies
and implications that the truth table analysis.

Final Notes on fsQCA 3.0 Software
There have been critiques of Ragin’s fsQCA 3.0 software because it does not
adequately address the problem of limited diversity. Limited diversity is a natural
occurring challenge that most small sample studies suffer from (although it exists with
large studies, too). A small sample size is often unable to account for all the possible
combinations of the solution. QCA provides counterfactual cases, which are
combinations of causal conditions that lack empirical instances.
However, concerns about limited diversity are minor given the dissertation’s
narrow scope. This dissertation’s scope is focused on a distinct policy issue across a
small number of state PUCs, during a period of time in which there was little salience for
that policy issue. So, the configuration of the cases represents the total population of the
cases that this dissertation is interested in explaining.
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In addition, the fsQCA analysis was supported by a strong familiarity and
understanding of the cases and the state contexts. Therefore, while fsQCA 3.0 software
may be problematic for other research agendas that seek to explain all possible
combinations of conditions, it is a good fit for this research design.
The following section of this chapter discusses the methods that were employed to
analyze how the regulatory process shapes the interactions and perceptions of influence
among stakeholders.
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Introduction to Part II: Examining Perceived Influence
The methodological approach for the second portion of the dissertation employs a
version of thematic analysis. The goal of the second part of this dissertation seeks to
assess stakeholder perceptions of influence along multiple points in the process. In
addition, this portion of the dissertation seeks to provide a strong picture of the social
interactions and behaviors that occur at state PUCs.
This study utilized stakeholder responses from semi-structured interview data to
provide a more granular examination of stakeholder perceptions of influence for the
entire PUC proceeding. Themes of perceived influence were then analyzed across the
interview data using the coding software, NVivo.
The qualitative analysis of the interview data from Oregon was important to
include in this dissertation to provide a richer explanation of the social dynamics at state
PUCs and among stakeholders. The findings from this second phase confirm and build
upon the initial QCA analysis. The rest of this section describes the processes for
collecting interview data, coding data, and consolidating the interview data into key
themes.

Case Selection and Interviews
Case selection was constrained by the availability of interview data. Only the
cases in Oregon were chosen because it was difficult to obtain a sufficient level of
interview data from the other four states. Some key stakeholder participated in many of
the state energy storage proceedings, but declined to be interviewed, which negatively
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impacted the quality of data for states that had a more limited amount of stakeholders
involved. In other instances, it was difficult to track down key stakeholders as they had
moved on from their position. However, for the majority of requests, the stakeholders
either declined or did not respond.9
California and Oregon had the best response rate for interview requests. Yet, the
circumstances for only examining Oregon stakeholders were stronger for a few reasons.
First, Oregon had a small number of stakeholders that represented a broad range of
interests. The smaller number of stakeholders made it easier to achieve a saturation point
in the interview data.
The methodological principle of saturation is important in qualitative research as
it helps determine the number of interviews that need to be conducted to capture the key
themes and ideas of the issue of interest. Saturation originated in qualitative research in
grounded theory by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Glaser and Straus (1967) originally
defined data saturation as the point in which “no additional data are being found whereby
the [researcher] can develop properties of the category” (pg. 61).
In the case of Oregon, eleven interviews were conducted with the following types
of stakeholder groups: environmental, clean energy, trade, research, utility, consumer
advocacy, and PUC staff. By the last few interviews, a saturation point had been

9

The lack of response rate for interview requests may be due to several factors. First, many of the requests
in non-responsive states were conducted during the first half of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Second,
individuals may have been wary of the aim of examining “stakeholder influence”. Even in the interviews
that I did conduct, stakeholders at times expressed concern that the study might be looking for instances of
undue influence or unethical behavior. As was mentioned in other sections, there has been a history of
corruption at state PUCs and unethical behavior by regulatory members and interest groups.
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achieved: there was not a lot of new information being collected and interviewees were
beginning to repeat similar accounts and themes.
California had a large number of stakeholders, which made it difficult to
determine if a saturation point had been reached in the data. Second, there was an issue
with time passage in the case of California. California’s framework energy storage
rulemaking occurred almost a decade ago, which made it difficult for participants to
recollect important details about the rulemaking. In contrast, only three years had passed
since the energy storage docket had been initiated in Oregon. Therefore, just focusing on
Oregon stakeholders was a better fit for the data, scope, and the intent of exploring the
facets of perceived influence.
The goal of these interviews was to assess stakeholder group perceptions of
influence along multiple points in the process, group tactics to influence the process, and
stakeholder group dynamics (i.e., collaboration and conflict). The interviews were
conducted over a year, from September 2019 until October 2020. Interviewees were
selected based on their participation with the PUC energy storage proceedings. Each PUC
docket has a list server that denotes which groups are parties to the docket. Key
stakeholders were identified from the docket materials and the list server. A total of nine
interviews were conducted with key stakeholder groups. The response rate for interview
requests with active participants was 69 percent.
In addition to the key stakeholders involved with the energy storage proceeding,
other environmental groups were contacted to be interviewed. The environmental groups
that were contacted were involved with similar legislative issues or had been involved
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with other OPUC proceedings in the past (i.e., negative cases). It was important to
understand outside environmental groups’ perceptions of the OPUC and the regulatory
process. The response rate for these groups was only 40 percent and resulted in just two
interviews that were negative cases.
In total, five interviews in-person and six interviews were conducted over the
phone. There were distinct questions and prompts that were followed. However, the
general structure of the interviews was open-ended. In addition, the interviews were on
background, in which respondents had greater freedom to disclose information with the
assurance of anonymity. The interview survey questions were intentionally developed to
be in chronological order to the energy storage proceeding. The interview questions were
structured this way to build up respondents’ memories over the course of the interview,
so that they would have a stronger recollection of the proceeding by the time they were
asked questions about stakeholder collaboration and influence. Appendix C includes that
response rate data for the interview requests. Table 5.6 lists the key conditions.

Table 5.6 List of Key Conditions to Explain Perceived Influence

Outcome

Perceived Influence
Group Capacity
Institutional Constraints
Individual Expertise

Key
Conditions

Individual Experience
Formal Lobbying
Ex-Parte Lobbying
Intra-Group Collaboration or Conflict
Inter-Group Collaboration or Conflict
Perceptions of Fairness During Process
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The interview questions relied upon a combination of Likert scale questions and
open-ended questions (see Appendix C for the interview survey). The interviews
questions were constructed to examine specific mechanisms and themes. The bulk of the
emphasis throughout the interviews was centered around a respondent’s participation
(and factors that contributed to the level of participation of their group), collaboration
with other stakeholders, perceptions of the regulatory process, and perceptions of
stakeholder influence.
The original intent of the interviews and the subsequent coding of the interviews
was to use them in a larger fsQCA analysis. The codebook was constructed to easily
convey interview answers into verbal scores and then into fuzzy membership scores. Yet,
the lack of state interview data dramatically altered the possibility of conducting a QCA
analysis. Therefore, the codes for the QCA analysis were modified into larger themes and
concepts to use to qualitatively code the interview data.
This dissertation utilized the qualitative coding software, NVivo, to code the
interview data. NVivo provided useful tools for analyzing the interview data for patterns
and key themes. In addition, NVivo provides descriptive data on the frequency of specific
words and the percentage that codes show up within and across the data. NVivo is also
useful for clustering and collapsing the codes within the data sets to ensure that each code
is distinct and robust. Appendix B shows the specific codes, definitions, and examples
used to guide the coding process.
The next section discusses how the thematic analysis (TA) was employed to
interpret and generate meta-themes from the interview data.
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Thematic Analysis
This portion of the methods employs a version of thematic analysis (TA). TA is a
tool for analyzing qualitative data. It has been predominantly utilized in the social
sciences. While the practice of TA has been around for quite some time (e.g., exploring
themes in qualitative data), there is not a consensus on a particular method that one must
follow (Terry et. al, 2017).
Terry et al. (2017) notes that there are two broad ‘schools’ across the TA
community: ‘Small q’ and ‘Big Q’. The first approach, ‘Small q” comes from positivist
research. Themes are determined in advance of the analysis and are often grounded in
theory. ‘Small q’ analysis relies heavily on coding reliability, in which the researcher’s
results can be confirmed and replicated using the codebook.
In contrast, the ‘Big Q’ TA approach “operates within a qualitative paradigm and
is characterized by (genuine) theoretical independence and flexibility, and organic
processes of coding and theme development” (Terry et. al, 2017, p. 8). ‘Big Q’ coding
can utilize a codebook, but relies more on repeated engagement and immersion with the
data to extract themes. Coding under ‘Big Q’ is a subjective and interpretative process
that results in a deeper level of analysis.
This dissertation fits between the ‘Small q’ and the ‘Big Q’ TA approach. While
the first round of themes was grounded in the content of the interviews and the initial
codebook for the interview questionnaire, the final analysis was shaped by my knowledge
of the cases and the meta-theme that emerged from the interview data.
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Again, while there is not a sole method to conduct TA, Clarke and Braun (2006)
provide a flexible framework for thematic analysis which involves six steps:
(1) Identify items of interest from the data
(2) Generate codes
(3) Generate themes
(4) Review potential themes
(5) Define and name themes
(6) Analysis
It is important to note that this dissertation did not prescribe entirely to the organic
analysis that Clarke and Braun (2006) promote. As noted earlier, the foundation of the
thematic analysis relied on a set of codes that were set prior to the content analysis. For
this reason, this dissertation has assumed a more flexible version of TA, which Terry et
al. (2018) observe as a commonplace practice across the disciplines.
The first step of TA is similar to any method of content analysis. The researcher
identifies important concepts and themes from the data set and previous research. It is
during the second step of the coding process that TA begins to differentiate itself from
other content analysis methods. During the second step, the researcher generates codes,
however the process is “iterative and flexible” allowing for code revision and
development to clarify and provide a more rigorous product (Terry et al., 2018).
During the third step of ‘generating themes’, the researcher examines the codes
for pattern formation and identifies key themes. NVivo is especially useful during this
stage as it enables the researcher to cluster and collapse codes within the data. The
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researcher identifies potential ‘candidate’ themes that are then transformed into a rough
thematic map.
It is during the fourth and the fifth step that the researcher reviews and defines the
themes to ensure that the themes are distinct from one another but also relate to each
other. The fifth step in the reviewing process adopts a more interpretive stance, in which
the researcher is able to construct a narrative that embodies the richness and connections
among the themes. This step of the TA process requires that the researcher have a deep
knowledge of the dataset and have developed robust themes. The final phase is the
analysis, which produces the narrative to connect the themes.
Thematic analysis was a natural draw methodologically because of the codes and
themes that were discovered prior to the analysis of the interview data. Thematic analysis
is applied seamlessly with the coding software NVivo. Using NVivo, thematic analysis
provided a compelling approach to organizing the interview data while taking into
consideration the nuances and moods from within the data that would otherwise been too
risky to address in more positivist approaches.
Examining themes of perceived influence is important because it captures social
subtleties that are missed just by looking at docket materials. As previous sections
throughout this dissertation have noted, the concept of influence is multi-faceted and is
difficult to determine with just one method. Many studies fight to control the fluidity of
social phenomena in order to pin down relationships and processes. However, the second
portion of this research design embraces the complexity and fluidity of the social
experience at public utility commissions. While these social interactions and calculations
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are not easily transmissible to neat tables and models, it is important to address them
because they are significant aspects of the regulatory process for stakeholders. The rich
details and empirical conclusions from these interviews provide a strong picture of the
social interactions and behaviors that occur at public utility commissions

Conclusion
The Balance Between Deductive and Inductive Frameworks
The first phase of this dissertation is largely deductive and based on empirical and
theoretical findings from previous literature. The conditions and relationships that were
propositioned amongst them were shaped by previous studies or white papers. The
propositions were tested using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to
determine which inclusive and participatory mechanisms interest groups are able to
access most successfully to influence the final rules.
The QCA framework is especially useful qualitatively, as it enables the researcher
to identify relationships among the cases and conditions, while also generating logical
patterns of causality. The results provide a comparison of cases within states and across
states. The five state case analyses provide thick description of the complex institutional
processes and their subsequent effect on the behavior of key interest groups, agency
members, and other relevant stakeholders. Previous quantitative rulemaking scholarship
has not provided nearly enough qualitative cases that explore these relationships.
The second phase of the analysis strikes a balance between deductive and
inductive approaches. A minimalist version of thematic analysis was applied in this
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portion of the dissertation. The initial data collection and analysis of the second phase is
grounded in a deductive approach. First, a codebook was constructed around key
conditions and concepts. The codebook helped to ensure the rigor and validity of the
process and analysis.
Second, interviews were utilized to provide greater detail on how stakeholders
perceived the act and concept of influence throughout the energy storage proceeding, the
PUCs, and among other stakeholder groups. The interview questions were based on
themes and concepts that were grounded in theory and empirical findings. While many of
the interview questions were framed to gain a greater understanding of stakeholder
influence, networks, and collaboration, there were unanticipated themes that were
discovered during the coding process that provided a shift to a more inductive and
interpretative approach.
An inductive approach was adopted during the coding process of the interview
data with the coding software, NVivo. NVivo was useful to analyze the interview data as
one can cluster and collapse codes within the data, view code frequency, and compare
how certain codes were spread across the cases. It became clear that more was going on
after some time was spent examining the codes and their frequency across the interview
data. Drawing from previous theory, the cases, and the Oregon interview content, a
conceptual model of implicit influence was constructed based on the analysis of certain
themes from within the interview data.
The balance between a deductive and inductive framework was not intentional,
but necessary with greater familiarity with the data. The findings from these two
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approaches are complementary to one another and provide a richer picture of the events,
processes, drivers, relationships, and actors involved in PUC energy storage proceedings.

Notes on Generalizability
This dissertation examines a small set of cases across a niche issue area and
within similar state regulatory agencies. It is important to reiterate that the range of cases
in this dissertation represents the entire population of cases (i.e., environmental and clean
energy interest groups). So, a limited number of cases existed from the beginning. This
limited focus is further narrowed in the second phase of the research, in which a single,
unique state case is examined. However, even though the focus of this dissertation is
limited, the methodologies and models in both phases of this dissertation are
generalizable for future research in similar issue areas or even for examining stakeholder
processes in other regulatory agency settings.
First, the fsQCA framework used in this dissertation is easily adaptable for other
research agendas or research on new states that pass energy storage regulations. One of
the advantages of fsQCA is that the researcher can modify the conditions throughout the
analysis as they gain a greater understanding of the cases and their causal relationships.
So, while certain conditions may not be sufficient in this framework due to the small
number of cases, they may be sufficient in others with more cases. Similarly, some
effects examined in this dissertation may not be present for other cases. However, as was
mentioned previously, the research question and conditions must be interval-based,
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indicating the presence or absence of a condition or the level (high or low). Therefore, the
fsQCA approach may not be appropriate for all research.
Second, fsQCA is an ideal approach for research studies with a small number of
cases. Many state-level research studies have a limited number of cases making it
difficult to analyze within-case and cross-case implications. The fsQCA methods provide
a rigorous qualitative and quantitative approach that generates generalizable results for
future studies. The fsQCA analysis determines which conditions (or combination of
conditions) are sufficient or necessary. Therefore, any final solution will include
sufficient conditions which are generalizable to similar cases and contexts. This aspect of
the fsQCA process helps relieve generalizability concerns that afflict other methodologies
for small-N research.
Third, while fsQCA was created for small-N research, fsQCA can also
accommodate larger sets of cases, enabling it to be used across many contexts and
research questions. For example, this methodological framework would continue to be a
good fit to examine the participatory and inclusive stakeholder frameworks of future
energy storage proceedings in other states. It could even be extended to examining the
stakeholder process for renewable portfolio standard mandates.
It is important to note that the fsQCA framework requires a strong understanding
of the cases and the contexts. Results from fsQCA analyses should be supported with
comprehensive case studies to elucidate the causal connections that each of the conditions
have with one another to produce the outcome. Therefore, results cannot be blindly
applied to other cases without the proper knowledge of the unique contexts.
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The second phase of this dissertation also provides a generalizable methodology
for future studies. The interview methodology for the second phase should be used in
future research to continue to test the rigor of its framework. The interview framework
and subsequent thematic analysis of perceived influence could easily be expanded to
include other state contexts. As mentioned earlier, the initial methodology sought to
include interviews from all of the five states. So, it is important to the validity of this
dissertation to continue to broaden the available data on perceived influence.
However, there does need to be some caution with utilizing the methodology for
perceived influence. There needs to be a high saturation rate of interviews among a
diverse range of participants, and again, the researcher needs to have a strong
understanding of the cases and contexts. It would likely be difficult to implement this
framework when there is a large number of cases (e.g., more than 50 stakeholders), given
the difficulty of reaching a saturation point with the interviews.
One would likely have to shift to questionnaires to address such a large number of
cases. Even then, much of the richness of the interview process would be lost in the
process. Therefore, it is preferable to maintain the interview structure to examine
conditions of perceived influence to retain the integrity of the rich details of the case.
This dissertation will come back to some of the issues raised on generalizability
more in the Conclusion as the findings from the fsQCA analysis, and the interview data
will clarify the generalizability of these methodological frameworks. The following
chapter presents the findings from the fsQCA analysis of the five energy storage
proceedings.
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Chapter 6 Results and Summary Findings
Introduction
This chapter presents the fsQCA truth table analysis results and discusses the
important features from those results. As the previous chapter highlighted, fsQCA
analysis is different than traditional regression and statistical analyses. Therefore, this
chapter spends some time going over the process and the rationale behind some key
decisions for the truth table. Appendix D provides pictures of the steps that were took
using the fsQCA 3.0 software since it is not as common as other statistical software.
In addition to the comprehensive fsQCA analysis of all five state energy storage
proceedings, a fsQCA analysis is conducted on just the stakeholders in California.
California is a special set of cases because it disproportionately included half of the cases
for the entire study and is one of the few states that allows environmental groups to be
eligible to receive intervenor compensation. It was important to isolate the nine
California cases to confirm the study’s findings and ensure that there were not any
outliers that were skewing the results. In addition, another fsQCA test is run without the
California cases to check for robustness of the truth table solution.
Finally, the last portion of this chapter reviews the cross-case findings and the
within-case findings of each of the states. The cross-case findings confirm the findings of
the fsQCA truth table analysis and the within-case findings provide a rich examination of
the key contexts for each of the five states in this analysis.
However, before examining the truth table results, this chapter provides a brief
summary of the key stakeholders involved across the five state energy storage
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proceedings. It is important to have an understanding of the different types of
stakeholders that each energy storage proceeding attracted because this contributed to
how the stakeholder process was conducted. The unique stakeholder make-up for each
state energy storage proceeding added to the diversity of expertise in some cases (e.g.,
California), while ensuring the opportunity for consensus among a small group of
stakeholders in other circumstances (e.g., Nevada).

Regulatory Stakeholders: Who Participates and Who Does Not
Each state’s energy storage proceeding attracted a different array of stakeholders.
Some proceedings were small such as Nevada and Oregon, whereas New York and
California brought in many different stakeholders. The type of stakeholder also varied
across each of the states. For example, Virginia brought in the most environmental
stakeholders however that did not seem to help their position or influence throughout the
rulemaking. There was a wide range of stakeholders involved in the energy storage
dockets across each of the five states.
While this dissertation focuses more on environmental and clean energy groups,
the role of developers and producers in these proceedings is important to note since it has
not been greatly examined in the academic literature. Energy storage developers and
producers make-up the largest group of stakeholders at 37percent. While there are many
smaller, start-up energy storage developers and producers, there are also some big names
that come to the table with money, resources, and expertise. Tesla is the most well-known
mainstream developer of batteries, however there are major energy storage developers
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that participated in many of the state proceedings such as NextEra Energy, Siemens,
Fluence, RES, Eversource Energy, Invenergy LLC, National Grid, AES, SunPower,
Borrego Solar Systems, Key Capture Energy, and Avangrid. Energy storage producers
and developers are taking large stakes in the energy storage market and are subsequently
becoming major actors in the policy making process. Figure 6.1 shows the proportion of
stakeholder groups across the five states.

Figure 6.1 Total Stakeholders by Sector

Total Stakeholders by Sector

Utility 14%

Non-Profit 3%

Government Agency 7%

Developer/Producer 37%

Environmental/Clean Energy 8% Trade 15%
Consultant 1%

Business 3%

Research/Think Tank 3%

Individual 2%

Consumer Advocate 2%

Government City 3%

The high proportion of energy storage developers and producers participating in
these proceedings is therefore not surprising. Energy storage developers and producers
are attempting to influence the content of the energy storage final rules while also
courting utilities to award them energy storage contracts. However, what is good for
energy storage developers and producers is not always good for utilities. The issue of
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third-party ownership is a key point of contention that divides energy storage developers
and producers from utilities. Utilities typically prefer to have greater control over the
energy storage projects they are implementing. Yet, third-party ownership provides
greater opportunities for developers to be awarded contracts for storage projects. So,
developers and producers must engage in these types of proceedings carefully, often
playing a two-level game.
Another important group of stakeholders were trade groups. Trade groups
represent a diverse range of interest groups. The participation of trade groups was integral
for the overall scope of each of the proceedings as these groups often brought a wide
range of expertise to the dockets and reputational power from their members. In addition,
there were instances in which members of the trade groups were also participating to
some level throughout the same proceedings. While not all trade group members will
agree with one another, having the trade group as a common identifier and source of
informational networking is useful to the learning and deliberation process for any PUC
proceeding.
While the majority of trade groups involved in the energy storage proceedings
were energy storage and solar groups, there were also trade groups for hydropower, wind
power, and hydrogen energy. These groups often were all in favor of energy storage, but
only within the confines of their sector. There were divisions among these trade groups as
they sought to show that their energy storage technologies should be included in the
procurement process.
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Table 6.1 shows the numeric breakdown of each type of stakeholder across the
five states.

Table 6.1 Stakeholder by Sector Across Five States

STAKEHOLDER TYPE
VA

NV

STATES
OR

Utility

4

1

2

10

8

25

Non-Profit

2

0

1

1

1

5

Government Agency

1

1

3

3

5

12

Developer/Producer

7

2

12

28

19

68

Environmental/Clean Energy

2

1

3

7

2

15

Trade

3

2

7

10

6

28

Consultant

0

0

2

0

0

2

Business

1

0

1

3

1

6

Research/Think Tank

1

0

1

2

2

6

Individual

1

0

0

2

0

3

Consumer Advocate

1

0

1

2

0

4

Government City

0

0

1

2

2

5

Legislature

1

0

1

0

0

2

Other

0

0

0

1

1

2

Total

24

7

34

71

47

183

CA

NY

Total

Despite these policy divisions, the participation of energy storage developers,
energy storage producers, trade groups, and research institutions brings to light the
importance of expert, technical knowledge in shaping the energy storage process and
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ultimately the final rules. In many of the cases, the issue of energy storage was new for
utilities and stakeholders. Therefore, many PUCs turned to experts to inform the process
and gain a better understanding of the intricacies of energy storage. This requisite to learn
is seen through the publication of energy storage study reports (e.g., Massachusetts, New
York, New Jersey, and Nevada), consultation with research institutions (e.g., Oregon),
and trade group experts (e.g., California).
Environmental, clean energy, and non-profit groups make-up a small proportion
of the total amount of stakeholders. While the energy storage proceedings span eight
years across five states, there has been few changes to the proportion of environmental
stakeholders that have participated. Environmental and clean energy groups continue to
remain on the fringes of energy storage policy at the regulatory phase.
The lack of participation of environmental groups appears to stem from a few
issues. First, some environmental stakeholders may not be aware that the proceeding is
occurring. While state PUCs are required to publish public notifications of the
proceedings, stakeholders must be privy to the sources that PUCs are sending their
notifications to or be on a list serv for that topic. Therefore, less experienced stakeholders
may never know that the proceedings are occurring, or may eventually join later once
they have heard from other stakeholders. This was especially true for environmental
groups that focus more on the legislative side of the policy process than the regulatory
process. These groups are less aware of PUC list servs and public notification processes.
Second, some environmental groups are structured to be more effective at
different phases of the policy making. For example, some environmental groups may
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place greater importance upon the legislative phase than the regulatory phase because
they realize that they can direct their resources and utilize their tactics more effectively
during that phase. In addition, often board members of non-profits want to prioritize more
salient and flashy legislative outcomes than the quieter, technical outcomes from a
regulatory proceeding.
Third, while it is considered to be important, energy storage legislation has not
garnered the same attention as renewable energy mandates or larger DER issues. With the
exception of professional journals and trade websites, there was little to find about state
energy storage legislation and regulatory proceedings in the mainstream newspapers and
magazines. It was difficult to find any mention of the energy storage proceedings for the
five states in any of their major state newspapers or in a search of national news sources.
Since there was so little data to find from these sources, it was not possible to construct a
condition for political salience based on news sources.
Finally, some environmental groups may not have the capacity to participate due
to financial or staffing shortages. There are often dozens of legislative and regulatory
proceedings occurring simultaneously. These groups must make decisions on what issues
or proceedings to prioritize. In the case of Oregon, the contentious Coal to Clean bill was
working its way through the legislature during the time that the energy storage bill passed
and then the subsequent PUC regulations. Many environmental groups were putting a
large amount of their resources into ensuring that the Coal to Clean bill passed the
legislature.
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Another notable group of stakeholders with a small presence at PUCs is
individuals. There were very few individuals or citizen groups that participated in energy
storage proceedings. While PUC proceedings are open to all stakeholder groups, there is
a lack of participation by individuals. The PUC process is dominated by professional
stakeholder groups and experts in the energy sector. It is likely that individuals and
citizen groups are not aware of how to participate during PUC proceedings due to the
technical nature of energy policy and PUC processes.
What is absent in this breakdown of stakeholder groups is telling as it highlights
the difference in stakeholder dynamics in PUC energy storage proceedings from those
depicted in the environmental literature. Business groups have a small presence in many
of the state energy storage proceedings. The largest presence of business groups occurred
in California, but even then, their participation was minimal. The conflict dyad between
environmental and business is replaced environmental and clean energy interests versus
utility interests.
However, even that conflict dyad does not embody the real dynamics of the
proceedings. Contrary to Baumgartner et al. (2009), there were not always two distinct
opposing interest group coalitions fighting over a policy dimension. In many of the
energy storage proceedings, differences arose among environmental, trade, utility, and
developer and producer groups at multiple policy points. Therefore, the key issues at
stake were not divided between pro-utility versus pro-clean energy concerns.
Environmental groups can be fractured and advocating for different outcomes. For
example, the determination to exclude hydropower as an allowable energy storage project
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in California’s rulemaking was a major divide across many stakeholder groups. Some
environmental groups advanced that hydropower should be included in energy storage
cases, while others believed its inclusion would detract from the aim to procure new
sources of storage (i.e., batteries).
In addition, many utilities were not necessarily against energy storage. Rather,
utilities were cautious about binding targets, storage ownership, regulatory oversight, and
how storage would be integrated into their resource mix. For example, the NV Energy
was already in the process of procuring pilot energy storage projects when the binding
targets were established. Therefore, there were many issues and contexts at stake in these
proceedings. It was not simply a policy division between groups that advocated for
energy storage and those that did not want energy storage.
It should also be noted that there did not appear to be any major veto players
across the regulatory proceedings. While there were differences of preferences and some
stakeholders were against the establishment of energy storage targets, there were not
outstanding stakeholders that were able to prevent the establishment of the energy storage
targets and subsequent framework. The state commissions oversaw the establishment of
energy storage targets that were meaningful. In the coming years, we may see major veto
players arise in these types of proceedings as the gain salience. The lack of veto players
may change as more states begin to seek to implement energy storage targets in states
that possess greater fossil fuel interests. As evident in the Virginia case, the natural gas
industry has begun to realize their diminishing role in state energy resource mixes and
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have begun to seek new paths to continuing natural gas’ legacy in future renewable
energy policy.
This lack of oppositional or veto groups is likely the result of the issue ambiguity
surrounding energy storage. As previous literature has discovered (Falkner, 2008; Stokes,
2015), divisions among powerful groups can create an opportunity for environmental
interest groups to be influential. In addition, when a specific policy issue is unfamiliar,
divisions have not been formed yet. Therefore, while the utilities were forced to
participate, other traditionally powerful stakeholders such as the fossil fuel groups and
business groups remained on the fringes of the proceedings. It was not until Virginia and
New York that there were more distinct coalitions, yet even then, there remained
ambiguity among the stakeholder groups on how to proceed with energy storage.
There was also collaboration and engagement amongst various stakeholders. In
proceedings in California, New York, Virginia, and Oregon, clean energy and
environmental stakeholders would often submit joint comments with one another. Across
the states, environmental stakeholders had great familiarity with one another and actively
sought to interact with one another, despite any differences that they had with one
another. This collaborative dynamic will be examined in greater detail in the state studies
in the following chapters.
This section has reviewed what types of stakeholders were involved in the energy
proceedings across the five states in this dissertation. Environmental and clean energy
interest groups made up a relatively small proportion of the stakeholders in each of the
five states. However, the following section shows how some of these environmental and
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clean energy stakeholders were able to successfully navigate the energy storage
proceedings to be influential.

Fuzzy Set QCA Truth Table Results
Setting Up the Truth Table
The results of the fsQCA analysis confirmed two major theoretical assumptions
for this study. First, stakeholders are influential in the rulemaking process, and second,
that environmental interest groups have greater influence over the final rules when state
PUC stakeholder processes were more inclusive and participatory. These results are
significant because previous literature (Golden, 1998; Woods, 2009; Baumgartner, 2009;
Yackee, 2011; 2015; Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz, 2014; Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2016)
has provided mixed results on the influence of non-industry stakeholders during
rulemakings. There is even less information within the rulemaking literature on the
influence of environmental and clean energy groups during state rulemaking processes.
In addition, these results show that process matters and can lead to more stringent
and progressive policy outcomes in the final rules. The findings show that while utilities
and other traditional industry stakeholders continue to have the greatest capacity
(finances, time, and staff) to engage in PUC proceedings, they do not possess unfettered
influence over the process. Utilities and industry stakeholders often must endure losses
and engage in processes they oppose. Therefore, utility influence during the energy
storage proceedings was not near the level that the agency capture model would have
predicted.
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The fsQCA analysis examined conditions relating to institutional participation,
institutional inclusiveness, group capacity, and procedural constraints or opportunities.
Table 6.2 shows the conditions and outcome variables that were used in the fsQCA
analysis along with their abbreviations.

Table 6.2 Research Conditions and Outcome

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Conditions
GUIDE
(Presence of framing document)
PREPROP
(Access to pre-proposal phase)
ACCESSM
(Amount of stakeholder technical meetings)
OPPCOM
(Amount stakeholder comment periods)
PCOM
(Stakeholder level of participation during comment periods)
PALL
(Present throughout entire proceeding)
GOV
(Governor led the policy process)
WORKG (Whether there were working groups on ES or
similar)
RULEM (Indicates whether case was a rulemaking or not a
rulemaking)
TARMAN
(Indicates whether an ES target was mandated in the
legislation or not)
RVIEW
(Indicates whether Final Rules were required to be vetted by
another government agency or government entity)
CONADV
(Indicates whether state had a consumer advocate or not
participating in the proceeding)

Outcome

INFL
(Influence over Final Rules)

It is important to note that the data was revisited a few times to achieve the final
results that are shown in this chapter. Revisiting the data is an important step in QCA that
Ragin (2008) emphasizes as a standard part of the process. Some conditions were deleted
145

and added other conditions as greater empirical knowledge of the cases was gained and
the causal relationships became clearer in the truth table. There were some conditions that
did not have strong consistency scores that appeared to overcomplicate the minimization
process. For example, in the first iteration of the truth table results, it is clear that state
level conditions (i.e., target type, case type, governor led, rule review, and the presence of
a consumer advocate) were not sufficient conditions. These conditions were dropped.
The second iteration of the truth table examined agency level and group level
conditions (e.g., access to pre-proposal phase, number of comment periods, number of
meetings, groups finances, group staffing, group participation, and presence throughout
the entire proceeding). These agency and group level conditions had greater explanatory
value and consistency scores.
In addition, while there were some interesting relationships to observe with group
factors such as financial strength and employee capacity, these conditions were
contradictory at times. The results showed that group financial and staffing capacity were
not causal conditions in determining the level of influence a group could achieve or not:
there were some cases in which low financial and low staff capacity led to high levels of
influence and some cases in which high financial and high staff capacity led to higher
levels of influence. However, this is a condition that should be studied in the future as
many interviewees noted the importance of financial and staffing capacity as a
determinant for choosing to participate in PUC proceedings or not. Yet, when
stakeholders make efforts to prioritize certain PUC proceedings, finances and staffing are
not seen as immediate barriers to their participation.
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The Table 6.3 on the next page, shows the calibrated membership scores for the
cases. The conditions were calibrated on different scales, but were consistent within the
condition. For example, the condition PREPROP (whether there was a pre-proposal stage
open to stakeholders) was calibrated dichotomously (1 or 0), while PCOM (participation
during comment periods) was calibrated along a six-point fuzzy score. These differences
in calibration were made to fit the different degrees certain conditions embodied. In
addition, the directionality of the conditions was calibrated to match the outcome of
influence.
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Table 6.3 Data Matrix of Cases for Stakeholder Influence
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CASE

GUIDE

PRE
PROP

ACCESS
M

OPP
COM

PCOM

FINS

EMPCAP

INTV
COM
P

RULE
M

TARMAN

CON
ADV

RVIEW

PALL

GOV

INFL

Sierra Club
(CA)
RNW/
NWEC
(OR)
WRA (NV)

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

0.9

1

1

1

1

1

0.4

0.67

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0.9

1

1

1

1

1

0.8

0.67

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0.9

GPI (CA)

1

1

1

1

0.6

0.4

0.67

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

0.6

CEJA/Sierra
Club (CA)
IREC (OR)

1

1

1

1

0.4

0.4

0.33

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.6

1

0

1

1

1

0.4

0.33

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

0.6

Clean
Coalition
(CA)
NRDC (NY)

1

0

1

1

0.4

0.4

0.33

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0.4

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.4

0.6

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0.4

NYCEJA
(NY)
Sierra Club
(VA)
Environ.
Adv. (VA)
Vote Solar
(CA)
FOE (CA)

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.4

0.4

0.33

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0.4

0

0

0

0.33

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0.4

0

0

0

0.33

1

0.6

0.67

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0.4

1

1

1

1

0.4

0.4

0.33

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.1

1

0

1

1

0.1

0.6

0.67

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.1

IREC (CA)

1

0

1

1

0.1

0.4

0.33

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.1

ACES (NY)

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.4

0.4

0.33

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

0.1

EDF (CA)

1

1

1

1

0.1

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

UCS (CA)

1

1

1

1

0

0.8

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

NWEC (OR)

1

1

1

1

0.4

0.4

0.67

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

Stakeholder Abbreviations: Sierra Club (Sierra Club), Renewable Northwest (RNW), Western Resource Advocates (WRA), Green Power Institute (GPI), California Environmental
Justice Alliance (CEJA), Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc. (IREC), Clean Coalition (Clean Coalition), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), New York City
Environmental Justice Alliance (NYCEJA), Environmental Advocates (Environ. Adv.), Vote Solar (Vote Solar), Friends of the Earth (FOE), Alliance for Clean Energy New York (ACE
NY), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Northwest Energy Council (NWEC).

Minimizing the Truth Table
Once the membership scores have been determined, the data is ready for the truth
table analysis. The results of the truth table from the fuzzy QCA analysis highlight
important conclusions about state PUCs, stakeholder participation, and the resulting level
of influence of certain groups. In the original output of the fsQCA, there are many logical
configurations shown (there were 64 configurations for this data set). Many of the
configurations are logical remainders, which are outcome configurations that do not have
any cases that meet the configuration. Since there are not any cases in those rows, these
configurations are dropped to minimize the set of possible solutions. As Table 6.4.
shows, there were only 7 configurations that fit the cases.

Table 6.4 Truth Table Analysis Results

GUIDE PREPROP ACCESSM OPPCOM PCOM PALL Number INFL

Raw
consist.

PRI
consist.

SYM
consist

0.0625

0.0625

•
•
•
•
•

Vote Solar
CEJA/Sierra
EDF
UCS
NWEC

1

•
•
•
•

RNW/NWEC
Sierra Club
(CA)
WRA
GPI

1

1

1

1

0

0

5

0

0.189189

1

1

1

1

1

1

4

1

0.916667 0.896552

CASES

1

0

1

1

0

0

3

0

0.25

0

0

•
•
•

Clean Coalition
FOE
IREC (CA)

0

0

0

0

0

1

2

0

0.666667

0

0

•
•

NRDC
NYCEJA

0

0

0

0

1

1

2

0

0.747664

0

0

•

Environ. Adv.
(VA)
Sierra Club
(VA)

•
0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0.166667

0

0

•

ACES NY

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

0.6

0.333333

1

•

IREC (OR)
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The previous chapter discussed the importance of logical remainders, which are
the extra configuration rows in the truth table that lack empirical cases. These empty
configuration rows highlight the problem of limited diversity, in which the researcher’s
cases are limited by the available social phenomena. Therefore, there can be
configurations that are a better fit for counterfactuals. In the case of this dissertation, it is
likely that there are future cases that may fit different data configurations better than the
current set of cases.
Yet, for what this dissertation is seeking to explain about forerunner states during
a specific moment in energy storage’s policy history, it is entirely appropriate to only
examine the configurations that are representative of the actual cases. The clean energy
and environmental groups in these first five states are the entire population. In addition,
these cases showcase a period in the energy storage policy history in which energy
storage was a new policy issue with nascent technologies. Given these factors, addressing
the problem of logical remainders is not a major concern for the results of this study
currently.
Moving on, one will notice that the results of the truth table analysis only show 0s
and 1s, to represent membership. While the output only shows 0s and 1s, the fuzzy table
consistency scores are calculated differently from that of a crisp set (only dichotomous
data). In fuzzy sets, cases are calibrated in such a way that they hold membership in
multiple rows simultaneously.
It is important to explain the parameters that the truth table utilizes to examine the
configurations: raw consistency, PRI consistency, and SYM consistency. First, raw
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consistency is a parameter of fit in which the portion of cases in the configuration that are
also in the outcome set. Consistency determines the configuration’s degree of sufficiency.
Consistencies for fuzzy sets should have a minimum consistency of at least .80 (Kahwati
and Kane, 2020). A consistency of 1 indicates a perfect subset relationship and therefore
a strong relationship of sufficiency.
The raw consistency score is used in the minimization of the truth table by
establishing a minimum consistency score to determine which configurations are the best
“fit”. The only configuration in Table 6.4 that had a raw consistency score above .80 was
the second row. The rest of the configurations lacked a sufficient relationship to outcome
(INFL). The researcher then codes the outcome (INFL) with 1 for configurations that
have a raw consistency above .80 and 0 for configurations with a raw consistency lower
than .80.
The PRI consistency stands for “proportional reduction in inconsistency” and is
an “alternate measure of the consistency of subset relations in social research” (Kahwati
and Kane, 2020). It is only relevant in fuzzy sets and provides a more accurate measure
than raw consistency.
SYM consistency is known as symmetric consistency and was established for
fuzzy set analysis of the original outcome and the negated outcome (the inverse
relationship). In crisp set QCA, the raw consistency score is symmetrical for the original
outcome and its negated form. However, the raw consistency score for the original
outcome and the negated outcome is different for fuzzy set QCA. SYM consistency
ensures that the consistency score is symmetrical for both types of analyses. Therefore, in

151

this dissertation, a high SYM consistency of 1 indicates that the inverse solution explains
a stakeholder not influencing the final rules. This is a good indicator of the strength of the
causal relationships among the conditions because it is logical in its original state and in
the inverse.
There are several prime implicants identified by the fsQCA software before the
final analysis of the Truth Table in completed: (1) PREPROP and PCOM and (2)
PREPROP and PALL. Prime implicants are expressions that cannot be reduced any
further. In some instances, there are multiple prime implicants (reduced expressions) that
cover the original primitive expressions (Ragin and Davey, 20I7). During the
minimization process of the truth table, the researcher seeks to find a solution in which
the prime implicants cover the most expressions as possible. The researcher determines
which prime implicants to use in the final analysis according to his or her theoretical and
substantive knowledge of the cases (Ragin and Davey, 2017). Since the prime implicants
are simple to understand, they were included in the final analysis for transparency.

Interpreting the Final Truth Table Analysis
Once the truth table has been minimized and coded, the researcher conducts the
analysis. Fs/QCA 3.0 software provides three solutions with the standard analysis:
complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solutions. The results of the three solutions are
shown in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.5 Results from Truth Table Analysis
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The three solutions are derived based on how they treat the remainder
combinations (Ragin and Davey, 2017).
Complex: remainders are all set to false, no counterfactuals
Parsimonious: any remainder that will help generate a logically simpler solution
is used, regardless of whether it constitutes an “easy” or a “difficult”
counterfactual case
Intermediate: only remainders that are “easy” counterfactual cases are allowed to
be incorporated into the solution.
The parsimonious solution is the most basic solution, but presents the “core conditions”
to the solution. In the parsimonious solution from Table 6.5, one will notice the two
prime implicants and their dual pathways to reach the outcome. The consistency scores
and coverage scores for both are lower than the intermediate and complex solutions. The
consistency score for the parsimonious solution PREPROP*PALL is the strongest, but its
unique coverage is naught. In contrast to the parsimonious solution, the complex solution
presents every possible combination of the conditions. In some cases, the large
combinations from the complex solution make it difficult to make any inferences about
the cases and the conditions.
The intermediate solution is a part of the complex solution and includes the
parsimonious solution. Both the complex and intermediate solutions are the same in the
truth table and advance a relationship between all six of the conditions. The expression
for the solutions is:
GUIDE*PREPROP*ACCESSM*OPPCOM*PCOM*PALL=>INFL
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The multiplication symbol in the results indicates a logical AND relationship, in which
each condition is a combination of the other. The conditions that appear in the
intermediate solution, but not the parsimonious solution (GUIDE, ACCESSM,
OPPCOM) are considered “peripheral conditions”.
The consistency score is 0.917 with a raw and unique coverage score of almost
.48. While the coverage score is initially not as robust as one might want (i.e., .60 or
above), it is does not undermine the final results. As noted above, there is often a tradeoff between high consistency scores and coverage scores. In addition, the empirical
understanding of the cases confirms the unique relationship between these conditions and
the level of influence environmental stakeholders are able to impart on the final rules.
While Ragin (2008) recommends using the intermediate solution, he also
emphasizes that the researcher should rely on empirical information to guide his or her
decision on which solution best fits the data and cases. However, among the QCA
community, there is division on which solution should be used (Baumgartner, 2015;
Thiem, 2019). The original critique of Ragin’s fsQCA software (1999-2003)10 was that
the complex solution was too complex and detracted from the “interpretability of its
findings” and the parsimonious solution made unrealistic assumptions about the empirical
material (Thiem, 2019).
Ragin and Sonnett (2005) sought to remedy this issue by devising what is now
known as the intermediate solution, which seeks a balance between the parsimonious and

10

Drass, Kriss A. and Charles C. Ragin. 1992. Qualitative Comparative Analysis 3.0. Evanston, Illinois:
Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University.
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complex solutions. The intermediate solution was found to be more attractive given that
“[t]he rationale for creating intermediate solution terms is that, on the one hand, the
conservative solution often tends to be too complex to be interpreted in a theoretically
meaningful or plausible manner and that, on the other hand, the most parsimonious
solution term risks resting on assumptions about logical remainders that contradict
theoretical expectations, common sense or both” (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p.
175). Yet, there is still controversy that the intermediate and the complex solutions
provide inaccurate inferences about the dataset that are contradictory.
Despite these criticisms, for these results, the intermediate and the complex
solutions reinforce one another and provide a stronger fit of the empirical cases than the
parsimonious solution. Given my empirical knowledge of the cases, the intermediate and
complex solutions are not contradictory of the cases. The final solution proposes that
clean energy and environmental stakeholders were more successful at influencing the
final rules when
(1) The group participated during the pre-proposal process.
(2) There were three or more stakeholder meetings.
(3) There were three or more comment periods.
(4) The group participated in the majority (90 percent) of the comment periods.
(5) The group was present from for the entire proceeding.
(6) There was not a guiding document.
It is important to reiterate that the final solution advances a “logical and” relationship, in
which the single solution is a combination of all of the conditions list above.
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Table 6.6 shows the standout configuration for all values over the solution threshold
greater than 0.8. The solution consistency for the parsimonious solution did not meet the
0.8 threshold, so was not included. Notice that the size of the black circles indicates
whether the conditions are core or peripheral conditions.

Table 6.6 Configuration for Stakeholder Influence
Solution
Configuration

Intermediate/Complex

Guide
Pre-proposal
Access to Meetings
Opportunity to comment
Participation During Comment
Presence
Consistency

0.916667

Raw Coverage

0.478261

Unique Coverage

0.478261

Overall solution consistency

0.916667

Overall solution coverage

0.478261

Note
Black circles indicate the presence of a condition
Circles with ""x" indicate absence of a condition
Large circles indicate core conditions
Small circles indicate peripheral conditions
Blank circles indicate "don't care"

The fsQCA results are significant because it supports this dissertation’s argument
that there are important access points throughout the proceeding. Specifically, the preproposal stage and the comment periods are integral to a group’s ability to influence the
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final rules. This is important on two levels. First, these findings show that the preproposal stage is important for stakeholders. Being at the “table” before major decisions
or rules are proposed does provide advantages to stakeholders.
However, the findings also support that the comment period is also an important
stage in which stakeholders can be influential. This is important because not all
regulatory proceedings will hold a pre-proposal stage for all stakeholders. The findings
on the importance of the comment period also emphasize that the quantity and likely the
quality of the comments is linked to a group’s level of influence.
However, these two conditions (PREPROP and PCOM) rely on other peripheral
conditions in order for a group to be influential. These findings highlight that
stakeholders must also display a high level of participation in stakeholder meetings and
the comment period to be influential. Therefore, the process is time intensive for
influential stakeholders as they must take time to be a part of the pre-proposal phase,
attend stakeholder meetings, and submit multiple rounds of comments. From a practical
point, this highlights that interest groups that want to be influential must put in the time to
be so.
As more states pass energy storage mandates, different configurations and
conditions may emerge. As the following sections discuss, the newness of energy storage
in these proceedings was a major factor in how each state approached the stakeholder
process. As state PUCs and utilities gain greater knowledge of energy storage systems,
the dynamics in energy storage rulemakings will likely shift so that there is less emphasis
on information gathering, learning, and deliberation.

158

One condition that this analysis did not examine was whether the presence of
intervenor compensation had a causal relationship with a stakeholder’s ability to
influence the final rules. The California cases are notable since a few of them were
eligible to receive intervenor funds. The following section takes a brief examination of
the Californian cases.

California and Intervenor Compensation
Out of all five states in this dissertation, California has nine clean energy and
environmental groups, which is the greatest number of cases. Given the large number of
cases attributed to California, it was important to isolate what was going on among these
cases to see if there were causal relationships that were unique to California.
In addition, the deeper analysis of California would show whether there was a
connection between intervenor compensation and a stakeholder’s ability to influence the
final rules. The membership data was separated so that it just had cases from California.
Only the group level conditions were included, as the state level conditions are negligible
when examining variation within state cases. The nine stakeholder groups represented a
range of environmental and clean energy groups with varying staffing, financial
capacities, and participation rates.
The California energy storage rulemaking attracted a diverse and large number of
environmental and clean energy groups. The age and type of the groups were varied.
Friends of the Earth, Environmental Defense, and the Union of Concerned Scientists are
older, national non-profit advocacy groups that arose from the environmental activism of
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the 1960s. Sierra Club is among the oldest and largest environmental groups, being
founded in 1892. In contrast, clean energy groups such as Clean Coalition, Vote Solar,
Interstate Renewable Energy Council, California Environmental Justice Alliance, and
Green Power Institute are newer groups from the 2000s (see Table 6.7).

Table 6.7 California Stakeholders Truth Table
CASE

PCOM

FINS

EMPCAP

INTV
COMP

PALL

INFL

Sierra Club

1

1

1

1

1

0.9

GPI

0.6

0.4

0.67

1

1

0.6

CEJA/Sierra

0.4

0.4

0.67

0

1

0.6

Clean Coalition

0.4

0.4

1

1

0

0.4

Vote Solar

0.4

0.4

0.33

0

0

0.1

FOE

0.1

0.6

0.33

0

0

0.1

IREC

0.1

0.4

0.67

0

0

0.1

EDF

0.1

1

0.67

0

0

0

UCS

0

0.8

0.33

0

0

0

Stakeholder Abbreviations: Sierra Club (Sierra Club), Green Power Institute (GPI), California Environmental Justice Alliance
(CEJA), Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc. (IREC), Clean Coalition (Clean Coalition), Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), Vote Solar (Vote Solar), Friends of the Earth (FOE), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS).
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Just like the comprehensive analysis of all five states, a necessary conditions test
was ran before the truth table analysis. The necessary conditions test in Table 6.8 shows
that PCOM, FINS, and EMCAP have strong consistency scores. However, PCOM is the
only necessary condition as it is the only condition that meets the minimum coverage
score, too.

Table 6.8 Necessary Conditions Test
Conditions
PCOM
FINS
EMCAP
INTVCOMP
PALL

Consistency
0.928571
0.857143
1
0.678571
0.75

Coverage
0.83871
0.444444
0.493827
0.633333
0.7

After analyzing which of the conditions were necessary conditions, the truth table
analysis was conducted (see Table 6.9 on the next page).
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Table 6.9 California Truth Table Analysis

The parsimonious solution had a much stronger consistency and coverage score
than the original analysis. A stakeholder’s level of participation during the comment
periods (PCOM) is shown to have a strong causal connection to their ability to influence
the final rules. Like the original fsQCA results, the intermediate and the complex
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solutions are the same. Table 6.10 provides a simplified table to interpret the results from
the fsQCA California analysis.

Table 6.10 Configuration for California Stakeholder Influence
Solutions
Configuration

Intermediate/Complex

Parsimonious

0.9375

0.83871

Raw Coverage

0.535714

0.928571

Unique Coverage

0.535714

0.928571

0.9375

0.83871

0.535714

0.928571

Group finance capacity
Group employee capacity
Intervenor Compensation
Participation During Comment
Presence
Consistency

Overall solution consistency
Overall solution coverage
Note
Black circles indicate the presence of a condition
Circles with ""x" indicate absence of a condition
Large circles indicate core conditions
Small circles indicate peripheral conditions
Blank circles indicate "don't care"

Again, group financial capacity is not a major condition for explaining influence.
However, unlike in the original analysis, group staffing (EMCAP) was a significant
condition. Therefore, the solution shows that stakeholder groups that were more likely to
be influential in the final rules had (1) a high level of participation during the comment
periods (PCOM), (2) were present during the entire proceedings (PALL), (3) had a
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stronger level of staff funding (EMCAP), and (4) received intervenor compensation
(INTVCOMP).
The solution expression is represented as:
PCOM*EMCAP*INTVCOMP*PAL => INFL
In addition to running a fsQCA analysis on the California cases, an analysis was
conducted on the other four state cases to see whether the California cases skewed the
results. The results for the four state fsQCA analysis were consistent with the original
results (see Appendix D for the truth table analysis of the four states).
These findings on California environmental and clean energy groups confirm the
importance of stakeholder comments in an interest group’s ability to influence the final
rules. In addition, these findings are significant because they highlight the important role
that intervenor compensation can have for interest groups. While intervenor
compensation was not a core condition, it does contribute to a group’s ability to influence
the final rules. Finally, the strength of a group’s employee capacity was significant in this
fsQCA analysis, which indicates that there may be more to say about a group’s resource
capacity in future research.
It was important to conduct an additional set of tests on the California cases to
ensure the rigor and validity of the original fsQCA analysis. The following sections take
more time to examine the implications of the results from the original fsQCA analysis.
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Theoretical Implications
The findings from the fsQCA truth table analysis clarify some of the ambiguities
in the interest group influence and regulatory literatures. The most substantial theoretical
finding in this dissertation was that interest groups are influential in the regulatory
process. While utilities do possess a large amount of influence throughout these PUC
processes, there is still room for other interest groups to influence the agenda, the
process, and the final rules. These five state energy storage proceedings highlight that
environmental and clean energy groups were able to influence the final rules. The truth
table results uncovered three cross-case themes regarding: (1) information and learning,
(2) stakeholder participation, and (3) stakeholder inclusiveness (see Table 6.11).

Table 6.11 Cross-Case Themes
Cross-Case Themes:
Information: How each state sought to overcome information and nascent technology concerns.
Stakeholder participation: How did each state seek to enrich the stakeholder process?
Stakeholder inclusiveness: What measures did PUCs take to create greater inclusivity?

First, how each state sought to overcome the information and learning gap for
energy storage (i.e., issue ambiguity) determined the scope of their stakeholder process.
The results show that states that did not rely on a framing document (GUIDE) had more
inclusive and participatory stakeholder processes. These states used the stakeholder
process to learn about energy storage and to deliberate on which features were important
to include for the state’s energy storage framework and programs. States also relied
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heavily upon consultants and experts to inform the process. The states that began their
energy storage proceedings first (California, Oregon, and Nevada) adopted a more
intensive stakeholder process to learn, consult, and deliberate. These states eventually did
conduct state energy storage studies later in the process. Yet, not having a guiding
document allowed for a more robust stakeholder process which some environmental and
clean energy groups were able to navigate successfully.
In contrast, states that relied upon a guiding document conducted less
participatory and inclusive stakeholder processes. New York and Virginia relied upon
guiding documents to frame their rulemakings. New York’s Governor Andrew Cuomo
directed the Department of Public Service (DPS) and the New York State Energy
Research and Development Authority to publish a roadmap on energy storage before the
rulemaking was to commence. The Energy Storage Roadmap was eventually used to
guide the scope and content of the energy storage rulemaking. The energy storage
rulemaking essentially was the medium for securing stakeholder “approval” on the
Energy Storage Roadmap.
So, across these five cases, the states that had published a guiding document prior
to the rulemaking had already set the agenda. It was difficult for stakeholders to influence
the final rules because the rules had already been established. In contrast, the states that
did not have a preset agenda or framework were more open to a deliberative stakeholder
process. It is within these states that stakeholders were invited to be part of the preproposal process.
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Second, access to the pre-proposal (PREPROP) phase of the rulemaking was
another important condition for a stakeholder’s level of influence. Opening the preproposal phase to stakeholders is important because it allows stakeholders the
opportunity to set the agenda or frame issues or concepts in a particular way. It is a
deeper form of stakeholder engagement because it embodies inclusive practices that
mutually define and address policy issues.
The nexus of this relationship hinges on which groups possess the power over the
issue definition (Kamieniecki, 2006). The groups that are able to set the agenda and
frame the issue have the greatest influence over the whole process. When the issue is
defined and settled in a finished document, it is difficult for other groups to redefine or
reframe key issues or concepts.
Previous literature (Yackee 2011, 2015; Rinfret, Cook, Pautz 2014; Crow,
Albright, and Koebele, 2016) has highlighted that the pre-proposal period is critical phase
of the rulemaking process because stakeholders can develop content of the proposed rules
through agenda-setting, agenda building, agenda blocking, and framing (Kamieniecki,
2006). As the case of New York highlights, it is difficult to change the final rules when
the agenda has already been established.
However, merely attending the pre-proposal stakeholder meetings and
conversations is not sufficient for influencing the final rules. Stakeholders were more
influential when they were present from the beginning of the proceeding (i.e., the preproposal phase), until the end of the proceeding. The longevity of a stakeholder’s
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participation was important to their level of influence in addition to their participation at
the beginning of the pre-proposal phase.
Third, the number of opportunities to attend stakeholder meetings was integral to
a stakeholder’s success in influencing the final rules. Stakeholder meetings, especially
during the pre-proposal phase of the process, gave stakeholders the opportunity to learn,
deliberate, and engage with other stakeholders. Previous literature (De. Martini et al.,
2016; Bilimoria et al., 2019; Cross-Call et al., 2019; McAdams, 2021) has noted the
importance of stakeholders having the time to interact with one another to gain better
information of the issue, of each other’s perspectives, and the process. This interactive
portion of the process ultimately can benefit stakeholders by creating meaningful
opportunities to collaborate and deliberate with one another. These interactions are
advantageous for stakeholders that are in it for the “long game”, as the PUC process is
iterative across issues and dockets. The collaborative success of one proceeding is likely
flow into future interactions.
Fourth, the number of opportunities to comment was also connected to an
environmental and clean energy group’s level of success. Environmental and clean
energy groups were more influential over the final rule in PUC proceedings that had more
than three comment periods. Potentially, a rulemaking proceeding could have at least four
opportunities for stakeholders to submit comments: the order instituting the rulemaking,
pre-proposal, draft, and final order. Many times, the opportunity to comment also
includes an opportunity to submit reply comments after the initial round of comments.
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The opportunity to submit comments provides stakeholders with potential access
points to influence the final rules and regulations. The more points of access, the more
opportunities to potentially influence the process and the final rules. Across the states,
interviewees highlighted that the comment period was a crucial phase in which they
believed that they could sway the final rules the most.
The number of opportunities to submit comments did not necessitate that
environmental and clean energy stakeholders would be more influential. Environmental
and clean energy stakeholders needed to submit comments for the majority of comment
periods to influence the final rule. Groups that contributed comments for at least 90
percent of the comment periods had higher levels of influence. Strong participation
during the comment periods was a necessary condition. Groups that had many
opportunities to comment and that did comment at a high rate were more influential over
the final rules. Groups that had a high opportunity to comment, but who commented less
frequently had lower levels of influence.
There was one outlier to this, though. In Virginia, there was not a relationship
between participation and the level of influence among groups. Virginia’s rulemaking
lacked key institutional mechanisms for stakeholder participation. There was not an
opportunity for stakeholders to be involved in any pre-proposal workshops much less any
stakeholder meetings.
In addition, there were only two opportunities for stakeholders to comment on the
draft rules. Trade groups, energy storage industry groups, and environmental groups all
seemed at odds with the Commission’s position. The Commission’s position lined up
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with the utilities. Even trade groups and storage developers, which often held a strong
position in other proceedings, “lost out” in that docket. The utilities held a clear line of
dominance during the Virginia energy storage docket. Thus, the level of participation of
some stakeholders was negligible in institutional settings that offered few stakeholder
access points. Table 6.12 summarizes the cross-case findings of the fsQCA analysis.

Table 6.12 Cross-Case Findings
Cross-Case Findings
•

The role of learning and information were critical to the success of the state PUC energy
storage proceedings. Energy storage was a new technology, which prompted a different
learning strategy in each state (Information and Learning).

•

Environmental and clean energy stakeholders were more influential in states that did not rely
on a guiding document or study (Information and Learning).

•

Environmental and clean energy stakeholders were more influential over the final rules in
states that held more than three comment periods (Stakeholder Participation).

•

Environmental and clean energy stakeholders were more influential over the final rules in
states that held more than three stakeholder technical workshops and meetings (Stakeholder
Inclusion).

•

Environmental and clean energy stakeholders were more influential over the final rules in
states that included stakeholders in the pre-proposal process (Stakeholder Inclusion).

There were also important within-case results from the empirical research that can
be corroborated with the fsQCA results. The within-case findings provide a more
granular examination of the stakeholder process in each of the five states. In addition, the
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within-case findings analyze the unique contexts that shaped the inclusive and
participatory framework of the five states’ energy storage proceedings. There are
distinctions within each state’s energy storage proceeding that are important regarding
why certain stakeholders participated or did not, constraints from the legislative mandate,
emphasis on consensus norms, and the leadership at state PUCs.
Table 6.13 summarizes the key within-case findings across each of the five states.

Table 6.13 Within-Case Findings

California
•

•

•

•

Was the first state
to establish an
energy storage
target mandate
(L)
Intervenor
compensation
helped
environmental
stakeholders (I)
Created policy
connections to
other proceedings
(L, P, and I)
Leadership of
Commissioner
Carla Peterman
(C)

Oregon
•

•

•

Relied on thirdparty experts to
help shape rules
(L)
Process focused
on learning,
deliberation,
and consensus
(P and I)
The
prioritization of
the Coal to
Clean Bill that
was occurred
during the same
time (C)

New York
•

•

•

•

Rulemaking
agenda pre-set
around Energy
Storage
Roadmap (L)
There was a
strong
interagency
presence
throughout the
rulemaking (L)
Lead workshops
around the state
to encourage
stakeholder
participation (P
and I)
Timeline
constraints of
rulemaking (C)

Nevada
•

•

•

•

Small
stakeholder
process focused
on collaboration
and consensus (P
and I)
Brattle Report
was
commissioned
during preproposal phase
(L)
Legislation
mandated for
investigatory
phase and
rulemaking (C)
In-state political
turnover (C)

Virginia
•

•

•

•

Did not have
stakeholder
workshops (~P
and ~I)
New legislation
and policy
shaped final
rules (Task
Force, FERC,
and RPS) (~L)
Many of the
unanswered
questions from
the rulemaking
were referred to
the Task Force
(~L and ~P, ~I)
Timeline
constraints of
rulemaking (C)

Key: (C) Context (L) Learning and Information; (P) Participation; (I) Inclusiveness;(~) absence of factor

In each of the state cases, there was variation with regards to: (1) how each state
handled issue ambiguity; (2) who was chosen to facilitate and inform the energy storage
proceeding; (3) the timeline of the proceeding; and (4) other legislation or regulatory
proceedings that shaped the energy storage proceeding. Yet, despite the variation within
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the five state cases, there was a strong causal connection between the type of access
points (inclusive and participatory access points) and a stakeholder’s ability to influence
the final rules.
The following chapters will delve more into the case details of these five states
and how these unique contexts shaped how each state PUC managed the challenge of
issue ambiguity and subsequently the stakeholder process.

Conclusion
This chapter presented the results from the fsQCA software analysis on the five
states that conducted energy storage regulatory proceedings. The truth table analysis
confirms cross-case propositions that environmental and clean energy stakeholders will
be able to influence the final rules when PUC proceedings provide participatory and
inclusive opportunities throughout the proceedings. The fsQCA results uncovered an
intermediate solution which advanced that clean energy and environmental stakeholders
were more successful at influencing the final rules when: (1) they participated during the
pre-proposal process; (2) there were three or more stakeholder meetings; (3) there were
three or more comment periods; (4) the group participated in the majority (90 percent) of
the comment periods; (5) the group was present from the beginning until the end; and (6)
there was not a guiding document or roadmap that defined the regulatory proceeding.
These findings are significant because they provide clarity to the mixed findings
from previous interest group and regulatory literatures. Foremost, the findings from the
fsQCA analysis highlight that stakeholders can influence the process and more
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specifically, that environmental and clean energy stakeholders are influential in certain
contexts. This finding dispels the notion that utilities are the only stakeholders that are
influencing regulatory proceedings. While utilities remain influential, they have not
“captured” state PUCs, at least for less salient issues such as energy storage.
In addition, the fsQCA analysis confirmed the importance of the pre-proposal
phase and the comment periods of the regulatory process. However, the findings
distinguish that these phases are only prominent when stakeholder groups are provided
multiple opportunities to engage in stakeholder meetings (at least three or more) and
stakeholder comment periods (at least three or more). In addition, stakeholders must
maintain active participation throughout the entirety of the regulatory proceeding: the
pre-proposal phase, the meetings, and the comment periods. This is a resource and time
intensive process for stakeholders, and explains why some groups may decide not to
participate in certain regulatory proceedings, as to save resources for proceedings that are
of greater priority.
With regards to the conditions related to capacity, there was not a significant
relationship found in the original analysis of the five states. However, the focused
analysis on the California cases shows that while financial capacity was not a significant
factor in a stakeholder’s level of influence, the group’s employee capacity was
significant. While this finding was unique to California, it will also be explored in other
chapters.
The latter half of this chapter explored the cross-case and within-case findings and
their implications for previous literature on interest group influence and regulatory
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agencies. These findings add greater insight to the fsQCA results with regards to how
each context and set of conditions are connected with one another.
While the findings from the fsQCA confirm the main propositions that are
advanced in Chapter 5, they do not provide sufficient explanatory power on their own. In
order to truly understand the causal relationships among the six conditions from the
fsQCA analysis, individual state case summaries are constructed for each of the five
states.
The state case summaries are divided into three chapters based on the five state
PUC’s stakeholder framework. Coincidentally, the state summaries divided simply
between big states (California and New York) and smaller states (Oregon and Nevada),
with Virginia being an outlier in the middle. As the case summary chapters will show, it
is likely that the size of the state had an impact on the size of the institutions and
subsequently the types and quantity of stakeholder groups that participated in the energy
storage proceedings. However, as the California and New York chapter emphasize, the
size of the state and the institutions do not preclude the type of stakeholder framework
PUCs choose to implement. There are other contexts and factors (relating to the
organization culture of institutions along with the political, social, and economic contexts
of each of the states) that will have some impact on the process.
The next three chapters provide a detailed analysis of how each state’s PUC
sought to overcome the issue ambiguity surrounding energy storage and how that
ultimately shaped the inclusivity and participatory nature of the stakeholder process.
These case summaries also explore contextual factors for each of the states such as issue
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ambiguity, the timeline of the proceeding, constraints or issues stemming from the
legislative mandate, and the organization of the PUC and its commissioners.
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Chapter 7 The Cases of Oregon and Nevada
Chapter Overview
Oregon and Nevada are small states that are known for their urban centers, but are
primarily comprised of expansive rural areas. In addition, while the main population
concentration in both states exists in one metropolitan area, the state capital resides in
another. Therefore, state policy is diffuse across two main political centers. In both states,
the public utility commissions’ (PUC) energy storage proceeding was more protracted
than the other states. Nevada and Oregon learned about the costs and benefits of energy
storage in an exploratory manner. In the case of Nevada, the rulemaking shifted from
being investigatory to a rulemaking. For Oregon, the docket was a contested case that
gave stakeholders the time to learn and deliberate as opposed to a regimented rulemaking.
While Oregon and Nevada implemented different types of regulatory proceedings,
they are similar in that the proceedings encouraged consensus building among key
stakeholders. The PUCs provided participatory and inclusive opportunities for
stakeholders throughout the energy storage proceedings. Both proceedings sought ample
opportunities for stakeholders to come to a mutual understanding of energy storage.
There were also multiple stakeholder meetings prior to the draft rules to deliberate on the
framework and rules. This deliberative approach (focused on learning and consensus)
proved to be a successful framework for environmental and clean energy stakeholders.
The rest of this chapter examines in greater detail how both Oregon and Nevada’s
environmental stakeholders were able to benefit from a participatory and inclusive
focused on learning and deliberation.
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The Case of Oregon: Learning and Deliberation
Introduction
Oregon was the second state to pass legislation for an energy storage target
mandate in June 2015 (HB 2193). While Oregon’s energy target was not aggressive, it
signaled that Oregon was committed to integrating energy storage into its electrical
system. Oregon stakeholders entered the energy storage proceeding requiring time to
learn about issues relating to nascent energy storage technologies, the barriers to energy
storage on a traditional electrical grid system, and the unchartered policy space. While
Oregon’s regulatory proceeding was not a traditional rulemaking, the Oregon Public
Utility Commission (OPUC) ensured that stakeholders were given the time to understand
the important issues associated with energy storage and then provide opportunities for
stakeholders to engage with one another in an inclusive and participatory stakeholder
framework. The sections below examine how some clean energy stakeholders were
successful in influencing the final energy storage framework.

Brief Energy Background
Oregon possesses few in-state power sources. Oregon imports coal power from
plants in Utah, Wyoming, and Montana while receiving some nuclear power from
Washington. Most of the electric power that Oregon generates and consumes comes from
hydroelectric power. Oregon relies heavily on its hydroelectric power to meet the
majority of its renewable electricity mix. However, in 2019, hydroelectric power dipped
to less than half of its typical generation due to an unusual bout of dry weather and
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resulting drought (US EIA, 2019). Even before 2019, Oregon’s hydroelectric generation
has been decreasing from 89 percent in 1997 to 61 percent in 2017. The continuation of
the drought into 2021 highlighted the vulnerabilities of Oregon’s renewable energy mix
in the face of hotter summers, less rain, and quickly evaporating mountain snowpack.
In 2019, wind power made up almost 11 percent of the electricity mix. However,
approximately 30 to 40 percent of generated wind power is exported to California so that
California can continue to meet its in-state renewable mandate (NTESS, 2021). Other
renewable energy sources (i.e., solar, geothermal, bioenergy, and biogas) make a very
small contribution to Oregon’s electricity mix, representing less than 1 percent altogether
(US EIA, 2021).
Oregon has been a leader in environmental and renewable energy policies
regarding energy efficiency, waste and recycling disposal, renewable portfolio standards,
and the retirement of fossil fuels. Oregon has adopted progressive renewable energy
policies such as the Oregon Clean Electricity, Coal Transition Act or the “Coal to Clean”
(SB 1547B) which set a timetable for Oregon’s major investor-owned utilities, Portland
General Electric (PGE) and Pacific Power, to phase out their coal-fired generation and
increased PGE and Pacific Power’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) from 25 percent
to 50 percent by 2040. At the time of the energy storage docket, Oregon was in the
process of retiring its only coal plant, the Boardman Coal Plant (retired in 2020). Both
PGE and PacifiCorp have some ownership in coal plants out-of-state in Montana and
Wyoming.
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Given that Oregon’s individual impact on America’s aggregate carbon emissions
is small, its energy storage mandate of 5MWh of energy storage will have a similarly
small impact on electricity usage in the region. However, Oregon’s present attempt to
integrate energy storage rules and regulations into its energy sector is notable, especially
given that few states possess the institutional and structural resources to do so. Therefore,
Oregon is currently among a small group of states paving the way for a larger
transformation of our national and regional energy systems to include new energy storage
infrastructure, rules, and regulations.
Oregon’s Public Utility Commission (OPUC) oversees the regulation of investorowned electric utilities, natural gas utilities, land-line telephone service providers, and
select water companies. The OPUC has three commissioners that the governor appoints
for a four-year term. The main office is located in Salem, which is approximately an hour
away from Portland. A small office is maintained in Portland for staff, but formal
commission proceedings are held in Salem. During the 2015/2016 energy storage
proceeding, the OPUC employed approximately 128 staff members to oversee PUC
dockets.
The head commissioner at the time the energy storage legislation was passed was
Commission Chair Susan Ackerman. Chair Ackerman’s approach to clean energy
policies appeared to be pragmatic, preferring policies that were cost-effective and
protected the consumer. In an interview for Fortnightly in 2015, Chair Ackerman noted,
“While I strongly agree that we need to go as far as we can in decarbonizing the power
sector, I also strongly believe that we need to keep utility services affordable. As a
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society, we seem to be pursuing renewables for the sake of renewables, and DG
[distributed generation] for the sake of DG.” (Fortnightly, 2015). With regards to the
then-recent passage of HB 2193, Chair Ackerman highlighted, “The Oregon PUC has
recognized the need for our utilities to add flexible capacity to integrate renewable
resources…and storage could be one of those options. Of course, our preference is
always for the most cost-effective option to be used first” (Fortnightly, 2015). Chair
Ackerman’s focus on cost-effectiveness and pragmatism underscores the OPUC’s duty to
protect consumer interests and ensure that utilities are implementing cost-effective
projects and practices that do not fall on ratepayers.
However, this duty to cost-effectiveness and pragmatism is not mutually
exclusive from supporting clean energy policies. Oregon’s history as an environmental
forerunner, its environmentally progressive governors, and democratically held
legislatures have created a strong foundation for the OPUC to adapt to transitioning
towards more aggressive clean energy rules and regulations.

Legislative and Regulatory Background of the Energy Storage Mandate
Oregon was the second state in the United States to pass an energy storage
mandate. In 2015, Oregon’s legislative Assembly passed HB 2193, which required
Oregon utility companies (Portland General Electric and PacifiCorp) to have a minimum
of 5MWh of energy storage by January 1, 2020. However, the mandate was capped at 1%
of a utility’s peak load in 2014. The bill took effect immediately upon its passage.
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The bill was introduced by Representative Paul Holvey, who sought the help of
the OPUC to support the bill. The OPUC, especially Commissioner John Savage, and
OPUC staff were supportive of an energy storage mandate and were involved throughout
the legislative process. Staff at the OPUC testified to the legislature’s committee on the
benefits of storage. In addition, Staff were instrumental in helping to write the bill, as the
ideas and language of energy storage required technical knowledge. While the bill was
uncontroversial, there was little support for the bill. As one respondent noted, “I don’t
remember [the utilities] trying hard to kill it because when you try to kill something you
really got to make a commitment” (OR Interview 003). Many believed that it would not
pass, which may explain the lack of major opposition against the bill.
The energy storage bill (HB 2193) coincided with the first attempt to pass a
version of what is now known as the Coal to Clean Bill, which was finally passed in the
2016 legislative session. The Coal to Clean Bill (SB 477) sought to establish a timetable
for IOUs to replace their out-of-state coal-generated energy with renewable sources of
energy. However, despite a strong environmental and clean energy coalition, SB 477
failed. PGE and Pacific Power were strongly against this bill and were able to defeat it.
Therefore, the majority of the focus during the 2015 legislative session was on the Coal
to Clean Bill, which may have allowed the energy storage bill to pass without much
notice or contention.
HB 2193 directed the OPUC to oversee the implementation of the energy storage
program. Unlike in the case of California, HB 2193 set specific procurement targets and
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timelines for the OPUC. HB 2193 directed the Oregon Public Utility Commission
(OPUC) to:
(1) adopt guidelines for the submission of PacifiCorp and PGE’s energy storage
proposals by January 1, 2017,
(2) accept utilities’ project proposals by January 18, 2018, and
(3) evaluate and authorize the project proposals by January 2020.
The broad timeline for this docket gave the OPUC and the electric utilities flexibility for
navigating the process. However, the regulatory scope and framework were bound by the
legislature’s mandated energy storage target of 5MWh.
It was stressed that HB 2193 was an exploratory phase for utilities to learn and
discover more about which energy storage technologies best matched their energy
systems. Given that the bill was exploratory, the docket was assigned as a contested case
that would produce Commission orders rather than quasi-legislative rules. Since energy
storage was a relatively new and unchartered policy issue, it was beneficial to have the
extra flexibility of the order than the rulemaking. Regulatory proceedings by order are
easier to modify than rules through rulemaking proceedings.
Therefore, the initial proceeding began as a policy-based contested case given that
specific rules were not being proposed. Three dockets were established to meet the
directives of HB 2193. The first docket, UM 1751 sought to implement a framework for
energy storage program guidelines. Following the adoption of the Commission Order 17118 on Implementing Energy Storage Program Guidelines pursuant of HB 2193, two
more dockets were initiated that oversaw the draft storage potential evaluations of

182

PacifiCorp (UM 1857) and PGE (UM 1856). A select number of stakeholders from UM
1751 participated in the dockets UM 1857 (PacifiCorp) and UM 1856 (PGE). This
portion of the regulatory proceeding was unique because stakeholders relied upon
testimony and the use of stipulations to ensure that any extenuating issues are resolved in
a consensual manner. This portion of the implementation phase was more formal and
required greater legal resources and process.
Given that a specific energy storage target had been established in the legislative
bill, stakeholders did not have to deliberate on whether to establish a specific target or
not. The docket (UM 1751) was divided into two main phases. The first phase centered
on establishing energy storage project and proposal guidelines for PacifiCorp and PGE.
The second phase focused on developing a framework for the utilities’ storage potential
evaluations, which would be used later as a metric to evaluate proposed energy storage
projects.
During the first phase, the OPUC sought to examine the potential value of
applying energy storage system technology within the context of six specified categories
and a seventh “other” category to be defined during the meetings: (1) deferred investment
in generation, T&D; (2) reduced need for peak generation; (3) integration of renewable
resources; (4) reduced GHG emissions; (5) improved reliability of transmission or
distribution systems; (6) reduced portfolio variable power costs; and (7) other (OPUC,
2016). This phase of the regulatory proceeding looked much like a rulemaking, with
opportunities for stakeholders to meet at technical workshops and to submit comments on
OPUC discussion documents, draft orders, and final orders.
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There were two staff led workshops over a period of a month and then a
Commission workshop later in May of 2016. This portion of the energy storage
proceeding was strongly shaped by issue ambiguity. Many of the stakeholders did not
have a strong understanding of energy storage and how it could be integrated into
Oregon’s electric system. The technical workshops enabled stakeholders to come to a
mutual knowledge of energy storage. In these workshops, experts and key stakeholder
provided informative presentations on the benefits of energy storage (Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory (PNNL), the Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE), PacifiCorp,
PGE, SolarCity, AES Energy Storage, and Strategen Consulting). The participation of
PNNL was especially integral in guiding the stakeholder learning process.
PNNL is a federal research laboratory based out of Richmond, Washington. There
is a small Portland office, which offered its research services for free to the OPUC.
PNNL provided energy storage expertise to OPUC Staff and stakeholders, as many
stakeholders had a rudimentary knowledge of energy storage. PNNL was instrumental in
drafting the straw poll discussion document and portions of the final energy storage
framework such as the process and the taxonomy of benefits of storage. These meetings
were crucial to the development of the final energy storage framework.
After the technical meetings, stakeholders then had four opportunities to comment
on the content of the rules (straw proposal, proposed storage potential requirements,
proposed competitive bidding requirements, and the draft project guidelines and proposal
guidelines) over a period of three months. Comment periods are an opportunity for
stakeholders to impart expertise and opinions about the direction of the docket: the more
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opportunities to comment, the more potential opportunities to influence the process. As
the analysis from Chapter 6 highlighted, the stakeholders that participated the most
during comment periods were more influential in shaping the final order. While the
Commission and Staff did not directly address particular stakeholder group comments
until the final round of comments on the draft guidelines and framework, they addressed
them generally in formal orders and Staff comments.
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 below highlight the timeline of workshops and comment
periods.

Figure 7.1 Oregon Energy Storage UM 1751 Workshops and Meetings

Stakeholder
workshop
1/27/2016

Stakeholder
workshop
2/29/2016

Prehearing
Conf.
03/30/2016
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05/09/2016

Stakeholder
Meeting
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Public
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Figure 7.2 Oregon Energy Storage UM 1751 Comment Periods
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During the second phase of the docket, a stakeholder meeting was held in which
Staff developed a discussion document to address the main issues for the utilities’ draft
Storage Potential Evaluations. Staff also opened up an additional two comment periods
beginning on February 8, 2017, and March 7, 2017. Staff used the discussion document
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and the comment periods to establish consensus among the stakeholders. The emphasis
on consensus was integral to making this phase of the process especially inclusive. In its
first order (Order No. 16-504), the Commission directed Staff to conduct workshops and
develop a consensus framework for the Storage Potential Evaluations. The Staff
recommendations that followed this comment period were adopted by the Commission in
their Final Order.
Once a framework for the energy storage program was established, the regulatory
proceeding turned to the utilities’ storage potential evaluation in two separate contested
case dockets, UM 1856 and UM 1857. Only a handful of stakeholders remained during
this phase: Citizen’s Utility Board (CUB), Alliance of Western Energy Consumers
(AWEC), Renewable NW (RNW), Northwest &Intermountain Power Producers
Coalition (NIPPC), Community Renewable Energy Association (CREA), and Oregon
Department of Energy (ODOE). Some of these stakeholders maintained more of a
monitoring role during the initial framework docket (UM 1751), but were more active in
the utility dockets.
There was greater stakeholder engagement in the PGE docket given that PGE was
responsible for the largest portion of the energy storage target. In contested cases, parties
can submit testimony and comments to the Commission. The procedures are more formal
than a rulemaking, and parties and Staff do not have access to the Commission, as the
Commission seeks only to make decisions based on the record and facts. The fsQCA
analysis did not include these additional contested cases because of the lack of available
data for how the Commission reached its decision (there were not any Staff or
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Commission comments on stakeholder comments). However, it should be noted that
parties to these cases were encouraged to reach consensus over key issues and that this
was an active period for just a handful of key stakeholders.

Stakeholder Influence
In total, thirty-five stakeholder groups were parties or intervenors during the
contested case, with nineteen groups taking an active role throughout the proceeding
(e.g., submitting comments, attending workshops). While the turnout and diversity of
stakeholders for UM 1751 were small, the participation rate among those engaged was
strong. Figure 7.3 shows the quantity of each type of stakeholder group.

Figure 7.3 Oregon Stakeholder Group Participation by Group Type
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Trade groups and developer groups were the most numerous groups at the
beginning of the proceeding, but their participation dropped off after the technical
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workshops. The two IOUs (PGE and PacifiCorp) were central throughout the stakeholder
process given that the energy storage legislation specifically directed PGE and PacifiCorp
to implement energy storage projects into their energy systems. There were only three
clean energy groups that participated throughout the proceedings: NW Energy Coalition
(NWEC), Renewable NW(RNW), and Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC).
While there was initially a strong stakeholder presence throughout the technical
workshops, active stakeholder participation dropped during the comment period. The
stakeholder influence scores are a cumulative total of three comment periods that
occurred around the final order: comments on the staff draft and comments on each of the
utility’s proposed energy storage evaluation proposals. The stakeholder influence scores
below in Table 7.1 show how influential stakeholders shaped the guidelines.

Table 7.1 Total Oregon Stakeholder Influence Scores

Stakeholder
Renewable NW and NW Energy Coalition

Fuzzy Score

Type

0.9

Clean Energy

Interstate Renewable Energy Council

0.9

Clean Energy

Northwest Power and Conservation Council

0.6

Government Agency

Community Renewable Energy Association

0.4

Intergovernmental

Oregon Solar Energy Industries Association

0.4

Trade

Energy Storage Association

0.4

Trade

Small Business Utility Association

0.1

Business

ITM
Northwest &Intermountain Power Producers
Coalition
Citizen's Utility Board

0.1

Developer

n/a

Trade

n/a

Consumer Advocate

Alliance of Western Energy Consumers

n/a

Trade
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The utilities PGE and PacifiCorp were not included in the influence scores since
they are inherently influential for their roles in submitting the framework and evaluation
proposals. The stakeholders in italics did not submit formal comments during the initial
energy storage framework docket (UM 1751). However, they did participate in dockets
UM 1856 and UM 1857, which evaluated the utilities’ energy storage program proposals.
The stakeholders that participated in the utility dockets were: NWEC, RNW, IREC,
CUB, NIPCC, AWEC, CREA, ODOE.
The clean energy groups did well at influencing the final draft order. RNW
provided a strong, active presence from the beginning of the energy proceeding. RNW
took the lead for many other environmental and clean energy groups that were
monitoring the docket on the sidelines. This included OSEIA (a solar trade group that
often allies with clean energy and environmental groups), which was invested in the
docket but had other issues that it was following more actively than the energy storage
docket. Similarly, while NWEC submitted joint comments with RNW and was involved
throughout various points in the proceedings, it often let RNW take the lead. NWEC and
RNW have a familial organizational history, as RNW was established in 1994 when
NWEC realized that there was a larger need for an organization that focused on
renewable energy. RNW is independent of NWEC but remain close given their
organizational history.
RNW was present at all of the technical workshops and submitted comments for
all of the comment periods. IREC entered the proceeding a bit later than RNW, though.
IREC missed the technical workshop meetings but submitted comments four out of the
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five comment periods. It should also be noted that IREC is an out-of-state clean energy
group, whereas RNW is a local group, so it may have been more difficult to engage in
some aspects of the proceeding fully. For example, while there are call-in options for
PUC workshops, it is not the same as physically and metaphorically being “at the table”.
At the time of the energy storage proceeding, Oregon granted intervener
compensation for three types of stakeholders: CUB fund, issue fund, and matching funds.
CUB receives intervenor funding because it directly represents the interests of customers.
The Oregon CUB was originally established in 1984 as a means to protect the rights of
residential utility customers before administrative, judicial, and legislative bodies. Often,
energy regulatory proceedings are very technical in nature, requiring experts and
stakeholders to help inform the process and the Commission. Intervenor compensation is
a means to defray some of the costs of participation. Intervenor compensation funds
attorney and consultant fees, expert witness fees, travel costs, and studies, testimonies,
and briefs.
The Alliance of Western Energy Users (AWEC, formerly ICNU) has an
agreement to draw from the matching fund because it represents industrial electric and
gas users. Utilities are responsible for funding the intervenor compensation fund.
However, utilities are able to use portions of their ratepayer fees to fund the intervenor
compensation fund.
The third type of fund is the Issue Fund, which was open to other non-profit
organizations on a case-by-case basis. Non-profits needed to prove that their participation
represented: (1) broad customer interests, (2) interests not represented, (3) other funding
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sources, and (4) effective advocacy. Most environmental and environmental justice nonprofits did not qualify for the Issue Fund because they did not represent “broad customer
interests”.
AWEC and CUB monitored the initial docket (UM 1751) on the framework and
storage potential evaluations. It was not until the utility dockets (UM 1856 and UM 1857)
that either group took a more active role. Both groups were awarded intervenor
compensation for their work on these dockets.
At the time, clean energy and environmental groups were not eligible for
intervenor compensation funds. It was not until 2021 that environmental and
environmental justice groups became eligible for intervenor funds. This is an
instrumental change to the OPUC that will likely bring in a broader range of interests,
especially as Oregon energy policy continues to examine the importance of equitable
access to energy. Chapter 10 will provide a more in-depth discussion of how greater
access to intervenor compensation may encourage environmental and clean energy
groups to participate more actively at the OPUC.

Discussion: A Deliberative Learning Process
Oregon’s energy storage mandate was the second in the country. Therefore, much
was still unknown about the technical feasibility of energy storage and how it could be
incorporated into utility planning and systems. Nevertheless, the Oregon energy storage
proceeding provided a successful institutional environment for clean energy stakeholders
to influence the final draft order. What made the Oregon case successful was the OPUC’s
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focus on learning and deliberation through (1) pre-proposal stakeholder workshops, (2)
the employment of experts to guide the learning of parties involved, (3) multiple
comment periods, and (4) a norm for consensus.
First, there was a concerted effort for Staff and stakeholders to learn about energy
storage through technical workshops. The legislative mandate noted that the energy
storage program was exploratory, which encouraged the OPUC and its Staff to take the
time to examine the costs and benefits of an energy storage program for Oregon. Experts
were brought into technical workshops to help stakeholders understand the multiple
facets of energy storage. Expert clean energy groups such as PNNL, Solar City (now
known as Tesla), Applied Energy Services (AES), the Clean Energy Group, and
Strategen provided presentations on energy storage. These technical workshops occurred
before any document drafts were established, thereby enabling stakeholders and Staff to
work organically from the bottom-up. There were no prior studies or established draft
proposals that guided the pre-proposal process.
Second, the role of experts was critical to the Oregon experience. The engagement
by PNNL was critical for OPUC Staff and stakeholders’ learning. PNNL was involved
from the beginning of the energy storage process to provide guidance and information.
PNNL presented during legislative committee hearings and helped stakeholders
understand key energy storage issues during the OPUC proceedings. PNNL worked
closely with OPUC staff to help draft the content to key parts of the straw poll and the
framework’s analysis of the process and the taxonomy of benefits of storage. PNNL
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provided energy storage expertise during a time when little was known about the issue
and the potential of storage technologies.
Third, the stakeholder process was heavy in participatory and inclusive
opportunities. With regards to inclusivity, there were three stakeholder workshops (with
one being a Commission workshop) conducted even before the drafting of the first
documents. All stakeholders were invited to attend the technical workshops, with
opportunities for stakeholders to call in to listen. In addition, over the course of the
docket, there were six opportunities to submit comments, of which four were during the
drafting phase.
Finally, the OPUC’s emphasis on consensus was an inclusive mechanism for
stakeholder engagement. Throughout the energy storage proceedings, Staff worked to
create a consensus among parties through mechanisms such as discussion documents,
draft polls, and comment periods. While consensus was not always reached among the
stakeholders, the Staff was able to achieve consensus for the majority of the key issues
for the energy storage framework.

Oregon Conclusion
Oregon’s energy storage proceeding is notable for its inclusive and participatory
stakeholder framework. While the energy storage proceeding was not a rulemaking
(rather a set of contested cases), this enabled the OPUC to conduct a more meaningful
stakeholder process over a longer timeline.
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Oregon’s stakeholder framework embodied Quick and Feldman’s (2011) criteria
for inclusiveness. First, the proceeding facilitated multiple ways of knowledge as the
framework of the stakeholder meetings were planned to overcome the issue ambiguity of
energy storage. Energy storage experts were brought in to help inform stakeholders and
the process. This helped stakeholders come to a mutual knowledge of energy storage
while allowing stakeholders the opportunity to share their perspectives and interests in
energy storage openly.
Second, the OPUC and Staff encouraged stakeholders to coproduce key
documents and drafts. Stakeholders were invited to participate in the drafting of the
framework before anything had even been written. This is unique to most PUC
proceedings, as often utilities or Staff will develop a draft proposal or document before
engaging stakeholders.
Staff utilized discussion documents, straw polls, and multiple comment periods to
create consensus among the stakeholders. The emphasis on consensus carried over to the
utility dockets, as the remaining stakeholders continued to find ways to reach consensus
through stipulations (UM 1856 and UM 1857).
Finally, the proceeding fostered temporal openness at multiple points. The
stakeholder workshops encouraged stakeholders to build connections with one another. In
addition, the practice of consensus required that stakeholders make concerted efforts to
deliberate with one another. The three dockets (UM 1751, UM 1856, and UM 1857)
created iterative opportunities for stakeholders to collaborate.
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The Oregon energy storage proceeding came and went as it did in the Oregon
Legislature: unnoticed by many. However, the proceeding established an energy storage
framework that will help Oregon and its neighbors innovate its electrical grid while
supporting infrastructure to transition to a low carbon future. The participatory and
inclusive opportunities throughout the stakeholder process will continue to strengthen
stakeholder and Staff interactions so that they can come together to develop innovative
clean energy and DER policies.
The next section examines the energy storage proceeding in Nevada. Like
Oregon, there was a strong emphasis on stakeholder consensus, which shaped stakeholder
informal and formal interactions. The emphasis on stakeholder collaboration and
consensus simultaneously facilitated a meaningful stakeholder process and a robust
energy storage framework for Nevada.
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The Case of Nevada: Forming a Consensus Among the Few
Introduction
The Nevada case is unusual given the small stakeholder process. Participatory
processes often seek to engage a broad array of stakeholders, which often results in more
stakeholders. Yet, Nevada’s energy storage stakeholder process focused on fostering a
deeply deliberative process with only a few stakeholder groups. The small number of
stakeholders enabled the groups to generally reach a consensus with one another
throughout multiple points in the rulemaking. While this was unique in contrast to the
other states that conducted energy storage proceedings, this deliberative process appeared
to be successful for the groups involved. The following sections show how stakeholders
were able to successfully influence the final rules due to a stakeholder process rich in
formal and informal opportunities.

Energy Background
Nevada’s resource mix relies primarily on natural gas. Natural gas-fueled
approximately two-thirds of the state’s electricity net generation in 2019 (US EIA, 2021).
Nevada possesses few fossil fuel reserves and ranks among the lowest ten states with
little generation capacity in-state. The state relies heavily on out-of-state sources of
natural gas and petroleum products. In 2019, approximately 85 percent of Nevada’s
energy came from outside the state (US EIA, 2021). Nevada only has one utility-owned
coal fired power plant, in which it receives its coal from neighboring states of Wyoming,
Utah, and Colorado.
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Nevada’s reliance on out-of-state energy resources and its rich renewable energy
potential has stimulated the state to invest in renewable resources. In the first eleven
months of 2020, approximately one-third of Nevada’s electric generation came from
renewable resources (US EIA, 2021). Nevada traditionally was able to rely upon a stable
source of hydropower. Hoover Dam is Nevada’s third-largest power plant by capacity
and fifth largest by generation (US EIA, 2021). However, years of drought have greatly
diminished hydropower’s stability. In 2021, Lake Meade (the reservoir formed by
Hoover Dam) was 35 percent under capacity (Van Voorhis, 2021).
Nevada’s resource mix is unique in that it is able to tap geothermal power.
Geothermal energy provides one-third of Nevada’s renewable generation. In 2015, a
geothermal power plant was outfitted to include solar thermal energy and solar PV,
becoming the first of its kind hybrid geothermal solar power plant. Nevada is second in
the nation after California for geothermal power production.
NV Energy is the only investor-owned utility in the state and provides service for
approximately 90 percent of the state. However, in recent years, NV Energy has actively
sought to integrate renewable energy resources in its energy plans. Independent of any
legislative mandates or PUCN regulation, in 2018, NV Energy outlined in its IRP a plan
to service its customers with 100 percent renewable energy. In addition, NV Energy had
several energy storage projects planned prior to the 2018 energy storage mandate.
NV Energy is owned by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Companies, which
seeks to move its utility subsidiaries away from coal-fired generation to renewablecentric generation portfolios (NCSS-Nevada, 2021). However, Buffett has been
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outspoken about the challenges that distributed generation (DG) possesses for electric
systems (e.g., residential rooftop solar) and stands firm on implementing renewable
energy through a centralized, regulated business model (Pyper, 2017).
Nevada’s clean energy policy has experienced periods of booms and busts
throughout the past twenty-five years. Nevada was one of the first states to implement an
RPS back in 1997 and later updated its RPS to 50 percent by 2030 in 2019 (SB 358). This
updated RPS target strengthened the viability of energy storage at the time of the
rulemaking. Increasing Nevada’s RPS target also increased the value of combining
energy storage systems with renewables to meet that mandate.
However, Nevada’s progress was stunted with the PUCN’s contentious net
metering decision in 2015, which sought to phase out net metering credits and
dramatically increase fees for residential solar customers. It was not until 2017 that net
metering was reinstated under AB 405. AB 405 was important because it was the first
time in US history that customers were allowed the right to self-generate electricity,
while ensuring that customers do not incur additional fees or unfair electric retail rates. In
addition, AB 405 ensured that customers who own solar in combination with energy
storage, will have full control over their systems and not be disadvantaged as such. AB
405 helped lay the foundation for Nevada’s energy storage policy.
The contentious net metering decision had major implications for the Nevada
PUC (PUCN). The PUCN has three commissioners that that the governor appoints to a
four-year term. The main office is located in Carson City, although there is another office
in Las Vegas. The Commission experienced major turnover in the wake of the 2015 net
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metering fiasco. Then-Governor Brian Sandoval chose not to reappoint two of the
commissioners involved in the net metering decision and reappropriated the
chairmanship. The following years saw high turnover as five commissioners came and
went from 2016 until 2019. On a high note, beginning in November 2018, the PUCN was
led by an all-female commission. The bulk of resignations and retirements of the
commissioners occurred over the period of the energy storage rulemaking (from August
2018 until December 2019). By the end of the energy storage rulemaking in March 2020,
the Commission was understaffed with only two commissioners. Whether it is in spite of
the commission upheaval or not, the energy storage rulemaking went from a tenuous
beginning to a strong finish.
Throughout the energy storage rulemaking, there was also a transition from a
republican governor (Governor Brian Sandoval) to a democratic governor (Governor
Steve Sisolak). Governor Sisolak has openly embraced a clean energy economy.
Governor Steve Sisolak was able to appoint two commissioners since coming into office
in 2019. These leadership changes continued to help secure the path for a more stringent
energy storage program in Nevada.

Energy Storage Target Legislation and Rulemaking
On July 13, 2017, Nevada passed SB 204, which directed the PUCN to open an
investigatory and rulemaking docket to implement SB 204. SB 204 gave the PUCN a
large amount of discretion over the establishment of energy storage targets. The bill
required that the Commission should determine whether the establishment of biennial
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energy storage targets was in the “public interest”. If the Commission were to determine
that biennial targets were in the public interest, there was a series of stipulations that the
Commission needed to consider and then meet.
August 21, 2017, the PUCN opened an investigation and rulemaking to
implement Senate Bill 204 (Docket No. 17-07014). The first order on the docket was to
determine whether the Commission should mandate utilities to meet specific energy
storage targets. A stakeholder workshop was held in November 2017 to lay the
foundation for determining how to proceed. Tesla led two informal teleconferences in
December 2017, in which participants discussed supporting a third-party study on energy
storage potential in Nevada and its scope. There were two issues of contention during
these teleconferences regarding the deregulation of Nevada’s electricity market and the
timeframe of the storage study.
At the suggestion by Tesla, stakeholders requested a third-party evaluation study
that examined the energy storage potential in Nevada. The PUCN staff (Staff) was
initially against this because they believed it to be repetitive of a similar study conducted
by NV Energy. However, the Commission determined that an independent study would
be beneficial to the process. The Governor’s Office of Energy (GOE) and Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) helped the Commission select the Brattle Group
to conduct the evaluation. In the study, the Brattle Group was aided by PNNL, which also
provided technical help during the Oregon energy storage rulemaking.
The Brattle Report identified four main benefits of energy storage: avoided
distribution outages, delayed T&D investments, production cost savings, and avoided
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capacity investments. The Brattle Report ultimately concluded that it was in the public
interest to establish biennial targets for the procurement of energy storage systems.
After the Brattle Report, stakeholders had an opportunity to comment on the study
and its findings. Environmental and trade groups favored biennial targets and believed
that the Brattle Study had actually underestimated the benefits of energy storage. In
contrast, NV Energy, the Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP), and PUCN Staff were
against biennial targets and argued that Nevada’s IRP and distributed resource planning
would provide superior means for implementing energy storage projects. The groups
against the establishment of targets also had concerns with the actual costs of energy
storage and the unpredictability of energy storage technology in the near future.
Ultimately, the Commission supported the results of the Brattle Report and
declared that it was in the public interest to establish energy storage targets. The
Commission referenced NV Energy’s recent evaluation of energy storage during its IRP
process and how that evaluation had shown that energy storage was cost-effective. The
beneficial results from the Brattle Report only strengthened the viability of real-world
instances of energy storage that NV Energy had discussed in its report.
After the Commission accepted the results of the Brattle Report, stakeholders
agreed to engage in “an informal stakeholder-driven process” to develop a draft
consensus regulation. These informal interactions often included email communications,
phone calls, and teleconferences. It was standard practice for the Commission to
encourage the parties to reach a consensus before formal hearings. Ultimately, there were
a few issues of contention regarding: (1) the definition of the energy storage target; (2)
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the final storage target amount); (3) the biennial target amount; (4) requirements for subcategories of the energy storage procurement target; and (5) additional requirements for
data and project solicitations.
The PUCN’s Hearing Officer (i.e., Administrative Law Judge) monitored the
stakeholder’s progress on a draft regulation. NV Energy sent progress reports on the
stakeholder’s development of a draft consensus regulation to the Hearing Officer over a
period of four months. By November 2019, the stakeholders were able to come to some
level of consensus over the course of multiple informal and formal meetings and
communications. A series of workshops and comment periods followed the draft
regulations. It was not until March 3, 2020, that the Commission issued a Final Order on
the proposed regulations.

Stakeholder Influence
The energy storage rulemaking attracted a very small number of stakeholders to
participate actively. While the energy storage rulemaking email list server had dozens of
individuals and groups listed, it appears that many of the PUCN proceedings have a
relatively small number of stakeholders that actively engage in the proceeding. There
were only eight stakeholder groups involved in the rulemakings. The rulemaking was
unique because there were not any in-state environmental or clean energy groups. NV
Energy and the Bureau of Consumer Protection were the only in-state groups. The rest of
the stakeholders represented regional or national organizations.
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Table 7.2 shows the type of stakeholder groups involved in the rulemaking.

Table 7.2 Nevada Stakeholders by Group Type

Stakeholder Type

Quantity

Environmental

1

Developer/Producer

2

Utility

1

Government Agency

1

Trade Association
Total

2
7

There was only one environmental stakeholder involved in the rulemaking,
Western Resource Advocates (WRA). WRA is a regional environmental group in the
western and southwest states. While there was an in-state attorney in Nevada employed
by WRA, the main office working on the rulemaking was out-of-state in Colorado. One
participant highlighted that few environmental groups participated at the PUCN (NV
Interview 001). The participant noticed that there has been greater involvement in the
past four to five years by other large environmental organizations such as Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the Sierra Club. The NRDC and the Sierra Club
had stronger presences in other energy storage rulemakings in California and Virginia.
However, these groups were not directly involved in the energy storage rulemaking in
Nevada.
Only a core group of five stakeholder groups remained active throughout the
entire process: Western Resource Advocates, Tesla, the Bureau of Consumer Protection,
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NV Energy, and the Energy Storage Association. These five stakeholder groups worked
closely together to create a consensus among the parties. Many of their interactions were
informal and formal. There were in-person workshops and conferences and many
informal exchanges among this core group.
The cohort of five stakeholders were influential in the Final Rules. Table 7.3
breaks down which stakeholder groups were most influential in shaping the final rules.

Table 7.3 Nevada Stakeholder Influence Score

Stakeholder

Fuzzy Score

Type

Western Resource Advocates (WRA)

0.9

Environmental

Tesla

0.9

Developer/Producer

Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP)

0.9

Government Consumer Advocacy

NV Energy

0.6

Utility

Energy Storage Association (ESA)

0.4

Trade

Able Grid Energy Solutions

0.1

Developer

Interwest Energy Alliance

0.1

Trade

While there is a range of influence scores, it should be noted that influence is
relative to another stakeholder. Therefore, while ESA may have a lower score than
WRA, that does not necessarily indicate that they were not influential throughout the
entire process. It just shows that ESA was not as influential in shaping the final rules
relative to the other stakeholders who submitted comments on the final draft. The last two
stakeholders in italics from Table 7.3 (Able Grid and Interwest Energy Alliance) were
only involved during brief periods of the rulemaking. They often did not partake in the
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informal and informal workshops and meetings that the core group of five participated in.
Their influence scores are lower than the rest of the core group of five stakeholders.
One surprising finding is the low influence score of NV Energy. NV Energy had a
key role in crafting the Final Rules, but there were key issues that the utility lost out on.
In particular, NV Energy failed to persuade the PUCN to take its position on non-binding
targets, a lower energy storage target, and an incremental schedule on biennial targets.
Rather, the PUCN adopted the more stringent target recommendations of Tesla, WRA,
and the ESA. This is not to say that NV Energy was not influential at all throughout the
proceeding. However, this highlights that utilities do not have an iron grip of state PUCs.
Other stakeholders can be influential at key points during the proceeding, too.
The ESA has been a major stakeholder across all four other energy storage
proceedings. The ESA continued to have a strong presence during the Nevada energy
storage rulemaking. However, in the end, while the ESA was able to make substantial
advances in some issue areas (e.g., targets), it was unable to convince the PUCN to
commit to more stringent rules for NV Energy. Tesla experienced similar setbacks in
ensuring that NV Energy adopted a more competitive procurement framework.
WRA was the only environmental group involved in the docket and was
successful in many of the key issues it attempted to influence in the Final Rules. WRA
brought a wealth of technical and regulatory expertise with its participation in the
rulemaking. WRA is unique from traditional environmental groups in that it is mainly
focused on regulatory proceedings rather than legislation. Therefore, WRA had a strong
history of intervening in regulatory proceedings at the PUCN and other PUCs in the

205

region. In addition, WRA’s mission is science-based, which gave the group an advantage
in possessing the technical knowledge to engage with the key issues fully. Since energy
storage is a relatively new technology, many non-industry interest groups do not have the
technical expertise or administrative knowledge to participate effectively in energy
regulatory proceedings.
Another advantage that WRA had compared to other out-of-state stakeholders
was that the group had an attorney on-site at the PUCN. Other out-of-state stakeholders
relied on teleconferences and the occasional in-person visit throughout the proceedings.
Interest groups with in-state staff often have a greater knowledge of the PUC, its staff,
and procedures.
Despite the range of stakeholder influence over the final rules, the stakeholder
process provided each of the key stakeholders opportunities to learn, deliberate,
collaborate, and ultimately influence the rulemaking process and ultimately the final
order. The following section examines what inclusive and participatory mechanisms the
PUCN utilized to facilitate a successful stakeholder process.

Discussion: Collaboration and Consensus
What made the Nevada case so successful for its energy storage rulemaking was
the focus on stakeholder collaboration and consensus. The PUCN achieved this by first,
providing a myriad of informal and formal stakeholder workshops and meetings, and
secondly, by facilitating stakeholder collaboration and consensus throughout the majority
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of the stakeholder process. In addition, discussion documents were employed to
encourage stakeholders to collaborate and reach a consensus with one another.
Table 7.4 details the various types of stakeholder activities throughout the
rulemaking process.

Table 7.4 Nevada Stakeholder Activity
Comments
Pre-Proposal

3

Formal
Workshop
3

Teleconference

Hearing

3

Informal
Workshop
2

Draft

3

2

0

0

1

Total

6

5

3

2

1

0

During the pre-proposal and draft proposal periods, the PUCN facilitated multiple
informal and formal interactions among stakeholders. There were at least ten on the
record meetings, although it is likely that the stakeholders had more conversations and
communications with one another than was noted in the official docket record. Often
stakeholders will write emails and call one another to determine their positions or gain
specific information about the docket. According to Nevada’s APA, the PUCN is only
required to hold a single workshop to solicit comments during a rulemaking per NRS
233B.061. The energy storage rulemaking far exceeded this requirement.
These formal and informal meetings provided stakeholders meaningful
opportunities to be part of an inclusive and participatory framework. The Commission’s
prioritization of stakeholder consensus helped to shape this inclusive stakeholder
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framework. All of the stakeholders were part of the coproduction of the discussion
documents.
It is also important to highlight that the core group of five stakeholders were
actively involved in the pre-proposal phase. During the pre-proposal phase, stakeholders
were able to provide input on establishing energy storage targets. In addition, energy
storage advocates (Tesla, WRA, and ESA) were able to effectively advocate for an
independent study on energy storage (the Brattle Report) to help sway the Commission to
determine that energy storage was in the public interest of the state.
While NV Energy was key in writing its draft proposal, other stakeholders were
directly involved in this process. This is unique from the other state contexts, as often the
utilities drafted their regulations independent of the greater stakeholder process. Other
stakeholders only became involved in the drafting process once utilities submitted their
proposals for stakeholder comment. Yet, in Nevada, Tesla, WRA, and ESA all were able
to actively come to a consensus on the draft proposal in collaboration with NV Energy.
Another component of the stakeholder process that worked in favor of a more
stringent outcome was the long timeline of the rulemaking. The rulemaking lasted two
and a half years, which is quite long for any PUC rulemaking. This long timeline could
have led to the dissembling of the original intent of the legislation, but instead, it enabled
the stakeholders and the Commission enough space and time to come to a mutual
understanding about the benefits and costs of an energy storage program to Nevada.
The timing factor is important because at the beginning of the docket, there was a
sharp division between stakeholders on whether to establish an energy storage target or

208

not. Essentially, there were two positions on the targets throughout the rulemaking: those
that supported stringent energy storage targets and those that did not want mandated
targets. Tesla, Western Resource Advocates, and the Energy Storage Association strongly
supported stringent energy storage targets and energy storage program guidelines and
rules. Whereas PUCN Staff, NV Energy, and the Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP)
took a more cautious stance on energy storage due to the uncertainty of energy storage
technology and their desire to maintain NV’s existing electrical needs rather than a major
system overhaul. Discussion documents were utilized to further the conversation of the
key issues of contention among stakeholders and to refine the scope of the proceedings.
These discussion documents are a notable inclusive mechanism that increases
transparency and consensus among the stakeholders. Figure 7.4 highlights the timeline of
key events during Nevada’s energy storage rulemaking.

Figure 7.4 Timeline of Key Events in Nevada

Aug. 21, 2017
Rulemaking opened

Feb. 5, 2018
GOE issued RFP
for study

Oct. 2, 2018
Brattle Group
Study released

Dec. 24, 2018
Commission
issued order to
estab. targets

Sept. 12, 2019
NVEnergy filed
draft consensus
regulation

Mar. 3, 2020
Commission
adopts proposed
regulation

In addition, the extra time spent during the investigatory phase of this docket
enabled the research and then publication of the Brattle Report. The Brattle Report was
instrumental in convincing the Commission to establish a state energy storage target.
It is also likely that the concrete developments in clean energy legislation after the
fallout from the contentious 2015 net metering PUCN decision helped lay a stronger
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foundation for energy storage policy. By the time the Commission determined it was in
the public interest to establish an energy storage target, there had been greater policy and
technological developments for energy storage. Other states such as New York, New
Jersey, and Massachusetts had passed similar energy storage legislation in 2018. There
were also similar state studies to the Brattle Report released during this period of time on
the benefits of energy storage (Massachusetts’s Energy State of Charge, New York’s
Energy Storage Roadmap, New Jersey’s Energy Storage Analysis). These studies were
further supported by positive economic and business forecasts showing that battery
energy storage was becoming more resilient and affordable (Bloomberg NEF, 2018). In
addition, Governor Sisolak was elected in the November 2018 election signaling a
change of state leadership. Thus, there were a myriad of contextual factors that developed
after 2017 that continued to shape the energy storage policy sphere in Nevada and the
country.
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Nevada Conclusion
Despite the small number of stakeholders involved, the Nevada energy storage
rulemaking is noteworthy for its facilitation of stakeholder collaboration and consensus.
The stakeholder process was likely successful because there were so few stakeholder
groups. The small number of stakeholders fostered an environment more amenable to
small group collaboration and consensus.
Like Oregon, the Nevada energy storage rulemaking embodied Quick and
Feldman’s (2011) criteria for inclusiveness. First, the rulemaking enabled stakeholders to
share multiple ways of knowledge through the tight collaborative stakeholder framework.
The five primary stakeholder groups had multiple informal and formal interactions with
one another in which they were able to communicate their interests and perspectives on
energy storage. Stakeholders were encouraged to reach a consensus with one another
through these deliberations. In addition, the request for a third-party study (the Brattle
Report) helped the stakeholders to reach a common understanding of energy storage
during a period in the process in which stakeholders were divided.
Second, the five primary stakeholder groups were involved with coproducing the
energy storage framework. Stakeholders were involved during the pre-proposal phase,
which allowed them to shape the framework’s content and direction. Again, the use of
discussion documents and multiple comment periods provided stakeholders opportunities
to coproduce the content of what became the final rules. The use of discussion documents
was especially helpful in reaching a consensus with the groups.
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Finally, the stakeholder process supported temporal openness through the many
formal and informal meetings and communications among stakeholders. The stakeholder
process was iterative and required stakeholders to collaborate with one another for an
extended amount of time.
Nevada’s energy storage rulemaking is unique. The final outcome of the
rulemaking highlights how the PUCN’s emphasis on collaboration and consensus
resulted in a meaningful stakeholder process that enabled multiple stakeholder groups to
be influential throughout the process.
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Chapter Conclusion
As these two state contexts demonstrate, environmental and clean energy
stakeholders successfully influenced the final regulations in stakeholder processes that
embraced an inclusive and participatory stakeholder framework. Inclusive practices
included stakeholder involvement during the pre-proposal and drafting phases,
stakeholder workshops, stakeholder technical meetings, and the use of discussion
documents. In addition, stakeholders were given multiple opportunities to participate in
comment periods before and after the draft framework was written.
In Oregon, the OPUC led a deliberative proceeding and focused on stakeholder
learning about the costs and benefits of energy storage. The OPUC’s participatory and
inclusive stakeholder process enabled clean energy storage groups to effectively
influence the final order. Stakeholders were able to participate in in-person technical
workshops during the pre-proposal phase. Stakeholders who participated in these preproposal workshops were literally and metaphorically “at the table” which contributed to
their influence by the end of the docket. Inclusive workshops ensure more meaningful
stakeholder engagement.
In Nevada, the long timeframe of the energy storage rulemaking provided
stakeholders the time to collaborate with one another through multiple informal and
formal meetings and discussions. These multiple meetings and workshops facilitated not
only stakeholder deliberation, but also stakeholder consensus. The PUCN’s emphasis on
stakeholder consensus deepened the core group of five stakeholders’ interactions and
fostered a strong environment of inclusivity.
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While Nevada’s case is exemplary for its inclusive and participatory stakeholder
framework, it should be noted that it was most likely successful due to the small number
of stakeholders involved. Such an intimate and focused stakeholder process would likely
be ineffective for rulemakings with a large number of stakeholders in a limited
timeframe. Yet, Nevada’s case does highlight that the stakeholder process can be
meaningful even when there is not a diverse range of stakeholders involved (i.e., less
emphasis on broadening participation and more emphasis on deepening inclusivity).
The following chapter examines the cases of California and New York. These two
cases are quite different from the Oregon and Nevada cases as California and New York
are much larger. Therefore, the PUCs in California and New York are larger and were
able to attract a large number of stakeholders for the energy storage rulemakings. While
California and New York’s administrative contexts are similar, each state’s PUC
conducted their rulemaking and stakeholder processes quite differently from the other.
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Chapter 8 The Cases of California and New York
Chapter Overview
This chapter seeks to explain why environmental and clean energy stakeholders in
California were more successful in influencing their energy storage rulemaking than their
counterparts in New York. California and New York have similar socioeconomic
contexts. Both California and New York possess large populations and boast high gross
domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita rates. In addition, both states have been
clean energy forerunners, implementing progressive renewable energy, distributed energy
resources, and interconnection policies. Both states have intentionally sought to link and
coordinate energy policies from the legislature to the public utility commissions (PUC)
for a seamless implementation process. Another similarity is that California and New
York operate their own state-independent system operators (ISOs) (Texas is the other
state with their own ISO). Finally, California and New York possess a highly
bureaucratic network of agencies that work together on energy policies.
However, the stakeholder process in California sharply contrasts in comparison to
the stakeholder process in New York. Environmental and clean energy stakeholders were
able to succeed at much higher levels at influencing the final rules in California than in
New York. This discrepancy can be explained by:
(1) the differences in the legislative mandate,
(2) how each PUC sought to overcome the issue ambiguity surrounding energy
storage,
(3) the type of stakeholder opportunities (participatory and inclusive), and
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(4) the quantity of access points (stakeholder meetings and comment periods)
The following case summaries examine the differences in California and New
York’s stakeholder process and how these contexts and the presence of inclusive and
participatory opportunities enabled environmental stakeholders in California to be more
successful in influencing the final rules than their counterparts in New York.
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The Case of California: Creating Policy Linkages
Introduction
California was the first state to pass an energy storage target mandate in 2010.
With that prestige also came a lengthy process of learning about energy storage and then
establishing an energy storage program that could be integrated seamlessly into the
traditional electrical system. Given that energy storage was a nascent technology and that
there was a lack of full-fledged energy storage projects, it was important for the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to turn to its stakeholders to inform the
rulemaking. The CPUC held many stakeholder meetings, workshops, and comment
periods to help facilitate learning for stakeholders and the Commission. The CPUC also
promoted policy linkages and network connections, as the rulemaking was occurring
simultaneously with other proceedings on interconnections and distributed energy
resources. After several years of stakeholder engagement, the CPUC instituted the
country’s first energy storage program. The success of the energy storage program can be
credited to the CPUC’s inclusive and participatory stakeholder framework.

California’s Energy Background
California faces many climate change challenges: the availability of water from
snowpack in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, rising sea levels and coastal areas, the effect
of droughts on agriculture, extreme weather, forest fires, degradation of natural resources,
and health problems associated with poor air quality. California has among the worst air
quality of any of the states (Schmidt 2007). California has a long history of air pollution
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problems. In particular, Southern California’s poor air quality can be attributed to high
vehicle traffic due to its low-density sprawl, heavy border traffic with Mexico, and the
Los Angeles-Long Beach port complex (Schmidt 2007). The air quality is especially bad
because the air pollution becomes trapped in the region due to low-lying valleys and is
unable to dissipate quickly.
As a result of these environmental and socioeconomic challenges, California
became an environmental forerunner early on and began to invest in renewable energy
resources during the late 1970s and 1980s. However, it was not until the 2000s under
Governors Arnold Schwarzenegger (2002-2011) and Jerry Brown Jr. (2011-2019) that
aggressive decarbonization policies were enacted. In 2002, California passed its first of a
series of Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) goals (with the most recent update in
2018 directed California to be 100 percent carbon-free energy by 2045). The 2006 Global
Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) was one of the first pieces of state legislation that
required California to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.
Regarding DER programs, the 2001 Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP)
encouraged the rise of residential solar and energy storage installations. California’s
energy storage bill (AB 2514) continued to revolutionize California’s energy sector.
During the 2016 legislative section, lawmakers continued to support the
institutionalization of behind the meter and utility energy storage capacity with the
passage of AB 1637 (Low), AB 2868 (Gatto), AB2861 (Ting), and AB 33 (Quirk). Of
particular note was AB 2868, which mandated another 500 MW of behind-the-meter
storage for the state’s three IOUs.
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However, California faces immense challenges in mitigating its greenhouse gas
emissions. California is the most populous state in the United States. Its total energy
consumption is the second highest in the country (US EIA, 2019). The transportation
sector makes up 40 percent of California’s energy consumption, in which California is
the largest consumer of jet fuel in the United States (US EIA, 2019). As noted above,
vehicle emissions have continued to be a problem despite innovative policies to increase
vehicle efficiency and lower emissions. In addition, California’s oil industry has been a
major barrier to the state’s transition to renewable energy sources. In 2016, California
was the fourth-largest crude oil producer in the country and the third in oil refining
capacity in 2017 (US EIA, 2019).
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that approximately half of California’s
electricity mix is from renewable energy sources, with natural gas making up more than
two-fifths of electricity generation (US EIA, 2019). Since there are no utility-owned coal
plants in California, little of California’s energy is generated by coal-fired plants. While
most of California’s renewable energy comes from hydroelectric power, it is notable to
highlight that solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass generate about a quarter of the state’s
renewable energy (US EIA, 2019).
Unprecedented droughts and wildfire seasons have uncovered major
vulnerabilities in California’s electrical grid system. These natural disasters have
prompted California to implement energy policies that support a more reliable and
resilient electrical grid as a means to prevent future crises. In 2015, the CPUC ordered
Southern California Edison to install energy storage systems to mitigate power failures
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after large portions of the state were put at risk of power outages in two incidences due to
infrastructure failures (The Climate Group, 2016). California’s environmental and energy
agencies continue to lead the nation in clean energy and renewable energy policy.
California has a highly bureaucratic energy system managed by multiple agencies:
the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), the California Energy Commission
(CEC), and the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). Figure 8.1 provides a
summary of each of the agencies.

Figure 8.1 California Energy Agencies

CPUC

CEC

CAISO

•Regulates IOUs
•Protects consumers
•Ensures safe and reliable utility service and
infrastructure at reasonable rates

•Primary energy policy and planning agency
•Overssees energy efficiency, renewable energy, and
energy emergency policy.
•Electrical grid manager
•Operates state's energy wholesale market
•Conducts reliability planning analysis
•Manages the Energy Imbalance Market in the Western
Interconnect

CAISO manages approximately 80 percent of California’s electrical grid and
operates the state’s energy wholesale market. CAISO conducts reliability planning
analysis and coordinates energy policy with neighboring balancing areas. In addition,
CAISO leads the Energy Imbalance Market (EIM), which is a real-time energy market
that connects balancing authorities across the western states. The EIM analyzes regional
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grid needs and makes available low-cost generation to demands leading to improved
efficiency and lower costs across the entire western interconnect.
The CEC is the state’s primary energy policy and planning agency. The CEC is
responsible for forecasting energy needs, promoting energy efficiency, supporting
renewable energy policy (e.g., RPS), maintaining historical energy data, supporting
public interest energy research, and planning for state emergencies. It has a similar
organizational structure to the CPUC but does not conduct as formal and technical
rulemakings as the CPUC does. The CEC has roughly 700 staffers across its divisions
and offices.
The CPUC has regulatory authority to regulate natural gas, electric, telephone,
railroads, and marine transportation companies. The CPUC is responsible for serving “the
public interest and ensuring the provision of safe, reliable utility service and
infrastructure at reasonable rates with a commitment to environmental enhancement and
a healthy California economy” (CPUC Mission Statement, 2021).
Regarding energy companies, the CPUC regulates investor-owned utilities such as
PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E, but not municipal utilities. In the CPUC, there are five
commissioners that are appointed by the governor (and confirmed by the state Senate) for
six-year staggered terms. The CPUC is a highly staffed agency, with over 1,000 staffers
across fifteen offices and divisions. The CPUC deals with many different issues due to
California maintaining a fulltime legislature. The California legislature maintains
oversight of the CPUC activities and rules.
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There is a large amount of coordination and policy overlap across these three
agencies. In addition, there has been a large amount of organizational growth within these
agencies as they work to meet the new demands that have arisen with renewable and
clean energy policies.

Legislative Background
AB 2514 emerged during an innovative period of clean energy policy. Before AB
2514, California had passed notable renewable energy and climate legislation such as AB
32, California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, SB2 California “Renewable
Energy Resources Act”, the 2006 Self-Generation Incentive Program (SGIP), and
California’s Renewable Portfolio Standards. In addition, at the federal level, the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 invested $685 million in
energy storage and smart grid demonstration projects. This injection of funds encouraged
utilities and industry to invest in energy storage projects and create partnerships with
governments.
Assembly Member Nancy Skinner (D-Berkley) authored AB 2514 in partnership
with then California Attorney General Jerry Brown in 2010. AB 2514 was the nation’s
first energy storage target legislation. Assembly Member Skinner noted, “The
Assembly’s passage of AB2514 is another step that advances California’s clean energy
economy and represents a great economic opportunity for the State” (CESA, 2010).
The bill was considered flexible given that it did not define the procurement
targets, the types of energy storage projects, various recovery mechanisms, and the
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procurement rules and procedures. The original draft of the bill had included specific
mandated targets for utilities. However, after pressure from the CPUC and utilities, the
bill was modified to direct the CPUC to determine appropriate energy storage
procurement targets through the rulemaking process (Wesoff, 2011). While there was
opposition from utilities, the bill passed with relative ease after it was “watered down”
from its original target mandate. The final bill did not mandate a specific target amount
that utilities would be required to adopt.
AB 2514 directed the CPUC to consider procurement targets and policies for the
state’s investor-owned utilities (IOUs), while encouraging publicly owned utilities
(POUs) to attempt to integrate energy storage into their systems. The legislative mandate
directed the CPUC to set procurement targets by March 1, 2013, in which each loadserving entity (LSE) would be required to achieve the initial target by December 31,
2015, and a second by December 31, 2020. The three IOUs in California that were
required to procure energy storage deployment were PG&E, Southern California Edison,
and San Diego Sempra Energy.
The order instituting rulemaking (OIR) determined that the proceeding would be
quasi-legislative. The Commission was proactive from the beginning of the rulemaking.
While AB2514 directed the CPUC to begin its rulemaking no later than March 2012, the
Commission actually started the rulemaking over a year early, on December 21, 2010.
The implementation of AB2514 required coordination with other Commission
proceedings at the time, such as California’s 33% Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS),
Long-Term Procurement Planning (LTPP), and Resource Adequacy (RA) activities.
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There were two primary phases during the rulemaking process, (1) the
establishment of procurement rules and procedures and (2) the establishment of
methodologies for evaluating and prioritizing individual projects within the procurement
process. The CPUC faced some daunting barriers in establishing a cost-effective energy
storage resource policy as a result of a lack of existing rulemaking, procurement, and
interconnection processes. The CPUC’s Energy Storage Framework noted nine key
barriers:
•

Lack of definitive operational needs,

•

Lack of cohesive regulatory framework, evolving markets, and market
production definitions,

•

Resource adequacy accounting,

•

Lack of cost-effectiveness evaluation methods,

•

Lack of cost recovery policy,

•

Lack of cost transparency and price signals (for both wholesale and retail
electricity),

•

Lack of commercial operating experience, and

•

Lack of well-defined interconnection processes.

Given that energy storage was a nascent technology and new policy issue, it was
important for the CPUC to take the time to understand how energy storage would fit in
with California’s energy system. Commissioner Carla Peterman took over as the led
commissioner for the energy storage rulemaking in 2013, which was instrumental to the
direction of the scope of the rulemaking. As Commissioner Peterman noted, “The
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legislation directed the PUC to consider setting targets for energy storage. But the storage
had to be one of those things and it had to be viable, and it had to be cost effective. I’ve
never seen such a high bar for new technology class in legislation. But that was the
direction that we had” (Peterman, 2018a 10:55-11:15).
There were other interrelated energy rulemakings throughout the energy storage
rulemaking proceedings. However, this issue overlap was beneficial in the case of energy
storage as created a common platform for knowledge. In addition, stakeholders were able
to interact with one another across multiple issues over a long period time (this is in
contrast to other cases in which the rulemaking occurred in a short amount of time, in
which there was little issue overlap). The CPUC working groups (e.g., LTPP and
Interconnection) also linked issues and stakeholders together during the energy storage
docket. These stakeholder working groups made the process more seamless to implement
energy storage objectives (Peterman, 2018b).

Stakeholder Influence
The rulemaking attracted diverse stakeholders however industry, trade, and
developer groups made-up the majority of the stakeholders. California’s bustling
technological sector provided a friendly environment for energy storage and clean energy
developers and producers.
A large influx of stakeholders requested party status to the rulemaking after
Commissioner Peterman’s June 10, 2013, ruling proposing aggressive energy storage
targets. This was a monumental moment for the rulemaking, as it was not clear whether
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targets would be mandated and what the framework for an energy storage program would
look like. Figure 8.2 depicts the breakdown of each of the major stakeholder group types
involved in the rulemaking.

Figure 8.2 California Stakeholder Group Participation by Group Type
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Stakeholder groups submitted many comments throughout the process regarding
the proposed targets and the framework rules and regulations. Under California’s APA,
agencies are required to respond to comments through a Final Statement of Reasons
(FSOR). The agency can dismiss comments that do not pertain to the proposed
regulations or proceedings. California has a 45-day public comment period. If any
changes are made to the regulations during the proceedings, a new 45-day notice and
public comment period is instituted.
California allows intervener compensation for stakeholders that are able to justify
their contributions to the proceeding. Often, energy rulemakings are very technical in
nature, requiring experts and stakeholders to help inform the process and the
Commission. California established its intervenor compensation program in 1981, and it
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was codified into state law by 1985. In 2013, the California State Auditor conducted an
audit of the CPUC’s intervenor compensation program and found that it was effective at
bringing in a “broad array of interests”, representing environmental interests, low-income
ratepayers, ratepayers from specific geographic regions, and minority ratepayers (State
Auditor Report 2012-118, 2013).
There are two requirements that intervenors must meet to receive funding. The
first requirement is that intervenors must demonstrate significant financial hardship
through either the undue hardship test (customer cannot afford to participate without
financial aid) or the comparison test (economic interest of individual members is small
compared to the costs of effective participation) (State Auditor Report 2012-118, 2013).
The second requirement is that intervenors must demonstrate their customer status
through one of three categories relating to (1) being an actual customer that represents the
broad interests of other customers, (2) a representative who has been granted the
authority to represent actual customers, or (3) a formal organization authorized through
its bylaws or articles of incorporation to represent the interests residential customers or
small commercial electric customers (State Auditor Report 2012-118, 2013, p. 16).
Within these requirements, environmental and clean energy groups are eligible to
receive intervenor funds as long as they pass the requirements of financial hardship and
customer status. For the rulemaking, six groups filed for intervenor compensation: Sierra
Club California, The Green Power Institute (GPI), the Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS), the Vote Solar Initiative, The Utility Reform Network (TURN), and the
Consumer Federation of California (CFC).

227

With regards to the availability of intervenor compensation, it is clear that groups
who were able to receive funds did relatively better than their counterparts in terms of
influencing the final rules. It should be noted that the majority of environmental groups
involved with the docket could have requested authorization to receive funds, but only
three groups followed through. One environmental group (UCS) requested intervenor
authorization but chose not to actively participate in the proceeding. Another group noted
that they had many other dockets and issues that they were too busy with and chose not to
participate as a result (EDF).
A few stakeholders stood out from the proceeding. Naturally, the three IOUs had
a strong role in shaping the content and direction of the final decision. The Division of
Ratepayer Advocates (DRA) (which is now called the Public Advocates Office) is an
independent organization within the CPUC that represents and advocates on behalf of
utility ratepayers. The mission of the DRA is to obtain the lowest possible rate for
ratepayers that is reliable and provides safe services. The DRA is an influential
stakeholder in many proceedings, given its statutory goal is to represent ratepayers at
regulatory proceedings.
Table 8.1 on the next page shows stakeholder influence scores for California’s
energy storage rulemaking.
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Table 8.1 California Stakeholder Influence
Stakeholder
Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E)
Division of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA)
Sierra Club
San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E)
Southern California Edison (SCE)
Green Power Institute (GPI)
Sierra Club/ California Environmental Justice
Alliance (CEJA)
Megawatt Storage
Marin Energy Authority (MEA)
Independent Energy Producers (IEP)
The Utility Reform Network (TURN)
Consumer Federation of California. (CFC)
Brookfield Renewable Power, Inc. (Brookfield)
Joint Solar
Clean Coalition
California Energy Storage Association (CESA)
Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Technologies (CEERT)
Energy Storage Association (ESA)
Calpine
California Independent System Operator (CAISO)
Pilot Power
California Wind Association (CalWEA)
Alliance of Retail Energy Markers (AReM)
PrimusPower
Energy Producer and Users Coalition (EPUC)
Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC)
Friends of the Earth (FOE)
Duke
Beacon Power
Shell Energy North America, L.P.
Sunverge
Stem
VoteSolar
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
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Fuzzy Score
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.6

Type
Utility
Government
Environmental
Utility
Utility
Environmental Research

0.6
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4

Environmental
Developer/Provider
Developer/Provider
Developer/Provider
Consumer Advocate
Consumer Government
Developer/Provider
Trade
Non-profit
Trade

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

Research
Trade
Utility
Government
Utility
Trade
Developer/Provider
Developer/Provider
Developer/Provider
Developer/Provider
Non-Profit
Utility
Developer/Provider
Utility
Developer/Provider
Developer/Provider
Non-Profit
Developer/Provider

In contrast to the success of the DRA, the Consumer Federation of California
(CFC) had trouble asserting its arguments to the Commission. The CFC is a non-profit
advocacy organization that seeks to represent consumer interests. It is very likely that
new and less experienced personnel assisting in the proceeding led to this lack of
influence. The Commission’s response to the CFC’s intervenor compensation request
noted multiple times the inconsistencies and inexperience of the individuals submitting
comments.
Similarly, the Utility Reform Network (TURN), a well-respected consumer
advocacy organization, was not as influential in the Final Rules. However, TURN did not
begin to actively participate in the rulemaking until 2013, when the CPUC was
determining whether to establish targets or not.
The Sierra Club was the most influential environmental group in the rulemaking.
The Sierra Club commissioned an environmental attorney from Earthjustice to represent
their organization. Earthjustice is a non-profit public interest environmental law
organization that has worked with the Sierra Club for well over a decade. Earthjustice
possessed the legal and energy expertise required for the energy storage rulemaking. The
Sierra Club participated from the beginning of the rulemaking and attended most, if not
all, of the technical meetings and workshops. The Sierra Club petitioned for intervenor
status and received due compensation for its contributions at the end of the rulemaking.
Another unique case was the Clean Coalition. While the Clean Coalition was
often at odds with the Commission’s decisions, the Commission noted their unique
positions and their ability to collaborate with other stakeholders in its response to the
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Clean Coalition’s intervenor compensation request. So, while Clean Coalition did not
have a large influence over the final decision, it seems like its reputation and unique
perspective helped them continue to exert a positive influence over the proceeding.
The Commission found that the Green Power Institute (GPI) provided expertise
and a diverse perspective throughout the proceeding. In the Commission’s decision to
grant intervenor compensation to GPI, the Commission noted their substantial
contributions throughout the proceeding.
The California Environmental Justice Alliance (CEJA) was another notable
environmental stakeholder. CEJA is an alliance of six grassroots environmental justice
organizations: the Asian Pacific Environmental Network, The Center for Community
Action and Environmental Justice, Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment,
Communities for a Better Environment, Environmental Health Coalition, and People
Organizing to Demand Environmental and Economic Justice. CEJA was the only
environmental justice non-profit involved in the rulemaking. While few environmental
groups are involved in PUC proceedings, there are even fewer environmental justice
groups involved. Often environmental justice groups are focused more on grassroots
campaigning and movements. Therefore, it is notable that CEJA was involved in the
rulemaking. CEJA submitted joint comments with the Sierra Club, which helped
strengthen their mutual positions on specific issues. While one cannot definitively say
that CEJA would not have been as successful without the Sierra Club’s alliance, their
joint comments were positively received by the Commission. Sierra Club was one of the
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more active stakeholders to the rulemaking, which would have afforded CEJA an
advantage in submitting comments.
There were other stakeholders involved in the docket that were not mentioned as
much in the stakeholder address in the final ruling. It should be noted that the influence
score only captures changes made from the draft document to the final ruling. The
California Energy Storage Association had a big role in drafting the energy storage
legislation and the rulemaking. However, this was not apparent from examining influence
at the final phase in the rulemaking. I address this issue more in Chapter 11.

Discussion: Overcoming Issue Ambiguity Through Knowledge and Policy Linkages
California’s energy storage rulemaking and stakeholder process were defined by
issue ambiguity. In 2010, energy storage was a nascent technology that had not been
widely tested. The CPUC had a great task in front of them. The CPUC had to
simultaneously create an original energy storage program while also working to mitigate
any potential barriers to implementing that new energy storage program.
Since California was the first state to implement an energy storage program, it
was important to take the time to develop a stable knowledge platform to establish the
program. The CPUC established the OIR on December 16, 2010, over a year earlier than
the legislation had mandated (the legislation mandated that the CPUC commence the
rulemaking no later than March 2012). The extra time granted the CPUC the necessary
time to really understand and deliberate on the costs and benefits of energy storage and
how it could be integrated into California’s electrical grid system.
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While there was not a specific roadmap that guided the rulemaking, the
Commission’s Policy and Planning Division issued a white paper on energy storage on
July 9, 2010, called, “Electric Energy Storage: An Assessment of Potential Barriers and
Opportunities”. This white paper was a good starting point for deliberation. However,
there was still not enough known about energy storage at the time and how it could be
integrated into California’s electrical system cost-effectively. The undeveloped
understanding of energy storage and its nascent technologies made it necessary for the
CPUC to take more time to understand the costs, benefits, and uses of energy storage
fully. The CPUC turned to its stakeholders to help fill in informational and practical gaps.
The CPUC actively sought an inclusive stakeholder process by inviting
stakeholders to consult and deliberate on the energy storage framework and the
imposition of mandated targets during the pre-proposal phase. Each stakeholder had the
opportunity to engage in pre-proposal meetings and workshops while also submitting
comments during this time. The pre-proposal period was especially important in the case
of California because this was the first energy storage program deployed in the country.
Not all environmental and clean energy stakeholders were parties to the
rulemaking during the pre-proposal period. There were multiple cases in which the
groups had a short period of involvement. Some groups such as the Environmental
Defense Fund and the Union for Concerned Scientists were not actively involved. These
groups likely monitored the rulemaking from afar for various reasons (e.g., other priority
issues, did not have the capacity to participate).
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In the case of Vote Solar, the group had initially been integral in passing the
energy storage legislation. It had even been approved to receive intervenor compensation
at the beginning of the rulemaking. However, for unknown reasons, Vote Solar stopped
submitting comments and participating after the adoption of the framework. Many other
groups such as the Clean Coalition, IREC, and Friends of the Earth did not become active
with the docket until after the Staff Report in February 2013. Therefore, when one
accounts for this discrepancy, the condition of access to draft meetings highlights the
importance of being at the table during the drafting of key documents.
The rulemaking facilitated even greater inclusivity through CPUC workshops.
Over two years, there were 11 workshops conducted by CPUC Staff. Many of these
workshops examined how storage relates to the LTPP proceeding, cost-effectiveness,
use-case development, and procurement policy options. These workshops were integral in
helping stakeholders understand the key issues surrounding energy storage and how it
would be integrated into California’s electrical system. In addition, workshops provided
opportunities for stakeholders to engage with one another and Staff. These formal
interactions helped stakeholders gain a greater perspective on each other’s preferences
and perspectives. In addition, stakeholders become more familiar with Staff, which can
be useful for sharing information throughout the proceeding. Chapter 10 takes a deeper
examination into how these stakeholder interactions are beneficial to stakeholders that are
in the “game” for the long-term.
Regarding the availability of intervenor compensation for groups, it is clear that
groups who were able to receive funds did appreciably better than their counterparts with
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influencing the docket (the exception being the CFC). California is unique because, at the
time, it was one of a few states that allowed non-profit environmental groups to be
eligible for intervenor compensation. Receiving intervenor compensation gives groups
greater opportunities to participate in the proceedings by enabling groups to expend more
resources on the proceeding or to either hire experts to represent them in the proceeding.
It should be noted that the majority of environmental groups involved with the California
docket could have requested authorization to receive funds, but only three groups
followed through. Two groups requested intervenor authorization but chose not to
actively participate in the proceeding. One group noted that they had many other dockets
and issues that they were too busy with and chose not to participate as a result (EDF).
The California rulemaking also had abundant opportunities for stakeholders to
submit comments. There was a total of 13 opportunities for stakeholders to submit
comments. The comment periods in the energy storage rulemaking do not represent a
typical rulemaking. The multiple comment periods reflect the CPUC’s desire to gain a
greater understanding of energy storage from stakeholders and come to a stronger
consensus of what the energy storage framework and program should look like. Only the
utility Southern California Edison (SCE) submitted comments for all 13 comment
periods. However, there was a handful of stakeholders that provided 10 to 12 submissions
for the comments (i.e., CESA, PG&E, CFC, SDG&E, Sierra Club, and DRA).
One unique factor to the California rulemaking was the leadership of the lead
commissioner for the rulemaking. The lead commissioner that oversaw the rulemaking
was Commissioner Carla J. Peterman. Prior to Commissioner Peterman’s appointment to

235

the CPUC, Peterman was the lead commissioner at the California Energy Commission.
Commissioner Peterman’s expertise in decarbonization policy, renewable energy, and
energy policy were integral in moving the rulemaking forward. Commissioner Peterman
is noted for her instrumental work throughout the rulemaking proceedings. Commissioner
Peterman’s first major docket after her appointment to the CPUC was the energy storage
rulemaking. Commissioner Peterman pushed for aggressive energy storage targets despite
the initial hesitation among Staff and business stakeholders. She recounted a story that
when one utility stakeholder found out about her proposed energy targets, they fell out of
their chair in complete surprise (Peterman, 2018c).
Commissioner Peterman also encouraged stakeholders to interact and collaborate.
Commissioner Peterman noted that she encouraged technical developers and producers to
consult with agency members and stakeholders skeptical about the technologies to
convince them that energy storage was a viable technology. This stakeholder networking
helped to secure the path for the energy storage targets. The CPUC voted 5-0 to pass the
target (Peterman, 2018a).
Compared to the other cases, it is unusual for a PUC commissioner to have such a
visible presence in a case. In many states, the commissioners oversee the cases as a
collective. In California, each commissioner is assigned specific cases due to their
background and expertise on the issue. Commissioner Peterman’s actions were
completely within the realm of her authority and provided a greater light on the inner
workings of the CPUC.
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California Conclusion
California set a high bar for establishing an energy storage program. Since
California was the first state to implement an energy storage program, it was important
that the CPUC take the time to understand how energy storage would be integrated into
California’s electrical system. In order to address the issue ambiguity around energy
storage, the CPUC facilitated an intensive stakeholder process. The CPUC sought
stakeholder consultation and deliberation from the very beginning during the preproposal phase. Many environmental and clean energy stakeholders were involved to
varying degrees in the rulemaking. Ultimately, the environmental groups that were the
most successful in influencing the Final Rules had intervenor compensation, were
involved from the beginning of the pre-proposal phase, attended the majority of the
workshops, and submitted comments 90 percent of the time.
Given the number of stakeholders involved in the California rulemaking, it was a
major task to institute an inclusive and participatory stakeholder framework. However,
the CPUC was able to provide its stakeholders an inclusive process by hosting frequent
stakeholder meetings or workshops, comment periods, and linking policy issues. From
this perspective, the California case did meet the three inclusive criteria from Quick and
Feldman (2011).
First, during the pre-proposal period, the open stakeholder process fostered a
dynamic environment of multiple ways of sharing knowledge. Stakeholders could share
their knowledge, perspectives, and interests during these meetings and comment periods.
Since the CPUC did not have a strong understanding of energy storage and its multiple
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uses, the stakeholder process was crucial to informing the Commission about energy
storage and retaining a rigorous record.
The California comment periods were central in continuing multiple ways of
knowledge as stakeholders had many opportunities to inform the Commission through
initial and reply comments. The reply comments were especially interactive as
stakeholders would actively engage with the comments from other stakeholder groups,
indicating what points they agreed with or not. This style of replying required that
stakeholders read the comments of other groups and communicate with groups of their
choosing, either to confirm positions or ensure that their comments were not repetitive.
This commenting style is intensive but highlights the CPUC’s expectation that
stakeholders actively deliberate and coordinate with other groups during the process.
It is important to stress again that the Commission does not want the same
arguments and repetitive facts. The Commission wants to review diverse perspectives and
information so that they can make the most informed decision. Therefore, stakeholders
will often check in with other stakeholders to ensure that their comments are distinct and
stand out.
Second, there was a strong push for coproduction over a two- and half-year
period. The CPUC held many workshops and comment periods during this time.
Stakeholder input and expertise was a large component of the rulemaking given that so
little was known about energy storage at that time. Again, the intensive comment periods
were integral in creating the final energy storage framework.
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Finally, temporal openness was a high priority during the rulemaking. The CPUC
worked hard to create policy linkages so that stakeholders would better understand how
energy storage and other energy issues could be integrated into the electrical system. The
CPUC staff held nearly a dozen workshops examining how storage related to the LTPP
proceeding, cost-effectiveness, use-case development, and procurement policy options.
Also, the emphasis on policy linkages allowed stakeholders to become increasingly
familiar with one another over multiple CPUC proceedings. These policy and network
linkages carried over to future issues and proceedings.
The California case was exceptional in that it created a statewide program for an
emerging technology about which little was known about. While the CPUC faced many
barriers and challenges to integrating energy storage into its traditional electric grid, the
CPUC took the time to examine the implications of instituting an energy storage
program. The CPUC relied heavily on its stakeholders to inform and guide the process.
This ultimately led to an inclusive and participatory stakeholder process, which is
impressive for such a large regulatory agency.
The case of New York is in sharp contrast to that of California. For all
appearances, while the New York DPS facilitated a strong participatory stakeholder
process, the process lacked inclusive opportunities, which negatively affected the
stakeholder process. New York relied heavily on an interagency process rather than an
inclusive stakeholder process. The following case summary takes a deeper examination in
New York’s stakeholder process for its energy storage rulemaking.
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The Case of New York: Agency
Introduction
On paper, New York’s energy storage proceeding meets all the main criteria for
successful stakeholder engagement: a diverse range of stakeholder groups, multiple
technical conferences held in different cities, two comment periods, and a series of public
hearings held in different cities. Yet, these participatory components were insufficient in
providing a meaningful stakeholder process. Stakeholder participation greatly decreased
by the end of the rulemaking. The reason for this diminished stakeholder participation is
likely due to the fact that most of the decisions and rules had already been established
prior to the rulemaking. The New York Department of Public Service (DPS) relied more
heavily on interagency coordination than stakeholder collaboration and input.
As the following analysis will show, the DPS set up a stakeholder framework that
was participatory but not inclusive. While the DPS was ultimately able to produce an
impressive energy storage program, the process that produced it was devoid of any robust
stakeholder input.

New York’s Energy Background
New York is the fourth most populous state in the United States and boasts the
third-largest economy. New York possesses few coal, petroleum, or natural gas assets;
however, it is a major consumer of all three sources. New York relies the most on natural
gas, in which more than half of its generating capacity comes from natural gas-fired
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plants (US EIA, 2020). In addition, New York is among the five largest consumers of
petroleum in the nation, in which four-fifths is used for transportation (US EIA, 2020).
Much of the population density of the state is in New York City, while the
majority of the state is rural. Therefore, most of the power generation sites are located in
the north, away from metropolitan areas. Transmission lines from these power generation
sites must bring electricity to these population hubs, which can create bottlenecks and
inefficiencies. Already, wind farms in the upper part of the state must curtail wind
generation because of transmission constraints leading to the lower half (NYISO, 2021).
Figure 8.3 depicts the imbalance of energy production and transmissions between the
upper and the lower of the state.

Figure 8.3 Tale of Two Grids

Source: NYISO. (2021). “A Vision for A Greener Future: Power Trends 2020”.
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Most renewable and clean energy sources reside in the upper part of the state,
while the lower portion of the state relies heavily on fossil fuels. New York City has
approximately 19 fossil fuel “peaker” plants along its waterfront that can be employed
quickly to meet excessive energy demands on the electrical grid. Peaker plants are
operating more with the increase of severe weather events (e.g., record-breaking hot
summers and polar vortex winters). Building transmission lines to connect these sources
to provide a cleaner, more reliable, and resilient grid is necessary but not easily done.
Despite its high reliance and consumption of fossil fuels, New York has been able
to create an energy-efficient economy. It consumes less total energy per capita than
residents from all states except Rhode Island. New York has six electric investor-owned
utilities (IOUs): Central Hudson & Electric Corporation, Consolidate Edison Company of
New York, New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, Niagara Mohawk Power
Corporation (National Grid), Orange & Rockland, and Rochester Gas and Electric
Corporation. In addition to these IOUs, there are other important energy providers in the
state, such as the New York Power Authority (NYPA), which is the largest state-owned
energy provider in the United States. During the 1990s, New York decentralized its
energy market and transitioned to a more competitive market. New York state’s electrical
grid is managed by NYISO, the independent system operator that operates the state’s
bulk power system and wholesale energy market. NYISO is unique because it is one of
three state ISOs but must also coordinate with regional ISO’s: ISO New England and
PJM.
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New York has traditionally relied heavily on energy alternatives of nuclear power
(one-third) and hydropower (one-fifth) (US EIA, 2021). New York is among the top four
producers of hydroelectricity in the country, with the Robert Moses Niagara hydroelectric
plant near Niagara Falls being the third-largest hydroelectric power plant by capacity in
the United States (US EIA, 2021). In 2019, nuclear power provided one-fifth of New
York’s net generation however, two out of the five nuclear reactors were retired by 2021
due to environmental concerns. While offshore wind farms are expected to fill the longterm gap left by the retirement of these nuclear plants, it is actually natural gas in the
short term that has met the new energy demands.
While wind power has doubled since 2009 and is the second-largest renewable
source of generation in the state, it still only made up 4% of utility-scale net generation in
2019 (US EIA, 2020). Solar power has less of a share in the energy mix, with only 2,150
megawatts of capacity in 2020 (US EIA, 2020). However, with the passage of the 2019
Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA), New York seeks to ramp
up renewable generation with a target of 9,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035 and 6,000
MW of distributed solar energy by 2025. Therefore, New York continues to make
headway to meet its clean energy aspirations.

Energy Storage Legislation and Rulemaking
The massive destruction of Superstorm Sandy in 2012 exposed New York’s
vulnerable electric grid and infrastructure. In 2014, Governor Cuomo introduced
Reforming the Energy Vision (REV), which sought to restructure New York’s energy
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industry to make it more resilient, affordable, and cleaner. A key part of the REV was to
reduce GHG emissions by 40 percent by 2030 and 80 percent by 2050. The REV was
broken down into seven key policy areas: (1) renewable energy, (2) building and energy
efficiency, (3) clean energy financing, (4) sustainable and resilient communities, (5)
energy infrastructure modernization, (6) innovation and research and development, and
(7) transportation. Key programs such as the 2012 NY Sun Solar Initiative (Solar
Initiative), the 2016 Clean Energy Standard (CES), the 2017 Value of Distributed Energy
Resources (VDER), and the 2019 Climate Leadership & Community Protection Act have
been key cornerstones for supporting REV initiatives.
The Energy Storage Order was another key piece to realizing the goals of REV. In
January 2018, during his State of the State address, Governor Cuomo proposed a 1,500
MW energy storage target by 2025. The legislature formally adopted Governor Cuomo’s
energy storage target goal in AB 8921A, which also established an energy storage
deployment strategy. The previous law (PSL§74) had directed the New York Public
Service Commission (PSC) to establish an energy storage deployment program along
with an appropriate energy storage target.
The amended PSL §74 directed the Commission to establish in consultation with
NYSERDA and LIPA a statewide energy storage goal for 2030 along with a deployment
policy to support the goal by December 31, 2018. In addition, the Commission was
required to summit annual reports on the achievements and effectiveness of the energy
storage program to the Governor, the Temporary President of the Senate, and the Speaker
of the Assembly. Governor Cuomo sought to further incentivize energy storage by
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earmarking $350 million towards energy storage deployment, of which $310 million of
that were to be incentives administered by the New York State Energy Research and
Development Authority and $40 million for solar energy storage.
The deployment of the energy storage program required the collaboration of key
governmental agencies. Figure 8.4 highlights the many agencies and other actors
involved in the energy storage program.

Figure 8.4 Road Map’s Key Actors and Expected Primary Roles

Source: Based on The Energy Storage Roadmap
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While Figure 8.4 is a simplistic figure, it highlights the individual roles of the
main actors involved in implementing, monitoring, and enforcing the energy storage
program. It is important to note that massive interagency coordination is required to see
this through. Some of the key actors involved were the Long Island Power Authority
(LIPA), The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
(NYSERDA), The New York Public Service Commission (PSC), The New York Green
Bank (NYGB), the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC),
and New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (NYISO).
Of particular importance to the energy storage proceeding was the New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) and the DPS Staff.
NYSERDA is a public benefit corporation that advances energy efficiency and renewable
energy sources. NYSERDA provides research, analyses, and technical expertise.
NYSERDA took on a stronger role in energy planning and policy when the New York
Energy Office was closed in 1995 and has continued to provide expertise and agency
leadership as New York has embraced clean energy policies.
The Public Service Commission is the body for DPS commissioners. New York’s
PSC had five commissioners at the time of the energy rulemaking (although it was later
expanded to seven commissioners in 2021). Commissioners are appointed by the
Governor for a six-year term limit but must be approved by the state Senate. There is a
bipartisan requirement which does not allow more than three commissioners to belong to
the same party. It appears that the PSC was open to energy storage. At the time of the
energy storage rulemaking, the PSC consisted of Governor Cuomo’s appointees. The
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Commission Chair John Rhodes stated, “Energy storage is not only crucial to achieving
our goal of 50 percent renewable energy by 2030, it will improve the resiliency of the
grid as we face extreme weather events and other emergency situations…With this step,
we continue to advance the deployment of energy storage in line with the target of 1,500
MW deployed by 2025” (Kovaleski, 2018).
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo spearheaded the energy storage target by
directing the New York DPS and NYSERDA to create the Energy Storage Roadmap
(The Roadmap). The Roadmap developed a series of recommendations and a framework
to implement Governor Cuomo’s 1,500 MW energy storage target. The Roadmap was
released on June 21, 2018, just three weeks before the energy storage rulemaking
commenced. While there were stakeholders involved in crafting The Roadmap, it was not
as open as a stakeholder process would be in a rulemaking. NYSERDA and the DPS
relied heavily on outside consultants to craft The Roadmap.
The Staff sought assistance from Energy & Environmental Economics (E3), the
Center for Renewables Integration, and the Climate Policy Initiative for project economic
modeling and developing the recommendations in The Roadmap. The Staff also
contracted Acelerex (an energy software company) to prepare an analysis of the benefits
and costs of energy storage. The Acelerex study modeled a scenario in which all pre1990 combustion turbine peaking units in New York City and Long Island were retired
by 2025, which resulted in 3,600 MW of energy storage being deployed by 2030. The
Acelerex modeling results encouraged the PSC to adopt the energy storage deployment
goal of 1,500 MW by 2025 and an aspirational goal of 3,000 MW by 2030.
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The Roadmap’s authors stated that it consulted with customers, storage
developers, renewable energy developers, system integrators, power producers, trade
groups, utilities, LIPA, NYPA, NYISO, and other stakeholders through working groups,
conferences, and individual meetings. There were two working groups being conducted
at the time: the Value of DER (VDER) and the rate design working groups. Staff held
public informational webinars on preliminary results prior to the final release of The
Roadmap.
The rulemaking was framed around the policy and recommendations of the
Energy Storage Roadmap. The rulemaking began on July 11, 2018. Stakeholder
comments were solicited regarding The Roadmap recommendations and policy. The
agenda and rules had essentially been drafted before stakeholders could come to the table
to discuss energy storage. The key issues of concern during the rulemaking were: (1)
retail rate actions and utility programs; (2) utility roles; (3) direct procurement; (4)
market acceleration incentive; (5) soft costs; (6) clean peak actions; (7) wholesale market
actions; and (8) accountability.
There were technical meetings in three locations (New York City, SUNY
Farmingdale, and Albany) from late July to August 2018. The technical meetings had the
same agenda, in which NYSERDA and DPS Staff introduced key issues and
recommendations from The Roadmap.
There were two public statement hearings in October of 2018 at two locations:
Colonie (near Albany, New York) and New York City. The official announcement for the
public hearings was released just 18 days before the first hearing. Key Capture Energy
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was the only stakeholder group that attended the first public statement hearing. During
the second public statement hearing the following evening, no parties were present in
New York City. The public was encouraged to submit comments if they were not able to
attend the public hearing however, only five stakeholders submitted comments. This lack
of stakeholder presence is troubling, as many professional stakeholders in other states
still make an effort to attend public hearings or PSC hearings.
The Final Rules establishing the energy storage goal and deployment policy were
released on December 13, 2018. The PSC released a detailed account and Staff response
to stakeholder comments. As the section below highlights, despite the Staff’s detailed
response to stakeholder comments, many stakeholders were not successful in influencing
the Final Rules.

Stakeholder Influence
There were 26 listed parties and 17 public commenters to the rulemaking.
However, it should be noted that some parties were conglomerations of multiple utilities
or groups (e.g., Joint Utilities and Joint IPI). A wide array of stakeholder groups
participated in the rulemaking, such as trade associations, energy storage developers,
clean energy advocates, environmental groups, and research organizations.
The New York energy storage rulemaking had the largest number of public
comments. Most of the public comments were from organizations. However, there were a
few public comments from individuals. The engagement of public comments is important
because it highlights that there are some organizations and individuals that find it

249

meaningful to submit comments to the DPS. As noted in the background in Chapter 2
(and will be revisited in Chapter 10), most of the groups that participate in PUC
proceedings are professional groups with the technical and legal expertise to participate.
Lay groups or individuals often find themselves overwhelmed and uninformed on how to
participate in the formal PUC proceedings (Baldwin 2018). Figure 8.5 shows the
breakdown of each stakeholder group type.

Figure 8.5 New York Stakeholders by Group Type
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Generally, few stakeholders were influential in shaping the Final Rules. The top
three stakeholders that did influence the Final Rules were the Joint Utilities, New York
Battery and Energy Storage Technology Consortium, and GI Energy. The Joint Utilities
consisted of the six main electric IOUs: Central Hudson & Electric Corporation,
Consolidate Edison Company of New York, New York State Electric & Gas Corporation,
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Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (National Grid), Orange & Rockland, and
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation. It is not surprising that the PSC made
allowances on behalf of the Joint Utilities since the utilities are the ones that must procure
energy storage. It should also be emphasized that the influence results are not necessarily
indicative of a problem of undue influence by the utilities.
The New York Battery and Energy Storage Technology Consortium (NY-BEST)
was a major source of expertise throughout the energy storage proceeding. NY-BEST is a
consortium whose members include manufacturers, academic institutions, technology and
material developers, government entities, and system integrators. Many of its members
and board members come from influential organizations (e.g., National Grid, Key
Capture Energy, EnelX, NYSERDA, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Rochester
Institute of Technology, and Con Edison). NY-BEST has a history of partnering with the
DPS on projects and research, so its level of influence over the final rules is not
surprising.
Table 8.2 on the next page provides the stakeholder influence scores.
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Table 8.2 New York Stakeholder Influence
Stakeholder

Fuzzy Score

Type

Joint Utilities
New York Battery and Energy Storage Technology
Consortium (NY BEST)

0.9

Utilities

0.9

Trade Association

GI Energy

0.9

Developer/Producer

Advanced Energy Management Alliance

0.6

Trade Association

Energy Storage Association (ESA)

0.6

Trade Association

Enel Green Power North America (ENEL)

0.6

Developer/Producer

GlidePath Development, LLC

0.6

Developer/Producer

Hydrostor, Inc

0.6

Developer/Producer

City of New York

0.6

City

New York Power Authority (NYPA)

0.6

Government Agency

O'Connell Electric Company, Inc.
New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYCEJA)

0.4

Utility

0.4

Environment

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

0.4

Environment

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA)

0.4

Public Benefit Corp

Borrego Solar Systems, Inc. (Borrego)

0.4

Developer/Producer

Energy Nest

0.4

Developer/Producer

Greenlots

0.4

Developer/Producer

Ingersoll Rand

0.4

Developer/Producer

Key Capture Energy

0.4

Developer/Producer

Northern Power Systems

0.4

Developer/Producer

Plus Power

0.4

Developer/Producer

Stem

0.4

Developer/Producer

Long Island Power Authority (LIPA)

0.4

Government Agency

NY Dept of State Utility Intervention Unit

0.4

Government Agency

Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Energy Association

0.4

Trade Association

Climate Change Mitigation Technologies

0.1

Developer/Producer

Energy Technology Savings, Inc.

0.1

Developer/Producer

Fluence Energy LLC

0.1

Developer/Producer

Fuel Cell

0.1

Developer/Producer

Grid Policy

0.1

Developer/Producer

Sunrun, Inc.

0.1

Developer/Producer

Institute for Policy Integrity (IPI)

0.1

Research

Dept. of State Utility Intervention

0.1

Government Agency

Hydrogen Energy Association

0.1

Trade Association

Independent Power Producers of New York (IPPPNY)

0.1

Trade Association
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Table 8.2. New York Stakeholder Influence (continued)
Stakeholder

Fuzzy Score

Type

Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA)

0.1

Trade Association

Alliance for Clean Energy New York, Inc. (ACE NY)

0.1

Clean Energy

Multiple Intervenors

0.1

Trade Association

New York Smart Grid Consortium

0.1

Business

Sustainable Westchester

0

New York State Department of State
New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority
National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation

0

Intergovernmental
Government
Agency
Government

National Fuel Cell Research Center

0

Research

NextEra Energy Transmission

0

Developer/Producer

0
0

Agency
Utility

There were only three environmental and clean energy groups involved, which
represented a wide spectrum: the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the
Alliance for Clean Energy New York, Inc. (ACE NY), and the New York City
Environmental Justice Alliance (NY-CEJA). The NRDC is a powerful environmental
group that was originally established to focus on environmental litigation. It is a wellrespected national environmental group. The ACE NY is an in-state clean energy group
whose 104 members include non-profits and private companies that want to promote a
clean energy economy in New York state. Many of ACE NY’s members are important
non-profit organizations (Sierra Club, NRDC, and the New York League of Conservation
Voters) and clean energy groups (e.g., Advanced Energy Economy, NextEra Energy,
Avangrid Renewables, and Key Capture Energy) that are regular stakeholders in PUC
proceedings for clean energy issues.
The NYC-EJA stands out as an environmental justice non-profit. Very few
environmental justice groups participated in PUC proceedings (the exception being in
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this study the NYC-EJA and the California Environmental Justice Alliance (CEJA)).
Often environmental justice non-profits focus their efforts at the grassroots level and the
legislative phase of the policy process. Therefore, it is notable that NYC-EJA was
involved in the energy storage rulemaking.
Despite the collective experience of these environmental and clean energy groups,
none of the groups had a strong influence over the Final Rules. All three environmental
groups only participated during one comment period. The NRDC and the NY EJA
submitted comments on The Roadmap for the initial comment period, while ACE NY
submitted reply comments during the second comment period. In general, ACE NY took
more of a bystander role during the rulemaking.

Discussion: Agency Facilitated Process
The New York rulemaking is interesting because there were multiple access
points for stakeholder engagement throughout the proceeding. The rulemaking took into
account: notification and time, technical meetings, and public hearings. First, there was
timely notification of meetings and comment periods. Second, there was a series of
technical meetings in three locations that lasted from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. to discuss
The Roadmap. Stakeholders could call into these technical meetings if they could not
physically attend the meeting. There were even two working groups that were active
during this period (Value of DER (VDER) and the rate design working groups). Finally,
there were two public statement hearings conducted in two locations in October of 2018.
Despite these procedural incentives for stakeholder engagement, many stakeholders did
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not fully participate in all components of the rulemaking (i.e., provide comments for both
comment periods and attend the public hearings). Ultimately, few stakeholders were able
to influence the Final Rules. Environmental and clean energy groups were particularly
ineffective at influencing the Final Rules.
Despite the DPS’s attempt to create a strong stakeholder framework, there were
three procedural weaknesses relating to (1) the legislative mandate’s deadline for the
energy storage rulemaking, (2) the brief comment period, and (3) the lack of a preproposal phase. Figure 8.6 depicts the timeline for the rulemaking.

Figure 8.6 Timeline of New York Energy Storage Rulemaking
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December 13,
2018

First, the New York PSC had a deadline to meet. The rulemaking was a quick
succession of events. The rulemaking was established on July 11, 2018, and stakeholders
had an opportunity to submit initial comments by September 10, 2018. Much of the initial
actions for the rulemaking occurred during the summer months. The public hearings were
scheduled at the beginning of October, with any final comments to be submitted by
October 31. The PSC came out with its final order on December 13, 2018. The
rulemaking’s aggressive timeline made it difficult for the DPS to lead a deliberative and
collaborative stakeholder process.
Second, since the initial focus was on the technical conferences at the beginning
of the rulemaking, there was limited time for multiple rounds of formal comment
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submissions. There were only two opportunities to comment: an initial comment period
on the Energy Storage Roadmap and a reply comment period. These comment periods
lasted just over a month from the final technical meeting. The lack of a robust comment
period is perhaps indicative of the larger issue of The Roadmap.
The Roadmap had already been written prior to the rulemaking. The Roadmap
was largely the product of NYSERDA, DPS Staff, along with the help of energy
consultants. Therefore, the agenda had been set even before the energy storage
rulemaking had begun. While there were modifications to The Roadmap’s initial
recommendations during the Final Rules, the PSC adopted the vast majority of
recommendations. Given that the rulemaking was centered around approving The
Roadmap’s recommendations, it is likely that stakeholders were less willing to invest
time and energy into the proceeding. The agenda had been set and was unlikely to change
much.
Governor Cuomo’s executive mandate to create the Energy Storage Roadmap
gave NYSERDA and DPS approximately six months to complete The Roadmap. The
Roadmap was released in June 2018, which was a couple of weeks before the energy
storage rulemaking commenced in July 2018. The agencies noted that there was
stakeholder engagement in crafting The Roadmap. However the extent of that stakeholder
engagement is vague and undocumented. In addition, The Roadmap mentions the word
“stakeholders” 49 times throughout the document and emphasizes the importance of
engaging stakeholders throughout multiple points in the energy storage implementation
process. However, The Roadmap also specifies what key stakeholders to focus the
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engagement process on in multiple areas in The Roadmap. The Roadmap mentioned Staff
from DPS, NYSERDA, NYISO, DEC, the New York Joint Utilities, and transmission
owners. So, while The Roadmap encouraged stakeholder engagement, it emphasized
greater interagency stakeholder coordination and deliberation instead of a diverse array
of non-agency stakeholders.

New York Conclusion
New York’s energy storage rulemaking, by most appearances, fulfilled many of
the necessary features to promote a meaningful stakeholder process. Yet, the stakeholder
process was undermined by the pre-established agenda of the Energy Storage Roadmap.
The Roadmap helped to create a unified direction for New York’s energy storage
deployment program. However, it did not give stakeholders the necessary time for
deliberation and collaboration that was valued during the PUC energy storage rulemaking
in Oregon, Nevada, and California.
Therefore, the predetermined nature of the rulemaking had an impact on potential
opportunities for stakeholder inclusivity and participation. The lack of multiple robust
comments period highlights how there really was not much to discuss or learn from
stakeholders. The weak comment periods do not mean that the DPS was apathetic to
stakeholders, but it does indicate that there was less capacity for stakeholder deliberation.
Key decisions had already been made so more stakeholder engagement was unnecessary
by this point in the process.
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The most substantiative portion of the rulemaking was the technical conferences
that discussed The Roadmap. While these technical conferences helped inform
stakeholders, the agenda had already been established around the key issues at stake. As
the section above highlighted, very few stakeholders were influential in shaping the Final
Rules. This is in line with previous research that notes that the most influential stage of a
rulemaking is during the drafting of the rules (Yackee, 2005, 2011; Rinfret, Cook, Pautz
2014; Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2016). Once the agenda has been set, it is difficult to
make big changes. In addition, the literature notes that many stakeholders perceive PUC
participation opportunities to be superficial but continue to participate in hopes of playing
the “long game” (Roundtree and Baldwin, 2018).
The DPS worked to create a participatory process for its stakeholders. However, it
overlooked the importance of also incorporating inclusive opportunities. Not engaging
stakeholders during the pre-proposal phase was a detriment to the process and likely the
final document. While there is not necessarily a “right” or a “wrong” way to conduct
stakeholder engagement, better practices could help legitimize and bring greater
transparency to the process.
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Chapter Conclusions
New York and California adopted two different approaches to handling their
energy storage mandate. The CPUC implemented a bottom-up approach to energy
storage policies. As a result of this bottom-up process, stakeholders have been able to
possess a larger role in establishing the groundwork for new energy policies such as
energy storage. There is also often policy coordination through CPUC technical
workshops and working groups.
In contrast, New York’s PSC has taken a top-down approach. While the PSC
encourages working groups and stakeholder expertise, the stakeholder process in the
energy storage rulemaking was limited more to consultants and interagency
collaboration. While both approaches have created strong energy storage programs in
their states, California’s bottom-up approach afforded its stakeholders a more meaningful
experience that took into account stakeholder input.
The California rulemaking focused on learning, deliberation, and policy linkages.
The CPUC commenced its energy storage a year earlier than mandated. This is an
important distinction from New York’s DPS because the CPUC sought an inclusive
stakeholder process from the beginning. It was very much in the CPUC’s authority to
take that additional year to create an agency framework for energy storage. This process
could have been stakeholder intensive without the strictures of the rulemaking process.
The CPUC could still have sought outside expertise from a diverse range of stakeholders.
Yet, the CPUC decided to commence the energy storage rulemaking early and invite
stakeholders to the pre-proposal process.
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Since the CPUC was leading the way on a statewide energy storage program, the
agency took the time to learn about energy storage from experts and stakeholders. The
CPUC gave stakeholders the opportunity to learn alongside them and to shape the preproposal agenda. The CPUC conducted over a dozen comment periods and led eleven
technical meetings and workshops. The California stakeholder process was deeply
inclusive and participatory for stakeholders that had the will and capacity to remain
active. Long-hauler stakeholders were also more successful at influencing the final rules.
In contrast, New York relied upon its agencies (DPS and NYSERDA) to facilitate
the pre-proposal and draft phases. DPS and NYSERDA contracted a third-party to
facilitate the Energy Storage Roadmap. While it was noted that there was stakeholder
input in the development of The Roadmap, it is unclear which stakeholders were included
and whether it was really agencies and utilities that were considered the key stakeholders.
By the time the rulemaking commenced, the key decisions had already been established.
There were few opportunities for stakeholders to participate in a meaningful way.
It is important to note that since California was the first state to pass an energy
storage target, the CPUC was starting at the bottom and gave itself and the stakeholders
the necessary time to learn about energy storage. New York had eight years of experience
from other states and pilot projects to help accelerate its energy storage program. While
there continues to be issue ambiguity around energy storage, New York was able to
develop an energy storage program with greater certainty than California had
experienced.

260

The next chapter examines the Virginia energy storage rulemaking. In contrast to
New York and California, Virginia lacked both an inclusive and a participatory
stakeholder process. The Virginia rulemaking was basic and met the minimum
requirements for stakeholder participation and notification. The lack of a participatory
and inclusive stakeholder process was a detriment for the majority of the stakeholders
involved in the rulemaking. The Virginia case shows that participatory and inclusive
stakeholder practices are critical for a robust stakeholder process.
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Chapter 9 The Case of Virginia and State Summaries Wrap-Up
The Case of Virginia: Meeting the Bare Minimum
The case of Virginia poses an interesting juxtaposition to the other four cases
analyzed in the previous chapters. Virginia experienced a short period in which there was
a democratic majority in both chambers of the Virginia General Assembly and the
governorship. It was during this period of democratic party control that many clean
energy and environmental policies were passed. The energy storage bill was part of a
greater set of clean energy bills that sought to innovate and renew Virginia’s renewable
and clean energy policy.
However, the energy storage rulemaking was unremarkable. The Virginia State
Corporation Commission (SCC) set forth a basic rulemaking that met requirements for
timely notification, accessible comment periods, a six-month timeframe, and SCC
acknowledgment of stakeholder comments. However, this basic rulemaking did not allow
opportunities for meaningful stakeholder learning or deliberations despite the SCC’s
insistence that energy storage was a nascent technology that required more time to learn
about. The state utilities largely influenced the rulemaking, and many issues were
deferred to another point in time.
As this chapter shows, while the SCC did facilitate participatory opportunities for
stakeholders, the stakeholder process was meaningless without any inclusive
opportunities for learning and deliberation. The Virginia case is a prime example of why
inclusive mechanisms are at the core of a successful stakeholder process. The conclusion
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of this chapter brings together the key themes of these case chapters and establishes the
foundation for the second analysis of stakeholder influence.

Virginia’s Energy Background
Virginia relied heavily on coal until the mid-2000s, when natural gas became the
predominant energy resource for the state. By 2015, coal-fired power plants had largely
been replaced by natural gas-fired plants (US EIA, 2020). By 2019, natural gas supplied
60 percent of the electricity demands in the state. However, the fossil fuel Atlantic Coast
Pipeline was canceled in 2020, ultimately impacting Virginia’s long-term energy plans.
Virginia also has two nuclear power plants, which generate approximately 30 percent of
the state’s total electricity. Renewable resources provide just over 6 percent of Virginia’s
electricity (US EIA, 2020).
Virginia has two major IOUs: Dominion and Appalachian Power. Dominion is the
largest utility in Virginia. Virginians pay some of the most expensive electricity bills in
the nation (US EIA, 2020). This is partly due to the freeze on biennial rate reviews of
Dominion and Appalachian Power back in 2015 when the Clean Power Plan was
expected to incur significant costs for the utility. However, the CPP never came to
fruition, and Dominion earned $503 million above authorized levels from 2017 to 2019
(Rankin, 2021).
For years, Dominion has been scrutinized for its lobbying clout, targeted
charitable giving, large donations to political campaigns in the Virginia General
Assembly and the Virginia State Corporation Commission (The Virginia Public Access
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Project, 2018). In one case in 2019, Dominion was critiqued by competitive service
providers (CSPs) and many in-state corporations (Walmart, Costco, Target, Cox, and
Kroger) for blocking competition of renewable energy providers.
Virginia’s public utilities commission is called the State Corporation Commission
(SCC). The Virginia Constitution established the SCC. Virginia’s SCC is a large
regulatory agency with well over 600 staff. The SCC is unique in that it not only has
authority over traditional utilities such as electric, water and communication, but also
insurance and financial institutions as well. The SCC has three commissioners that the
Virginia General Assembly elects for a six-year term.
In the past, the SCC has come under scrutiny for its secrecy and lack of
transparency. In 2011, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in Christian vs. State Corp.
Comm’n that the SCC was not subject to the Freedom of Information Act because the
agency’s statutory authority lies within the Virginia Constitution and is therefore
governed by a different set of laws and should not be considered a public body.11 Further
attempts to create transparency during SCC deliberations were crushed by gas utilities
and telecommunication industry later in 2012 when legislation was put forth to require
the commission’s deliberations be subject to the FOIA.

11

Christian v. State Corp. Comm’n, 282 VA. 392, 718 S.E. 767 Va. (2011).
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Energy Storage Legislation and Rulemaking
Before the energy storage mandate, Virginia was already courting energy storage
programs. In 2018, Virginia’s General Assembly passed an omnibus energy bill (SB
966), which established a pilot program called the Grid Transformation and Security Act
(GTSA) for utilities to invest in storage up to 10 MW or 30 MW.
The GTSA was a key turning point for the SCC’s cost-benefit testing as many
previous energy efficiency policies had been rejected based on their Ratepayer Impact
Measure test, which focused solely on the cost of EE measures to ratepayers without
considering other types of benefits. The GTSA changed the state code for cost-benefit
testing by requiring that energy efficiency programs only pass three of the four costbenefit tests to be in the public interest. The 2020 VCEA attempts to rectify the carte
blanche of the GTSA by ensuring that the SCC had more oversight over major utility
projects and by implementing cost-caps.
The GTSA was also beneficial for utilities, as Dominion was a key champion of
the bill. The bill allows utilities to offset profits above their authorized rate of return by
investing in projects that are considered in the “public interest”. The bill’s intent was for
utilities to invest in renewable and grid modernization projects; however, this is seen by
many critics as a means for the utilities to continue to over-earn without having to refund
customers.
In 2019, Governor Ralph Northam attempted to enact a wide-sweeping clean
energy plan, Executive Order 43, that laid out a plan for the state to achieve 100 percent
carbon-free electricity by 2050 and join the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
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However, the Republican-held Assembly were able to stall the clean energy plan, even
using the state budget to prohibit Virginia from joining the RGGI. However, once the
Democrats regained control in the Assembly later in 2019, the legislature passed the
Virginia Clean Economy Act (VCEA) in 2020.
The VCEA saw Governor Northam’s clean energy vision come to fruition. The
VCEA aims to develop a 100 percent clean energy grid by 2045 through investments in
rooftop solar, energy efficiency resource standards, and cap carbon pollution. Among the
key provisions in the VCEA was for the SCC to set specific energy storage targets. The
VCEA required that Appalachian Power Company (APCo) and Virginia Electric and
Power Company (Dominion) construct or acquire 400 MW and 2700 MW of energy
storage by 2035.
Virginia’s energy storage rulemaking provides an interesting case, given that it
was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic in the autumn of 2020. COVID-19
precautions prevented the PUC from conducting in-person hearings. In addition, there
was not a single technical workshop or stakeholder meeting held in-person or virtually.
According to one respondent, it is standard practice at the SCC not to hold technical
workshops or stakeholder meetings during a rulemaking (VA Interview 001).
The legislative mandate granted the SCC quite a bit of discretion in how it
conducted the rulemaking. However, it did include two important features that had an
appreciable impact on the process regarding the timeline that the rulemaking had to be
completed and the specification of targets for APCo and Dominion. First, the
Commission’s timeline was bound to the legislative mandate, which only granted them
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six months to establish and complete the rulemaking. In addition, the legislative mandate
required the Staff to file a report on comments, proposals, or requests by November 16.
Therefore, while this stipulation of the Staff report most likely was to ensure that
stakeholder comments and proposals were given proper consideration, it also created a
more aggressive timeline for stakeholders to submit comments for Staff to compile a
report.
Second, the legislative mandate provided specific energy storage targets for each
utility to meet. Therefore, even if Staff and the Commission were not supportive of
energy storage targets, they had to implement a program and framework to meet the
mandate. Both Staff and the Commission appeared apprehensive about implementing a
stringent energy storage program given their concerns that there was not enough known
about energy storage and its benefits.
There were only two comment periods throughout the proceeding. The first
comment period directed APCo and Dominion to submit comments and “permit[ted] any
other interested person or entity to submit comments” (Virginia SCC, Order Establishing
Proceeding). During the initial comments on the energy storage regulation, the utilities
(APCo and Dominion) requested an extension to submit comments and proposed
regulations. The utilities requested, in all fairness, that the extension be extended to all
commenters. The Commission granted the utilities an extension but maintained that other
stakeholders submit their comments on the original date.
The second comment period requested stakeholders to comment on the proposed
rules. The request for comments came on September 11, 2020. The utilities largely
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shaped the proposed rules. While Staff altered some aspects of the utility proposal, most
of the key issues and language were the same. ESA and Delorean Power submitted
proposed regulations but were unsuccessful in getting their proposed rules into the final
rules.
On December 18, 2020, the Commission had adopted the final regulations,
thereby closing the rulemaking. The Commission adopted the Staff Proposed Rules with
only a few changes. The biggest change in the final order required utilities to provide
bidders with access to relevant electric system data. This was one of the small
concessions made to non-utility providers.
Ultimately, as the next section highlights, the environmental stakeholders
involved in the rulemaking had little influence over the Final Rule.

Stakeholder Influence
The Virginia energy storage rulemaking brought together a wide array of
stakeholders. Many of the stakeholders formed coalitions and submitted joint comments.
There were four main stakeholder coalitions: solar stakeholders, the environmental
stakeholders, energy storage stakeholders, and the utilities. In many cases, coalitions can
be beneficial arrangements as groups are able to pool their resources and present a strong,
unified position. However, joining forces with one another did not seem to help any of
these coalitions.
While there were the usual stakeholder types of solar, energy storage, developer,
and trade association groups involved in this rulemaking, there was also a large number

268

of environmental stakeholders that intervened. There were eight environmental groups in
the environmental coalition: the Southern Environmental Law Center, the Appalachian
Voice, the Virginia Conservation Network, The Chesapeake Climate Action Network, the
Virginia League of Conservation Voters, The Piedmont Environmental Council,
Rappahannock League of Environmental Protection, and the National Parks Conservation
Association. Chart 9.1 shows the composition of stakeholders involved in the energy
storage rulemaking.

Figure 9.1 Virginia Stakeholders by Type
Individual
3%
Utility
13%
Business
3%

Non-profit
6%

Developer/Producer
23%
Trade Association
13%

Environmental
29%

Think Tank
3%

Government
Agency
7%

With the exception of the National Parks Conservation Association, the rest of
these environmental groups were in-state or regional groups. The environmental groups
were a mix of small and large groups. Capacity was an issue for some of these groups. In
one instance, the attorney for an environmental group was a volunteer with previous SCC
experience (VA Interview 001). There were simply not enough funds or expert staff to
follow all the important issues.
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Based on the final rules, it is apparent that many of the stakeholders were not
influential throughout the proceeding. The raw scores were very low. The reason as to
why the scores were so low is that the Commission’s responses to the stakeholders were
often in direct opposition to their comments. In the Commission’s responses to
stakeholder comments, the Commission almost always deferred to the utilities’
preferences. Table 9.1 shows the influence scores for the stakeholders involved. The
stakeholder in italics did not submit comments but were parties to the rulemaking.

Table 9.1 Virginia Stakeholder Influence Scores

Fuzzy
Score

Type

Joint Commenters (Dominion and APCo)

0.9

Utility

Data Center Coalition

0.6

Trade

Mitsubishi

0.6

Developer/Producer

VA Dept of Mines, Minerals, and Energy

0.6

Government

Virginia Legislators

0.6

Government

Sierra Club

0.4

Environmental

Environmental Advocates JOINT

0.4

Environmental

Solar Stakeholders

0.4

Trade

Glidepath

0.4

Developer/Producer

ES Stakeholders

0.1

Trade/Business

Delorean Power
Office of the Attorney General, Division of
Consumer Counsel

0.1

Developer/Producer

0

Consumer Government

Able Grid Energy Services

0

Developer/Producer

Energy Storage Association

0

Trade

LS Power Development LLC

0

Developer/Producer

Virginia Oil and Gas Association

0

Utility

esVolta

0

Developer/Producer

Stakeholder
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Therefore, while it is not surprising that the two utilities (Dominion and APCo)
were the most influential stakeholders involved, it is surprising that the majority of the
other stakeholders were unsuccessful despite the type of stakeholder group they
represented. The industry stakeholders (e.g., developers and trade groups) had a
particularly difficult time making inroads with the Commission. In the other four energy
storage proceedings, these types of groups had often, at a minimum, been received as an
important source of industry knowledge. In general, there were very few points in which
the Commission agreed upon that were not in favor of the utility position.

Discussion: Caution and Deferment
The Commission deferred much of the utilities’ energy storage procurement
process to their annual RPS Plan proceedings. There were few additional rules regulating
utilities’ proposal and bidding process, monitoring, or enforcement of energy storage
projects. The final rules granted the utilities much discretion in their energy storage
procurement process. The Commission defended the rules noting that utility construction
of electrical facilities is encompassed in other statutes and does not need to be
incorporated in the energy storage rules (Final Order, 2020, p. 13-14).
In contrast, approximately three-quarters of the rest of the Final Order pertained
to third-party developers and non-utility-owned energy storage. The rules for third-party
developers created what many stakeholders perceived to be an overly rigorous permitting
process for small storage projects beginning at 1 MW or larger. In addition, stakeholders
found the rules on the project approval process, notice requirements, and filing
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requirements, to create undue burdens for third-party developers. Six of the legislators
behind the energy storage bill submitted comments that they were greatly disappointed
that the final rules did not reflect the bill’s original intent. The legislators noted, “It is
critically important that Virginia develop its storage industry through competitive
procurements that ensure the lowest costs to ratepayers, and bring a diverse, creative, and
innovative industry to the Commonwealth” (State Assembly Comments, 2020, p. 2).
However, the Commission highlighted,
…the Commission has the duty to protect the reliability and safety of the
electrical system to which these non-utility energy storage assets will
interconnect. The Rules are intended to ensure developers seeking to operate
within the Commonwealth will operate safely, will not negatively impact the
reliability of the electrical power system, and will be ethically responsible in their
interactions with Virginia consumers. (Final Order, 2020, p. 14)
There are two key takeaways from the division over the Final Order. First, the
Commission saw the energy storage program as too new, with unproven technology. The
Commission laid out the Final Rules to be a flexible groundwork for future energy
storage. The Commission emphasized the newness of energy storage in its decision and
advanced a framework that supported an incremental process. At the beginning of the
Final Order, the Commission stated, “As experience is gained and lessons are learned, the
Commission intends to update and revise these Rules as needed” (p. 3). The Commission
reinforced this perception of energy storage by utilizing words such as “premature” (p.
11), “nascent stage” (p. 7, 12), “lack of experience” (p. 12) to describe stakeholder
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recommendations that sought a more stringent framework for evaluation and monitoring
the energy storage program. While the Final Order did establish interim targets for the
main IOUs, the overall framework of the program reflected a high degree of caution and
incrementalism.
Second, the Commission deferred many non-utility stakeholder concerns to be
deliberated by other programs such as the energy storage Task Force, the annual utility
Renewable Portfolio Standard Plans (RPS), and FERC Order 2222. The Commission saw
these other programs as an alternative stream to monitor and evaluate the utilities’ energy
storage target deployment progress.
The establishment of a Task Force was mandated by House Bill 1183 in the same
2020 legislative session as the energy storage bill. The bill directed the Commission to
create a task force to evaluate and analyze the integration of energy storage resources in
the Virginia electricity system and submit a report by October 1, 2021. The Commission
noted that many of the stakeholder’s concerns and comments could best be addressed by
the Task Force, especially since the time frame of the energy storage rulemaking was too
brief to consider these issues properly. The Commission believed that concerns about
utility reporting could best be addressed in their annual utility RPS Plans. The VCEA
required the utilities to include information on the progress of the deployment of their
energy storage interim targets through their annual RPS Plans.
Finally, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 2222 in
September 2020, which directs RTO and ISOs to remove barriers to distributed energy
resources (such as energy storage) to “level the playing field”. The Commission
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recognized that Order 2222 would likely affect the deployment of energy storage in the
state so concerns about distributed energy barriers should be addressed at a later date.
Time was a barrier that appeared to shape the decisions of the Commission and
affect the behavior of the stakeholders. While it is standard for rulemakings to last for just
six months, stakeholders felt rushed and pressed for time throughout this rulemaking (VA
001). Based on the way that the comment periods were set up, there was little time to
collaborate with other stakeholders, formally or informally. Figure 9.2 below shows the
timeline of events for the rulemaking.

Figure 9.2 Complete Timeline for Virginia Energy Storage Rulemaking
OIR and Notice and
Comment
June 29, 2020

Comments
Due July 29,
2020

Notice and
Comment
Sept. 11, 2020

Comments
Due Nov. 2,
2020

Staff Report of
Comments
Nov. 14, 2020

Final Rules
Dec. 18, 2020

There was a lag between the first comment period in July 2020 and the second comment
period in November 2020. The first round of comments came quickly after the OIR. On
September 11, 2020, the Commission established an Order for Notice and Comment on
the Proposed Rules, in which stakeholders had approximately under two months to
submit comments. However, this long comment period on the Proposed Rules stymied
the ability for stakeholders to participate in a meaningful way due to the original bill’s
requirement for Staff to file a report by November 16 on stakeholder comments,
proposals, or requests. While this requirement provided greater transparency and
accountability of the SCC stakeholder process and the Staff, it constrained the
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stakeholder process when the second round of comments was scheduled too closely.
Stakeholders could not deliberate or respond to other stakeholder comments on the
Proposed Rules.

The Energy Storage Task Force
What is notable of the Virginia energy storage rulemaking is not the rulemaking,
but the Task Force that came in its wake. Many important issues from the rulemaking
were deferred to other programs or dates in the Final Rules. In particular, the energy
storage Task Force was relegated many of those unanswered issues. The Task Force was
established early in 2021. Throughout 2021, there were monthly meetings to discuss
many of the issues that were not resolved in the rulemaking. The Task Force compiled
stakeholder comments and submitted a report for the Commission in October 2021.
While it remains to be seen whether the Task Force will be effective in shaping
future energy storage policy, the distinction between its stakeholder process and that of
the SCC’s energy storage rulemaking is critical. The SCC Staff led both the rulemaking
and the Task Force, but the processes were quite different. The Task Force’s stakeholder
process provided participatory and inclusive opportunities for stakeholder engagement.
The Task Force included over 100 members representing a diverse range of
organizations. While many of the members of the Task Force were also involved with the
energy storage rulemaking there were also many new groups that had not been involved
during the rulemaking. These members met at thirteen meetings from February 2021 until
September 2021. Members had the opportunity to join virtually or over the phone. Often
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stakeholders were divided into smaller groups to deliberate on key issues. The final report
and recommendations were released on October 1, 2021.
The Task Force facilitated inclusive opportunities by allowing stakeholders to be
a part of drafting recommendations and by prioritizing stakeholder consensus. The Task
Force generated two types of recommendations for the legislature to consider and take
action on consensus recommendations and non-consensus items. The range of consensus
recommendations included improving energy storage permitting, provide incentives for
behind the meter energy storage, develop an energy storage roadmap, ensure that the
Integrated Resource Planning Process include energy storage as an issue, and continue to
convene stakeholder groups such as the Task Force.
While advocates for energy storage were noticeably upset by the Final Rules of
the energy storage rulemaking, the Task Force granted them a greater opportunity to
share their input. The Staff’s prioritization on expanding the Task Force to more
stakeholders and facilitating meetings based on deliberation and consensus created a
more meaningful outcome than the rulemaking. How the SCC and the Virginia
Legislature act upon these recommendations will determine how effective the Task Force
was in influencing the development of the energy storage program for the state.
Currently, it seems like the Task Force Report is just a small, first step towards creating
substantive policy. However, time will tell if the Task Force was the redeeming feature of
the rulemaking or not.
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Virginia Conclusion
The Virginia energy storage rulemaking met all the requirements of a rulemaking:
timely notification, accessible comment periods, a six-month timeframe, and
acknowledgment of comments. However, the rulemaking lacked inclusive mechanisms
for participation. The energy storage Task Force facilitated a stronger inclusive process,
but it only occurred after the energy storage rulemaking. Like the case of New York, it
seems like regulators were set in their justifications for the manner in which the
rulemaking was conducted.
The Commission, Staff, and the utilities emphasized the newness of energy
storage and its unknown future. However, there was no time for meaningful deliberation
of these concerns or providing opportunities for the Commission or the stakeholders to
learn. The energy storage rulemaking in Virginia had the least amount of stakeholder
opportunities to participate than any of the other states. There were not any stakeholder
meetings or working groups throughout the proceeding. There were only two
opportunities to comment on the rules, with no collaboration on the draft rules. It was
only after the rulemaking that a Task Force was established for stakeholders to deliberate
on key issues.
The most significant aspect of the energy storage rulemaking is the energy storage
Task Force. The Commission deferred many important queries and clarifications to the
Task Force. At the time, this appeared superficial and a way for the Commission to
assuage stakeholders. However the Task Force created a stakeholder process that
provided meaningful deliberation and engagement among diverse groups. Whether the
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Commission will act on the recommendations of the Task Force remains to be seen. The
stark differences in these two separate but interrelated stakeholder models require greater
examination in future studies.
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State Summaries Wrap-Up
Each of the five states display an array of contexts, processes, and stakeholders.
However, these five state summaries reveal the importance of participatory and inclusive
access points in the stakeholder process at PUCs.
To review, the fsQCA results uncovered that environmental and clean energy
stakeholders were most influential over the final rules when,
(1) There was not a guiding document that framed the proceeding.
(2) They participated during the pre-proposal process.
(3) There were three or more stakeholder meetings.
(4) There were three or more comment periods.
(5) The group participated in the majority of the comment periods.
(6) The group was present for the entire process.
Environmental and clean energy groups were most successful in California, Oregon, and
Nevada. In each of these states, the PUCs took time to overcome the issue ambiguity
surrounding energy storage. The PUCs provided multiple opportunities for stakeholders
to learn and deliberate as they, too, gained a greater understanding of how energy storage
systems would fit into their state electric systems. The regulatory proceedings in each of
these three states took approximately two years to produce the final rules or orders. In
some instances, a lengthy proceeding may derail the original intent of the proceeding.
However, in these three cases, the long timeline gave the PUCs and stakeholders time to
come to a common understanding of energy storage and its uses.
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California, Oregon, and Nevada’s energy storage proceedings are defined for their
emphasis on inclusiveness. Each state’s stakeholder frameworks embodied the three
criteria of inclusiveness (Quick and Feldman, 2011): multiple ways of knowledge,
coproduction, and temporal openness.
First, multiple ways of knowledge were encouraged with stakeholder workshops
and meetings. Each PUC hosted multiple stakeholder workshops, in which stakeholders
were given the opportunity to share their perspectives on energy storage and also have
access to energy storage experts to help come to a mutual knowledge of what energy
storage embodies. Stakeholders were able to share multiple ways of knowledge through
comments and reply comments.
It is important to emphasize that an environmental and clean energy stakeholder’s
level of influence over the final rules was dependent on their level of activity during
comment periods. Stakeholders that were present for the entire rulemaking and
commented at higher frequencies were likely to be more influential at shaping the final
rules than stakeholders who were not present for the entire rulemaking and only
commented half of the time or less.
Second, coproduction was fostered by including stakeholders during the preproposal phase of the process. In each of the energy storage proceedings, the PUCs
granted stakeholders opportunities to coproduce documents that would be the foundation
for the final rules or framework. In addition, the norm of stakeholder consensus
motivated stakeholders to collaborate with one another.
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Finally, the energy storage proceedings in California, Oregon, and Nevada were
conducted over a longer time, allowing temporal openness. This extra time enabled
stakeholders more opportunities to interact with one another and form connections that
would have been difficult to do in more fast-paced proceedings. Also, in California, the
CPUC promoted policy linkages, which encouraged stakeholders to participate in crosspolicy meetings and groups. The aim of linking policy issues was to help foster greater
collaboration and deliberation for current and future proceedings.
In contrast, New York and Virginia carried out very different stakeholder
frameworks. Both of these states facilitated rulemakings that met most participatory
criteria: there was sufficient notification, comment periods, and PUC responses to
stakeholder comments. New York’s energy storage rulemaking actually went beyond
basic standards for participation. New York hosted three technical meetings. In addition,
the DPS worked to provide better accommodation and access for stakeholders.
Stakeholder technical meetings and public hearings were held on multiple days when
most individuals would be able to meet. Stakeholders could also call into the meetings or
submit comments through email if they could not attend. A public hearing transcript was
also put on the record for anyone to access. Despite these participatory efforts for
stakeholder engagement, the stakeholder frameworks in New York and Virginia were
wanting.
With regards to New York, the diminished stakeholder participation by the end of
the rulemaking highlights that stakeholders had realized that their efforts to influence the
final rules were futile. In Virginia, stakeholders expressed their frustration outright that
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the energy storage proceeding was going against the original intention of the legislation.
The tone in the final rules for both states also indicated that the commissions were not
receptive to stakeholder input. While they addressed the stakeholder comments, there
were few moments when the commissions agreed with non-utility and non-agency
interests.
New York’s energy storage rulemaking prioritized interagency coordination
rather than stakeholder input. Government agencies (DPS and NYSERDA) were tasked
to develop a roadmap for energy storage prior to the commencement of the rulemaking.
The agencies conferred with other government agencies and consultants to create the
Energy Storage Roadmap. In the final rules, the PSC continued to stress interagency
coordination as they worked to vet utility energy storage projects. Some of the
stakeholders that were successful in influencing the final rules were actually partner
organizations of the agencies.
Virginia’s energy storage rulemaking was devoid of any inclusive practices.
There were not any stakeholder meetings or workshops, and most of the stakeholder
comments were deferred to other proceedings or what became the Energy Storage Task
Force. The Virginia energy storage rulemaking was purely procedural.
While it is impossible to predict what the energy storage rulemakings would have
produced with greater stakeholder inclusivity in New York and Virginia, it is important to
note that stakeholder engagement is at the core of PUC proceedings. The PUC
stakeholder process exists so that the commission can receive the best range of
information to inform their decisions. So, not investing in a robust stakeholder framework
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is a disservice to any commission. The energy storage rulemakings are no exception,
especially since energy storage is a nascent technology and there remains uncertainty in
how to incorporate them in the energy market.
As energy storage policies become more widespread, there will be a new influx of
stakeholders at PUCs (i.e., energy storage developers and producers, environmental
justice advocates, and environmental non-profits). It is important for the formation of
effective and efficient policy to include the considerations of these stakeholders.
First, per the basis of this dissertation, environmental and clean energy groups are
essential to a robust PUC stakeholder process. Given the inactivity at the international
and national levels over the past decade, state PUCs are the new hub for climate change
policies. While the calculus is more on economic benefits at PUCs, there is room for
environmental and clean energy stakeholders to advance their agenda at state PUCs. As
the PUCs in Washington D.C. and Connecticut have shown, it is likely only a matter of
time until PUCs will be granted the authority to include environmental considerations in
their decisions.
Second, equity and environmental justice issues are a growing concern with the
rise of renewable and clean energy projects. The state, much less a city, cannot undergo a
major clean energy revolution if it cannot also support the needs of communities from
more diverse socioeconomic backgrounds. While issues of equity and environmental
justice remain at the periphery of most PUC proceedings, it is important to begin to
actively include these types of stakeholders in the process to prepare for the future.
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Third, not considering the input from stakeholders such as developers puts the
energy storage market at risk. Many developers involved in the New York stakeholder
process expressed their concern about the uncertainty of the energy storage market under
the recommendations of The Roadmap (e.g., Northern Power Systems, Fluence, Borrego,
Enel, and Sunrun). If there are too many barriers and risks, developers are likely to move
their projects to more developer-friendly areas. This can be detrimental to creating a
competitive and innovative energy storage market.
Similarly, developers (in concurrence with many other stakeholder groups) in
Virginia were deeply concerned that restrictive permitting and bidding rules would
discourage third-party developers from attempting even to propose energy storage
projects in the state. Given that the success of the energy storage programs relies on the
building of energy storage projects and systems, it is important to take greater
consideration of the concerns of the stakeholders that will actively participate in the
program or market.
Finally, it is critical to create an environment of trust and transparency for any
agency. Without trust, a culture of animosity and cynicism can pervade the regulatory
agency’s relationship with its stakeholders. This will ultimately have a negative impact
on the level of stakeholder participation and the quality of information that the
commission receives. Therefore, in the long game for PUCs, inclusivity and participatory
opportunities do matter for the quality of commission decisions and the relationships that
agency members are able to maintain with stakeholders to ensure the best outcome.
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The next chapter builds off of the five state case summaries. It explores the
implications of when stakeholders and agency members are able to build collaborative
and iterative relationships with one another. As Chapter 10 highlights, stakeholder
network relationships greatly impact an individual’s perception of influence and how
they subsequently interact with other stakeholders during PUC proceedings. This
perception of influence can create biases and heuristics that reflect facets of the balance
of power among stakeholder groups. The findings on the perceived influence underscore
the importance of creating inclusive and participatory opportunities for stakeholders.
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Chapter 10 Implicit Influence
Introduction
In the first phase of this dissertation, stakeholder influence over the final rules was
examined across five state energy storage target proceedings. The fsQCA results
uncovered that environmental and clean energy stakeholders were most successful in
states that facilitated a participatory and inclusive stakeholder framework. This
dissertation now shifts to examine how participatory and inclusive mechanisms have a
direct effect on the ability of interest groups to engage and influence the rulemaking
process, the tactics interest groups employ to influence the process, the range of
stakeholders involved in the process, and opportunities for collaboration throughout the
process.
These energy storage proceedings are not occurring in a vacuum. Previous
proceedings and interactions with other stakeholders inform individuals how to behave in
the future and can even create bias in their perceptions of events and social interactions.
In addition, there are multiple PUC proceedings occurring in a given period of time,
which can shape a group’s learning and issue linkages. The range of interactions and
perceptions of the stakeholders are also fluid as often these types of PUC proceedings are
learning experiences and networking.
This chapter takes an in-depth examination of the different facets of stakeholder
influence by proposing a conceptual model of implicit influence. Implicit influence is
defined as the summation of multiple individual and group factors that manifest into an
individual’s ‘state’ of influence. Interview data was analyzed with NVivo to understand
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the themes between a stakeholder’s perceptions of influence for their group and for other
stakeholders (Appendix B provides a greater discussion of the process for NVivo).
Due to limitations in interview data across the five states, this chapter focuses just
on Oregon stakeholders. This analysis is descriptive and interpretative in nature. Yet, the
findings from this chapter are important to the regulatory and interest group literature
regarding the beneficial stakeholder dynamics that can flourish in an inclusive and
participatory stakeholder framework. In addition, the model of implicit influence lays the
theoretical and empirical groundwork for more specified and rigorous studies of
stakeholder relationships in the future.

A Model of Implicit Influence
As indicated throughout this dissertation, Oregon was a unique case compared to
the other four states. Oregon’s energy storage proceeding was not a rulemaking. It was a
contested case that began with a PUC proceeding that then split into two additional
dockets to manage each of the two utilities’ energy storage proposals. In addition to the
procedural differences, the data collection for Oregon was more robust than in the other
four states. The content of the Oregon interviews was distinct and provided rich content
on network and interpersonal relationships.
The structure of the interviews and the subsequent content analysis of the
interview data were guided by the key concepts and themes from this dissertation’s
codebook. The data analysis software, NVivo was useful for organizing the interview
data and highlighting the main words and themes that were most prevalent from that data.
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A meta-theme emerged from the interview data that the original theoretical and
empirical groundwork had not anticipated: implicit influence. Implicit influence is defined
as the summation of multiple individual and group factors that manifest into an
individual’s state of influence. Implicit influence is a condition (noun) rather than an
action (verb).
Influence can simultaneously be an action (verb) and a state or condition (noun).
In the first portion of the dissertation, influence is measured as an outcome and action.
However, in the second part of the dissertation, influence is conceptualized as a state or a
condition (noun). Influence as a noun is difficult to quantify because one knows it when
you see it, but it is difficult to deconstruct and pin down for a model.
For example, when the President of the United States walks into the room,
everyone immediately recognizes that she has influence. That immediate recognition of
influence can stem from multiple facets: (1) the position of an individual or group; (2) the
reputation of an individual or group; (3) the resources or capacity the individual brings
with her; (4) expertise; (5) experience; and (6) networks. All of these facets of influence
play into the actual outcome of her influence and the perception of her level of influence
by other individuals. Therefore, when stakeholders begin to engage in a PUC proceeding,
they bring with them varying levels of influence and perceived influence from the
beginning. These facets of influence can be instrumental in their ability to influence the
process. In addition, the concept of perceived influence helps explain the various
heuristics that interview participants may utilize to describe network relationships and
perceptions of other individuals and groups.
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Implicit influence should not be mixed up with concepts such as reputation, clout,
and power. The interest group literature has largely overlooked the operationalization and
measurement of concepts such as organizational and individual reputation and clout
because of their fluidity and difficulty in quantifying. The interest group literature
recognizes reputation and clout as being an important characteristic of individuals and
interest groups, but have not focused on it solely in the context of social and political
phenomena. Most of the literature on organizational reputation exists within the corporate
business literature (Ravis et al. 2018) and the public administration literature (Carpenter
and Krause, 2012; Bustos 2021).
While there may be similar characteristics shared among these concepts, implicit
influence is distinct from reputation and clout as it embodies an iterative social process
that is the culmination of multiple moments and facets of the act of influencing.
Therefore, reputation and clout may be distinct components that contribute to an
individual’s implicit influence, but they are not the same concept.
The meta-theme of implicit influence was supported by three key sub-themes on
stakeholder influence that came from the interview data.
(1) Stakeholder perceptions of influential groups and individuals is shaped by
personal connections relating to organizational and individual networks.
(2) Individual stakeholders representing their groups are perceived to be more
influential due to a culmination of individual factors such as reputation,
expertise, and experience at the public utility commission.
(3) Interest group reputation matters.
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These three sub-themes from the interview data all circle around the theme of implicit
influence, in which certain stakeholders are perceived to be more influential based on
group and individual factors.
The NVivo analysis was utilized to analyze the following five facets of implicit
influence: group capacity, organizational reputation along with an individual’s expertise,
experience, and network. These characteristics are generally fluid, although some such as
organizational reputation are less so in the short term. Each of these five facets is distinct
but can shape one another, too. For example, one’s expertise on a specific policy issue
can impact which policy network a stakeholder may turn to for information sharing and
collaboration. Figure 10.1 provides a graphic of the different characteristics of implicit
influence.

Figure 10.1 Implicit Influence Model
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This dissertation does not attempt to quantify which facets are more valued or the
magnitude of the connections among the five facets. Rather, this model provides a
platform for understanding the relationships and dynamics among stakeholders in the
Oregon energy storage proceeding. The next section provides the foundation for this
dissertation’s analysis of implicit influence by presenting the results from the interview
data on stakeholder perceptions of influence.

Stakeholder Perceptions of Influence
The perception of influence can be just as important to explore as the “objective”
outcome of influence because it uncovers hidden biases, heuristics, and a general
understanding of the different social and networking dynamics of a group of
stakeholders. Ultimately, the policy process is a social process. While the PUC
commission seeks to remain neutral by relying on the record’s content, the social
interactions among stakeholders and PUC staff can still shape the process and content
that goes into the docket record.
It should be noted that some participants’ recollections of the energy storage
proceedings were not as strong as others. The reliability and validity of participant
responses is a critical disadvantage for most research. Taking this into account, interview
questions were arranged so that the content of each question built upon the other to give a
logical sequence of events. This way, participants had the opportunity to recall the
proceeding and their interactions with other stakeholders. By the time that the final
interview questions on stakeholder collaboration and perceived influence were reached,
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participants had established recollections of the proceeding and which stakeholders were
involved during it.
However, there were still discrepancies in participant recollections by the end of
the interview sessions. Participant memories had been affected by the passage of time.
Three years had passed since the original docket establishing an energy storage program,
and many of these participants had also been active in other OPUC proceedings during
that time. Most professional stakeholders are active in dozens of regulatory proceedings
over the course of a year.
Despite these potential problems of unreliability and validity, this portion of this
dissertation is focused on perceptions of influence rather than purely objective outcomes.
This potential unreliability of participants adds to the analysis of stakeholder heuristics
and biases that shape their perceptions of the process and other stakeholders. In addition,
the lack of memory on some of these issues points to a more interesting implication of
these networks: pre-established perceptions of others may impact network interactions.
Groups may be granted a more preferential position in the network when there is a stable
level of respect and deference to specific members or organizations.
In the interviews, participants were asked to rank their organization’s overall level
of influence throughout the proceeding from low, moderate, and high. While there were
specific calculations of “successful” and “influential” groups throughout the interview,
the stakeholder recollections of influential groups were not embedded in statements
relating to specific successful outcomes or actions.
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Table 10.1 below shows the participants’ self-reported levels of influence.

Table 10.1 Self-Reported Levels of Influence

Organization

Level Of Influence

Renewable NW (RNW)

Moderate to High

NW Energy Coalition (NWEC)
Oregon Solar Energy Industries Association (OSEIA)
Staff
Citizen’s Utility Board (CUB)

Moderate
Low
High
High

Alliance of Wester Energy Users (AWEC)
Northwest Intermountain Power Producers Coalition
(NIPCC)
Portland General Electric (PGE)
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)

Moderate
Low
High
High/low-moderate over utilities

From the groups that were interviewed, OSEIA and PNNL were only involved in
the first docket (UM 1751), which set up the framework for the energy storage program.
Renewable NW, the NW Energy Coalition, CUB, AWEC, PGE, and NIPCC were
intervenors for all three dockets, although AWEC and NIPCC were less involved during
the initial framework docket, UM 1751.
Participants were then asked to rank the level of influence of other stakeholder
groups, with the rank of one being the most influential and then descending from thereon.
Some participants only ranked a couple of stakeholders while others chose to rank all
stakeholders. A few stakeholders were reluctant to name any groups and noted that most
groups were influential to some degree.
Right away, it is clear that the utilities are perceived to have the highest level of
influence. This is in line with previous literature on interest groups and regulatory
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processes (Yackee, 2006). The utilities were responsible for drafting up their energy
storage proposals. As many respondents noted, the onus of power lies with utilities, and
other stakeholders are simply reactive participants in a PUC proceeding. That is not to
say that other stakeholders are not influential. As this dissertation has shown, non-utility
stakeholders were able to influence the content and process of the energy storage
proceedings, but the calculus ultimately lies with the utilities. Table 10.2 shows only the
top three ranking of most influential stakeholders throughout the energy storage dockets.

Table 10.2 Perceived Influence of Groups
Perceived
Influence Rank 1

Perceived
Influence Rank 2

Perceived
Influence Rank 3

Staff and PNNL

Utilities

CUB

NW Energy Coalition
Oregon Solar Energy Industries
Association

Utilities

CUB

AWEC

PNNL

Staff

No Rank Given

Oregon Public Utility Commission Staff

Utilities

Staff

CUB

Citizen’s Utility Board

Utilities

Staff

PNNL

Indeterminant

Indeterminant

No Rank Given

Utilities

No Rank Given

No Rank Given

Portland General Electric

Utilities

Staff

No Rank Given

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Utilities

PNNL

No Rank Given

Organization
Renewable NW

Alliance of Wester Energy Users
Northwest Intermountain Power Producers
Coalition

The Staff was also noted as being highly influential. Staff is very influential
throughout the process regarding leading the informational dockets, leading workshops
and meetings, writing up docket findings, and making recommendations to the
Commission for consideration. There were two particular staff members that were
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mentioned multiple times as being instrumental in leading the energy storage proceeding.
Another influential organization was PNNL. PNNL was not a stakeholder or even a
consultant (as they shared information and expertise for free). Yet, PNNL was still noted
as a highly influential player in the energy storage proceeding due to their high expertise
of energy storage in contrast to other stakeholders. PNNL helped OPUC staff with
specific content relating to the energy storage cost, the evaluation of the energy storage
program guidelines, and the procedures to file the utility proposal reports. PNNL was a
source of expertise and was critical in helping OPUC Staff and stakeholders learn about
energy storage and the major technical components of energy storage systems. However,
as Table 10.3 shows, the ranking of other stakeholders is not consistent with the original
QCA analysis of influence over the final order.

Table 10.3 Oregon Stakeholder Influence on the Final Order
Stakeholder

Raw Score

Fuzzy Score

Renewable NW and NW Energy Coalition

15

0.9

Interstate Renewable Energy Council

11

0.9

Northwest Power and Conservation Council

8

0.6

Community Renewable Energy Association

5

0.4

Oregon Solar Energy Industries Association

4

0.4

Energy Storage Association

4

0.4

Small Business Utility Association

-1

0.1

ITM

1

0.1

Northwest &Intermountain Power Producers
Coalition

n/a

n/a

Citizen's Utility Board

n/a

n/a

Alliance of Western Energy Consumers

n/a

n/a
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The three clean energy groups (RNW, NWEC, and IREC) were influential on
multiple points in the final order and the utility energy storage proposal dockets UM 1856
(PGE) and UM 1857 (PacifiCorp). Yet, these clean energy groups were not noted as
being the most influential in the interviews.
While some of the stakeholders could not be interviewed for various reasons, it is
clear that out-of-state stakeholders were not as influential as their in-state counterparts.
For example, the group IREC was an active participant during the proceedings and the
comment period, but many participants were unable to remember the involvement of this
group. It is important to note that even if stakeholders are not physically present for PUC
meetings or conferences, it is common practice for stakeholders to read through other
stakeholder comments and even reference them in their reply comments. Therefore, even
if some of the stakeholders had not physically met with out-of-state stakeholders, they
likely reviewed their comments at some point.
In addition, while respondents noted that NWEC and RNW had a strong history
as intervenors at the PUC, they were not ranked high for the energy storage proceeding.
Many stakeholders were unfamiliar with the trade group ESA, which has a stronger
national presence. Respondents were also directed to discuss any other interest groups
that they collaborated with during the energy storage docket.
One aspect that was unique to the Oregon interviews was the familiarity that
stakeholders had with one another and the ease at which they had in listing individuals or
groups that they had network linkages with. This was consistent during in-person
interviews and over the phone. This ease of naming individuals may stem from the
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interviewer having a local connection. Yet, even in interviews across the other four states,
stakeholders seemed reluctant to name specific individuals or elaborate on network
connections. Figure 10.2. below shows the stakeholder self-reporting of collaborations
with other groups.

Figure 10.2 Self-Reporting Stakeholder Collaboration Networks

Stakeholder Abbreviations: Renewable Northwest (RNW), Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc. (IREC), Northwest Energy
Council (NWEC), Energy Storage Association (ESA), Community Renewable Energy Association (CREA), Portland General
Electric, Northwest &Intermountain Power Producers Coalition (NIPCC), Citizen's Utility Board (CUB), Alliance of Western Energy
Consumers (AWEC), Oregon Solar Energy Industries Association (OSEIA), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).
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The stakeholder collaboration network highlights the alliances and interpersonal
dynamics among the key stakeholders. As one can see from this figure, RNW was one of
the most cited stakeholder groups that others collaborated with during the energy storage
proceedings. Yet, this high level of network collaboration is not reflected in the perceived
influence responses. There are clearly factors at play that have contributed to these
discrepancies in responses of perceived influence of one’s group, perceived influence of
the most influential groups, and the scores for the level of influence over the final
framework order.
Without reference to the entire interview data, these discrepancies in stakeholder
perceptions appear counter to the fsQCA results from the previous chapters. However,
patterns in each of the interviews underscore the connections between perceptions of
influence and the following themes: (1) organizational reputation, (2) organizational
capacities, (3) individual expertise, (4) individual experience, and (5) individual
networks. Participants referred to these five themes across the interviews as they
explained their perceptions of other stakeholders and their perceptions on how to be
influential at the OPUC.
The following sections examine how participants employed these five themes to
illustrate what this dissertation identified as an individual’s implicit influence.
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Interview Themes of Implicit Influence
Group Capacity
A group’s financial and staffing capacity is important to implicit influence
because it foremost enables a group to participate in what are usually time and resourceintensive processes and secondly, empowers groups to play the “long game”. Not having
adequate capacity greatly diminishes a group’s ability to participate and influence the
process and rules.
The interviews from Oregon stakeholders highlighted that financial and staffing
capacity are critical barriers to overcome in order to participate in an OPUC proceeding.
Out of the nine groups interviewed, six groups cited concerns about staffing and financial
capacity. The three groups that perceived capacity as less of a concern to their
participation were AWEC, PGE, and PNNL. It should be noted again that PNNL was not
a stakeholder; they were an outside organization brought in for their expertise. Even then,
PNNL is a federally funded research organization. It has a large number of resources and
staff. In addition, AWEC is eligible to receive OPUC intervenor funds from the
“matching” fund. The intervenor funds were instrumental in defraying the costs of
participation (OR Interview 007).
Utilities are often regarded as having the upper hand during OPUC proceedings
due to financial and staffing capacity. As one stakeholder noted, “At the PUC, utility is
king. [The PUC] can have a utility and put 10 attorneys at the table.” The participant
continued, “I think if you look at any regulatory proceeding, and [sic] the industry will
have a lot of resources, and a lot of firepower, and the public and the community will not.
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[The non-profits] have really smart people, but will not have the capacity, so [nonprofits] really have to pick and choose battles” (Interview OR 004).
While group capacity (finances and staffing) is a major participation obstacle for
most interest groups, it is especially the case with non-profit environmental and clean
energy groups. Many groups that are interested in participating do not have enough staff,
finances, or time to participate. All of the clean energy and environmental groups
interviewed throughout this dissertation highlighted this capacity barrier: “…as nonprofits, we have very limited resources…” (Interview OR 001). This limited capacity
forces environmental and clean energy non-profits to prioritize legislative and regulatory
issues. “We can be a bit more selective, but on the other hand, we have very small staffs
on this side, and you have to pick your targets” (OR Interview 003). Some stakeholders
noted that it was apparent that less influential stakeholders were “stretched thin” due to
staffing and other capacity factors (OR Interview 010).
Capacity was a major obstacle for one environmental group involved with the
passage of the energy storage legislation but was not party to the energy storage docket.
The participant noted that environmental groups often lack the capacity to engage fully in
these matters. In addition, donors of these groups are less likely to fund regulatory
procedures. Donors push for legislation that can continue to create momentum and roll
over for stronger policies (Interview OR 002).
Capacity not only enables stakeholders to participate in the process, but also the
extent that they are able to participate. With adequate funding and staff, some
stakeholders were able to participate for the entire proceeding. One stakeholder
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highlighted the importance of having the capacity to participate from the beginning of the
proceeding. “We were there from beginning to end…We dedicated a good amount of
staff time and were able to move the Commission on a number of things that were
important to us” (OR Interview 001). The fsQCA results showed that clean energy and
environmental stakeholders were more influential when they had participated for the
entire duration of the PUC proceeding.
In addition, a consistent stream of adequate funding and staff enables stakeholders
to play the “long game” and participate in more proceedings. The “long game” is
important because it helps groups become visible to the OPUC and other stakeholders,
gives the group more experience with the OPUC, and reinforces the group’s commitment
to the OPUC process. Thus, the more a stakeholder participates in the proceedings, the
greater likelihood that stakeholder will become more influential. As this stakeholder
noted,
…the groups that have influence over the process or the groups that are
there all the time that are familiar, that show that they have a real
commitment to the process and are really interested in the issues…there
may be lots of groups out there that you could say […] basically don't
have the financial resources to participate in every case all the time…It's a
high barrier to entry, simply because it's an arcane process and there's a
ton of dockets and, you just have to do this all the time. (OR Interview
007)
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This is in line with Roundtree and Baldwin (2018), who note that stakeholders will
continue to participate in regulatory proceedings despite failures because they are playing
the long game, in which they are working to position themselves to influence multiple
policies over the long term.
The interviews highlighted that group capacity has a major role in a stakeholder’s
ability to participate and influence regulatory dockets. In addition, many of the
participants were familiar with capacity issues of other stakeholders and how that may or
may not have affected their ability to participate or be influential. This shared knowledge
of capacity issues points to the larger theme of implicit influence. Some groups such as
AWEC and the utilities were known across the respondents as having much greater
capacity to participate at the OPUC. Respondents were aware that having more money
and staff to participate at the OPUC gave these groups an advantage over groups that
often struggled with funds and staff. Therefore, there is implicit influence in having the
capacity to be an active stakeholder.

Group Reputation
Group reputation has a strong impact on the implicit influence of an individual
with regards to recognition of a group and the of past interactions with said group. The
group that an individual represents is important and can immediately open doors. Less
known groups will have to work harder to be noticed and taken seriously.
For example, most of the key intervenors were in-state organizations. However,
there were a few notable out-of-state intervenors, too, such as the Energy Storage
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Association (ESA) and Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC) that have a strong
presence in other states. While these out-of-state organizations were influential to some
level (based on the fsQCA analysis), many of the key stakeholders were unfamiliar with
them and did not recall them having a strong influence throughout the proceeding. As one
stakeholder noted,
This kind of docket where you bring in industry, people like the ESA and
other groups that have significant experience in other states, they've got
their own depth of membership in that particular area, they can have a
pretty important impact as well, but there's no question until you then [sic]- If you start showing up in a few dockets in the state and people start to get
to know you, that will increase your influence. Really, I don't think they
have been involved in Oregon much before that. (OR Interview 003)
Similarly, another stakeholder highlighted that they were not taken as seriously until their
organization had established themselves as credible intervenors at the OPUC after years
of participating in OPUC dockets.
Another key aspect of group reputation is the norms that dictate how groups
interact with one another. In Oregon, the regulatory community is small, and groups often
have a long history of interacting with many of the same groups. This has led to the
institutionalization of norms that guide stakeholders’ behavior towards one another.
These norms contribute to the reputation of each group which extends to how other
stakeholders react and treat them in later proceedings. While there is not a concrete list of
norms to follow, all of the stakeholders interviewed were aware of certain norms
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regarding civility, collaboration, and deliberation that guided their interactions with one
another, which also shaped their perceptions of each other. One respondent noted,
I don't know that we have them written down, but obviously we have
professional [norms]. We try to respect the other party, understand where
they're coming from, try to work with them to the extent that we can, you
know, obviously sometimes we know what we want out of something and
there are things we can get and things we can't get, we try to work with
them then. (OR Interview 009)
Respondents emphasized the importance of maintaining good relations with one another.
It was not worth it to create divisions and contention even when opposing sides disagreed
with one another. One respondent stressed the importance of these norms for maintaining
positive relationships with other stakeholders.
I think that the other one is taking the organization approach, the []
approach to engage in advocacy issues, to try to be pragmatic and positive
[…] we do value our long-term relationships. I really think it is a key
factor for our success in the regulatory arena. It's the same people. There’s
a core group you are going to be seeing: the same people tomorrow, and
the next day, and the next day. Being rude or mean or non-diplomatic is
not particularly helpful. (OR Interview 001)
More so, some respondents emphasized that these norms were unique to the region.
“[T]he culture in the northwest is fight when you have to but when you don't have to, you
don’t, and you try to be more collaborative. [It’s] just different than what it is in other
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states” (OR Interview 005). Another respondent expressed, “I've always liked that about
the Oregon PUC process. The expectation is for negotiation…[w]hen people aren't doing
that, then “Portland polite” or “Oregon nice” wins over…” (OR Interview 004).
Ultimately, these norms affect how groups interact with and perceive other
groups. In-state groups that have a long history together will have formed certain
perspectives on one another. These perspectives culminate into a stakeholder’s
assessment of the group’s reputation. When asked questions about collaborations with
other groups and assessing the level of influence of a group, respondents will likely revert
to their assessments of group reputation as a heuristic. Groups that the respondent knows
more about and has had specific interactions with will likely be at the forefront of their
mind.
In contrast, respondents will be less likely to recollect newer groups and out-ofstate groups since there are few reputational heuristics to refer to. That is not to say that
concrete recollections of the energy storage proceeding are not processed by the
respondent. However, a group’s reputation will be a major factor in the respondent’s
cognitive assessments.
Implicit influence is largely shaped by group reputation, as it embodies positive or
negative perceptions of a group and its staff based on repeated interactions and events
together. A group’s reputation blends into an individual’s level of experience, which is
also another important facet of implicit influence.
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Individual Experience
Experience is another key facet of implicit influence. Experience in the policy
community and at the OPUC were highlighted as important to being influential at the
OPUC. Many of the respondents had been in the Oregon regulatory and policy
community for upward of twenty years. This experience over a long period of time has
impacts on an individual’s network, reputation, institutional knowledge, and policy
knowledge.
Experience with the OPUC is integral to a stakeholder’s success. One concern
about PUC participation is that its technical nature makes it difficult for lay individuals or
groups to become involved. The OPUC has worked to open up the process more to other
types of stakeholders and provides learning resources for new stakeholders. Yet,
intervening at the OPUC (much less any state public utility commission) remains a
challenge for most stakeholders. Participants highlighted the major undertaking that new
stakeholders faced.
Lots of process, it really takes a big effort to get to where you can have an
effect on the process. Everybody can be involved in these processes,
there’s no limit…Anybody can walk into the workshop, can send in the
comments to the Commission, can call people on the phone, and talk about
it. That’s important because if you get that, it provides a way for the
commission to make better decisions because they’re getting better
input…That said, not many people just come wandering off the street to
say, “Hey, I’m here for your storage workshop”. (OR Interview 003)
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Other participants noted that it is difficult for inexperienced stakeholders to overcome the
OPUC’s technical barriers. There is a sharp learning curve at the OPUC that may
discourage inexperienced stakeholders to participate. As one participant observed,
Now, I see a lot of other groups coming in and they absolutely should be
at the table, but that also means that they need to one, figure out how to
play. As the old saying goes, you've got to know the rules before you
could break them. Then they have to do the work. They want to do
something different, great. It just doesn't happen, and that's a hard process.
A really hard process. (Oregon Interview 004)
Possessing experience at the OPUC is an integral aspect of implicit influence because it
captures not only an individual’s ability to successfully navigate the many technical and
legal processes, but is also a embodies the wealth of knowledge and institutional and
policy history of the OPUC. One stakeholder observed of themself, “there's a couple of
decades of knowledge and experience. It does give me a bit of an advantage in some of
these things” (OR 006).
As experience builds up, so does implicit influence. Experience also shapes other
group and individual facets of implicit influence. For example, an individual’s experience
at the OPUC also complements their group reputation as they become associated with
their group’s success (or failures). As the next section shows, experience can also lend
itself to an individual’s expertise.
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Expertise
Stakeholders noted throughout the interviews the importance of expertise as being
a key determinant for stakeholders that were influential versus those that were not. The
PUC model is based on stakeholders providing information and expertise to the
Commission. Commissioner’s root their decisions based on the docket record, which
usually consists of stakeholder comments and, in some cases, witness testimony for
contested cases. Therefore, a high level of expertise on the issue at hand is crucial to an
individual’s implicit influence.
There were three sub-themes on expertise from the interview data: (1) the bar is
set high for groups to demonstrate their technical and legal expertise at the OPUC to be
perceived as credible and influential; (2) there are a limited number of interest groups that
possess the technical and legal expertise to intervene at OPUC proceedings effectively;
and (3) individuals and groups that are perceived to have greater expertise on an issue
will often take the lead for an array of other potential stakeholder groups.
First, as groups participate in more and more PUC proceedings, they gain greater
credibility to come to the table, especially as they are able to demonstrate that they have
the technical expertise to engage in PUC proceedings constructively. One participant
emphasized that, “[It was] our ability to be able to consult with, and check in with, and
bring along with our own knowledge of the technology also the thinking of the industry”
(OR Interview 001).
Another participant noted that their group had previously been a “fringe” group
until it was able to demonstrate its technical expertise on certain issues and skills on how
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to engage with other stakeholders at the same playing level (OR Interview 004). After
that particular docket, industry stakeholders perceived the group as a credible intervenor.
A second theme that emerged from the interviews centered around the question of
broadening OPUC participation. The OPUC report on SB 978 noted the importance of
broadening the OPUC process to include environmental justice and under-represented
minority interest groups. Respondents were asked whether they knew of any groups that
should be part of the process but did not participate due to extenuating circumstances.
Most respondents did not note any major groups that they believed should be part of the
process that were excluded. One respondent noted, “I think given the nature of the
docket, it had the stakeholders that needed to be there for that type of docket…” (OR
Interview 001).
The general consensus on the question of diverse stakeholder engagement points
to the underlying theme that it is important that stakeholders have a minimum level of
expertise on the policy issue and that they are able to offer a particular perspective or
source of information that adds value to the OPUC proceeding. Commissions (across all
states) expects intervenors to provide a unique perspective that is supported by
information and expertise. Commissions do not want an avalanche of information that
cannot provide meaningful information to the record.
[A] participant should come with something more than “yay renewables”.
For example, [this organization] sometimes comes in and says “yay,
renewables” and that's not what staff is looking for, [they are] looking for
help…how you participate matters (emphasis added). There are a couple
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NGO’s who know how to participate at that level…when they’re fully
staffed and focused…but then there’s this other range of NGO’s who
either don’t participate at all or do so very delicately. (OR Interview 005)
Third, participation is often predicated on weighing the importance of the proceeding and
whether a group believes that they would be able to provide a viable contribution or not.
If there was a group with greater expertise and stake in the proceeding, stakeholders
appeared to take a step back from participating more fully in the proceeding.
Multiple stakeholders emphasized that there was often a stakeholder group lead
for each major issue or perspective. As one participant noted, “If you don’t have the time
to do it yourself, you can join or be active as an organization that does, that has that as its
purposes…there are both indirect and direct ways to be active in these kinds of dockets”
(OR Interview 003). Another respondent highlighted the importance of a lead group.
We all pick and choose where we get involved and you try to work with,
informally, with other groups to see where you’re going to be more active
on that docket, so I don’t have to be as much. That’s certainly true with
the storage docket because we knew that [another organization] was going
to be effectively in the lead for all these advocacy groups on that docket.
(OR Interview 003)
The stakeholder interviews emphasized the importance of individual expertise as a
critical component of a group’s influence over OPUC proceedings. Individual expertise
has a central role in the perception of a stakeholder’s implicit influence. Individuals or
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groups that possess expertise on certain issues will be perceived as potentially more
influential.

Networks
An individual’s professional and personal network has a strong impact on their
implicit influence in that they can build beneficial relationships with other stakeholders.
These relationships can create opportunities for learning, information sharing, policy
collaborations, and a stronger foundation to reach a consensus when there are contentious
issues. An individual’s network contributes to how other stakeholders perceive their level
of influence and even how an individual perceives their own level of influence. A highly
connected individual will appear to be more influential than an individual with just a few
network contacts.
The policy world in Oregon is small and tight knit. Many of the offices are
located in downtown Portland. There are cases in which organizations even share office
space with similar groups. The interviews highlighted that many of the key stakeholders
had a long history with one another, which benefitted their professional work. As one
stakeholder put it, “You build that relationship. There are people that I sit across the table
from and worked with for a long time. We can start with better conversations. And a
better relationship” (OR 004). In addition, in some cases, there were cross-organizational
relationships as many of the key players had moved through multiple organizations and
events with one another.
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Professional and personal networks are especially important when a stakeholder is
considering the “long game”. For stakeholders in it for the “long game”, each PUC
proceeding builds upon the next, and influence can accumulate over time. Over time,
stakeholders are able to have a stronger understanding of other stakeholders’ preferences
and behaviors which can lead to more optimal outcomes and negotiating.
Once you figure out what's driving somebody or what somebody needs out
of that, then you can get some stuff done. It's all about motivation. If you
can crack what's motivating people, you can do cool stuff. A lot of times,
at [the organization], we always said, you're always litigating the next
docket. Yes, there's things that are being debated. We need to get into the
docket, but there's always something that's leftover, so if you can stick in it
and stick to it long enough, that's when you can really [get things
accomplished]. (OR 004)
Individuals with large networks are at an advantage with regards to being able to
communicate and deliberate with a wide array of stakeholders, especially informally.
While the docket does provide a large amount of information about stakeholder meetings
and comments, it cannot highlight informal interactions. Many of the interactions among
stakeholders were informal and not always in the setting or context of the energy storage
proceedings.
Yet, these informal interactions with stakeholders’ networks were important
opportunities to share information, learn, and strategize comment submissions.
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They engage more than the comments they tell (sic) would suggest.
Sometimes they would have had comments, but they would talk to us. We
would get on the phone with them or submit questions to them and they
would provide some assistance, in terms of understanding ethical and
technical issues that were outside of our depth. (OR Interview 001).
Network benefits can also extend to OPUC staff. There are not any ex-parte rules against
talking to staff.12 As the perceived influence results highlight, staff is very influential
throughout the PUC process. It should be noted that talking to staff is not the same as
trying to influence or control the agency or the commission. Many stakeholders noted
that they would often talk to staff and had a comfortable familiarity with them. “I have
informal conversations with them all the time. I text with them every once in a while.
[It’s] a good way to get information on issues if your sort of behind the eight ball” (OR
Interview 007).
Newer and less experienced stakeholders did not have as many interactions or
familiarity with staff as more experienced stakeholders did. Many established
stakeholders worked closely with staff at certain points in the process.
So there's (sic), we always have a relationship with staff. We always have
a shared interest and, and sort of those, sometimes we disagree with
them…they're the closest ally we'll work with… coordinating some stuff
in settlement to sharing knowledge and expertise to just sometimes calling

12

In Oregon, there are only ex-parte rules governing stakeholders meeting with commissioners for certain
types of cases (i.e., contested cases).

313

them up before a docket….to see what they think and how we can move
the policies along. (OR Interview 006)
This familiarity with staff gives some stakeholders greater influence or at least the
perception of influence. As was noted, nothing undue is occurring in these interactions.
These interactions are based on information sharing about the content and the process of
the proceedings. Nonetheless, being able to possess that information and that network
contact is perceived as being invaluable.

Implications
The stakeholder interviews provide an illuminating glimpse into the network
relationships at the OPUC and how these connections shaped individuals’ perceptions of
influence. Implicit influence is an important finding in this dissertation because it
explains discrepancies between the data on group influence and perceptions of influential
groups by interview respondents. These findings are important to consider when
observing stakeholder dynamics at PUCs.
An individual’s implicit influence can predispose other stakeholders’ actions
towards them, which can have beneficial consequences in later PUC proceedings or
interactions. From the interview data, it became clear that there was a distinction drawn
between insider (expert) stakeholder groups and outsider (lay) stakeholder groups (Crow,
Albright, and Koebele, 2016; 2020; Roundtree and Baldwin, 2018). Insider stakeholders
are regulars around the PUC and have high levels of the five facets of influence
(experience, expertise, group capacity, group reputation, and networks). These
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stakeholders are often representing industry groups that have a history of participating at
the PUC and understand the formal and informal mechanisms to succeed in PUC
proceedings (Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2020). These insider stakeholders have a
reputation that has been accrued over the years due to interactions with other stakeholders
and agency members. Often insider stakeholders will be familiar with PUC staff due to
working closely with them over the years. These reputational, experience, and network
factors can give expert stakeholders an advantage at the PUC.
In contrast, outsider or lay stakeholders are often from advocacy groups, nonprofit, or citizens that have low levels of the five facets of influence (expertise,
experience, capacity, reputation, and network). These stakeholders often have little
experience with the PUC. They will often lack the expertise and capacity to participate to
level that expert stakeholders can participate.
From the interview data, it was clear that insider stakeholders had a higher level
of implicit influence, mainly stemming from their experience and familiarity with the
OPUC and the professional networks that they had acquired during their long tenure
engaging at the OPUC. Many of the interviewees had strong ties to one another. These
interviewees had worked together at the OPUC for many years (decades in some
circumstances). Some of the interviewees even considered some of the other stakeholders
as long-time friends they would see during their free time.
These congenial relationships benefit the regulatory process by promoting a
constant informal communication and deliberation stream among the stakeholders. Many
of these stakeholders are likely to cross paths with one another in their off time, given
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how “small” the policy and social circles are in the Portland-Salem metro areas. Most
importantly, these relationships enable stakeholders to find productive ways to overcome
conflict when they have opposing views. As many of the stakeholders emphasized,
maintaining constructive, professional relationships at the OPUC was a priority. While
disagreements are a natural part of any stakeholder process, there was no room for
antagonism or fighting. Therefore, these long-term relationships highlight how implicit
influence can promote a more cooperative and efficient PUC process.
In contrast, stakeholders with a low implicit influence were newer to the process
or had not engaged frequently with the OPUC. Possessing a low level of implicit
influence may inadvertently lead other stakeholders to leave them out of key informal
discussions or negotiations. These obscure stakeholders will miss out on opportunities to
influence the process and the outcome. In addition, possessing a low level of implicit
influence may lead other stakeholders to perceive them to be not as influential as they
truly are. This perception of not being influential can carry over to future proceedings and
interactions, which may negatively impact a stakeholder’s ability to be effective.
There are substantial disadvantages to having a low level of implicit influence. As
the state rulemaking literature has noted (Crow, Albright, and Koebele 2016; 2020;
Roundtree and Baldwin, 2018), there is a stark difference in success between insider and
outsider stakeholders. Experience matters and can open access to other opportunities at
the regulatory agency. Therefore, individuals with a low level of implicit influence will
need to overcome the following barriers: (1) organizational reputation, (2) organizational
capacities, (3) individual expertise, (4) individual experience, and (5) individual
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networks. Figure 10.3 summarizes some of the advantages and disadvantages of an
individual’s implicit influence.

Figure 10. 3 Implicit Influence Dynamics

Low Implicit Influence

High Implicit Influence

•Small in-state network
•Less capacity
•Low group reputation
•Low experience with PUC culture and PUC
staff
•Less informal coordination and information
sharing

•Coordination increases with networks and
reputation
•Knowledge of PUC process and PUC staff
•Similar group norms
•Information sharing
•Expertise due to years intervening at PUC

These differences between individuals with high levels of implicit influence
versus low implicit influence are important implications as PUCs bring in newer
stakeholders. While many PUCs (especially the OPUC) help newer stakeholders to
become familiar with PUC processes, it remains a sharp learning curve that cannot be
overcome in a short amount of time. Becoming a professional stakeholder is time,
resource, and experience intensive, which explains why there are fewer established
stakeholders during the regulatory phase than in the legislative phase. However, it is
better to be at the literal and metaphorical “table” than not at all.
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Conclusion
This chapter expands upon the concept of influence by examining how an
individual’s implicit influence is built from a set of individual and group factors. While
this chapter relies on descriptive and preliminary inferences on implicit influence, it
provides a promising foundation for future research. Most importantly, the findings on
implicit influence highlight how facilitating inclusive and participatory stakeholder
frameworks can lead to a tight-knit policy community. However, these findings also
indicate that outsider stakeholders that do not have high levels of implicit influence will
likely face multiple barriers to effectively participating at the same level as their
counterparts.
It is important to be cautious on the potential use of the model of implicit
influence, given that it might have captured social phenomena unique only to Oregon or
political communities that are smaller. The model of implicit influence was generated
among a tight-knit group of individuals and groups within a small policy space and
distinct setting (i.e., formal proceedings at the OPUC). The interview data was robust and
represented a large proportion of the stakeholders involved. As noted at the beginning of
this chapter, interviews in the other four states did not uncover this unique socio-political
phenomenon (although only a few interviews were conducted in those four states, and a
saturation point was never achieved). Interviewer familiarity with state politics and
interviewer state affinity may sway respondents to open up more or respond differently to
questions being asked.
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Despite these unique circumstances, it is also quite reasonable to assume that
these social phenomena exist in other states or agencies. The model of implicit influence
should be tested in other political and social contexts to explain individual perceptions,
biases, and heuristics. However, it is important to stipulate some boundaries for using the
model of implicit influence.
Foremost, it is important to emphasize that the model of implicit influence
analyzes the individual and the social dynamics that the individual experiences in a
formal (and informal) setting. The model in its current form is not meant to be scaled to
groups and countries.
The model of implicit influence should only be employed in settings in which
there is a:
(1) Defined set of individuals and their groups.
(2) Common issue or reason that brings these individuals together.
(3) Defined formal space or setting that these individuals meet with one another.
(4) Consistent and iterative interactions within the formal settings (e.g., meetings,
hearings, conferences).
In the case of this dissertation, there were defined individuals from organized interest
groups that were brought together to participate in the energy storage proceedings at their
state public utility commission. These individuals had consistent and iterative interactions
throughout the regulatory process in stakeholder meetings, PUC commission hearings,
public hearings, and comment periods. It is important for this model that there is some
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level of familiarity among the individuals based on previous interactions or at a
minimum, knowledge of the interest group.
Given that this model is in its infancy, it should first be tested in research designs
with similar cases and contexts. If the model’s validity can be established across these
similar contexts, the model could then be applied to other issue areas and disciplines. The
model of implicit influence could then be utilized across public policy, public
administration, political science, and sociological frameworks. Most organized entities
would satisfy the first criterion as long as there was a common formal space where they
interacted with one another. For example, defined formal spaces may include regulatory
agencies, legislative sessions, or other institutional spaces. A school board meeting could
even meet this criterion as long as there were defined and established roles among key
individuals and groups.
The next chapter is the Conclusion. The Conclusion reviews the major findings
and implications of this dissertation. The final section of the Conclusion reflects on future
research and the value of these dissertation findings to the larger challenge of creating
state energy policy to support national climate change goals.
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Chapter 11 Conclusion

In their seminal book on interest groups and influence, Baumgartner and Leech
(1998) reflected that their research question should not have been on whether interest
groups are influential, but rather “when, why, and to what extent they are powerful on
what types of issues” (p. 134). Nearly twenty-five years later, few studies have taken on
this challenge. This dissertation has attempted to meet Baumgartner and Leech’s (1998)
call to researchers by providing a rich analysis of the events, processes, contexts, drivers,
and actors involved in energy storage proceedings across five public utility commissions
in the United States.
In this conclusion, I review the main findings from this dissertation’s case studies.
I then present the major theoretical and policy implications of this dissertation. I conclude
with some final thoughts for future research.

Major Findings
This dissertation began with two questions. First, what participation mechanisms
at public utility commissions lead to greater influence among environmental and clean
energy groups? Second, what effect do the social dynamics among stakeholder groups
have on shaping a stakeholder’s ability to be influential?
This dissertation advanced a model of stakeholder access points and influence that
emphasized the importance of the quantity and type of access points throughout PUC
proceedings. This dissertation discovered that clean energy and environmental
stakeholders are most influential when public utility commission proceedings provide
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participatory and inclusive opportunities for stakeholders. In particular, it was the
presence of inclusive opportunities that enabled clean energy and environmental
stakeholders to be more influential due to greater opportunities for learning, deliberation,
and consensus.
The fsQCA results showed that environmental and clean energy stakeholders
were successful at influencing the final rules when,
(1) They participated during the pre-proposal process.
(2) There were three or more stakeholder meetings.
(3) There were three or more comment periods.
(4) The group participated in the majority (90 percent) of the comment periods.
(5) The group was present from the beginning until the end.
(6) There was not a guiding document
The fsQCA findings are notable because they identify the necessary and sufficient
combination of conditions that explain environmental and clean energy stakeholders’
ability to be highly influential. Necessary and sufficient conditions are important to
identify because they provide a causal explanation that is generalizable to similar
contexts or cases (Ragin 2000, p. 91). Also, when proven relevant, necessary conditions
provide practical information that can “have very powerful policy implications” (Ragin,
2000, p. 203). The following sections will discuss the generalizability of these necessary
and sufficient conditions in detail.
In addition to addressing complex causality, this dissertation constructed the
model of implicit influence, which seeks to explain stakeholder interactions and
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perceptions of influence among one another. The model of implicit influence revealed
how various facets of influence (i.e., expertise, experience, capacity, reputation, and
network) contribute to an individual’s implicit influence. Implicit influence explains why
some individuals are perceived to be more influential than others, even if their actual
effectiveness of changing the outcome was less consequential. Similarly, implicit
influence can imbue individuals with a “natural” sense of command and influence
towards which others will instinctively be responsive.
The following sections review the major findings in this dissertation regarding (1)
stakeholder influence; (2) issue ambiguity; (3) inclusive and participatory access points;
(4) barriers to participation; and (5) the implicit influence and its effect on stakeholder
dynamics at state PUCs.

Stakeholder Influence
This dissertation uncovered which stakeholders were influential and at what
points in the regulatory process these stakeholders were influential. First, at the basic
level, the findings of this dissertation confirm previous literature’s conclusions that
utilities and expert stakeholders dominate public utility commission PUC proceedings
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Golden, 1998; Rosenthal, 2001; Yackee and Yackee, 2006). In
addition, utilities continue to be among the most influential groups throughout the
regulatory process. This is not surprising given that many PUC proceedings are utilitydriven: utilities are tasked to submit plans, timelines, and proposals. For most non-utility
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stakeholders, participation is therefore reactive. Non-utility stakeholders are often
responding to the agenda that utilities and other powerful stakeholders set.
Despite the strong influence that utilities maintain during these PUC proceedings,
this dissertation also confirmed that environmental and clean energy groups can also be
influential throughout the process. This is a major contribution to the interest group and
regulatory literatures as previous federal literature on interest group influence has been
mixed (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Rosenthal 2001; Burstein and Linton, 2002;
Yackee and Yackee, 2006 Berry and Wilcox, 2008; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Hojnacki et
al. 2012; Yackee, 2011, 2015) and there have only been a few state rulemaking studies
(Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz 2014; Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2016, 2020; Roundtree
and Baldwin 2018). These findings put into question the viability of the regulatory
capture model and whether future research should reconceptualize what influence
actually looks like in the context of a more diverse stakeholder framework.
Second, this dissertation uncovered key access points during the regulatory
process. In particular, this confirmed that the pre-proposal stage is a critical stage for
influence in which stakeholders can shape and define the agenda. Again, this is in line
with previous federal and state literature (Yackee, 2011; 2015; Rinfret, Cook, and Pautz,
2014; Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2016, 2020). This dissertation discovered that
environmental and clean energy stakeholders were more successful at influencing the
final rules or order when they had access to the process from the beginning of the preproposal stage at state PUCs in California, Oregon, and Nevada.
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In some instances (i.e., New York), the majority of the final rules were
established even before the formal start of the rulemaking. In these cases, only a few
industry stakeholders had “access” to setting and framing the agenda, which bodes poorly
for stakeholders that want to be at the table to set the agenda from the very beginning of
the pre-proposal stage.
However, these findings should not necessarily be perceived as a complete loss as
this dissertation showed that the comment period is also a key point of influence. Nonutility stakeholders can still influence the content of the rulemaking at these points,
especially when they are involved during the pre-proposal phase and there are multiple
opportunities for stakeholder meetings and comment periods.
It is important to note that a stakeholder’s ability to be influential during the final
rules was contingent on their level of participation during the comment period. The
fsQCA analysis identified that a stakeholder’s participation during the comment period
was a necessary condition. A stakeholder’s level of participation is an important finding
as it shows that if a stakeholder wants to be influential, they will need to engage at a high
level during the comment period. Stakeholders will need to commit a high level of
resources and time into their submitted comments. This finding is supported by
interviewee responses that highlighted that the expertise and quality of stakeholder
comments were integral to being successful at state PUCs. As the next section highlights,
this has implications for how stakeholder frameworks at PUCs should be organized.
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Access to Inclusive Opportunities
The findings from this dissertation show that inclusive access points provide more
meaningful opportunities for stakeholders. Much of the regulatory literature has focused
on PUC practices and procedures that promote participation (Golden, 1998; Furlong and
Kerwin, 2004; Woods, 2009, 2015; Baldwin 2019a, 2019b). While participatory
opportunities bring in a wide array of stakeholders and provide them opportunities to be
part of the process, this dissertation discovered that stakeholder processes focused on
inclusiveness engendered more meaningful opportunities for traditionally less influential
stakeholders (e.g., environmental and clean energy stakeholders). Inclusive opportunities
provided stakeholders opportunities for multiple ways of knowledge, coproduction, and
temporal openness (Quick and Feldman, 2011). Inclusive opportunities included
stakeholder workshops and technical meetings, working groups, and an emphasis on
norms such as consensus. These inclusive opportunities provided stakeholders a more
substantive role at the metaphorical and literal “table.”
For example, in the case of New York, the DPS provided multiple participatory
opportunities for stakeholders. The DPS facilitated stakeholder technical meetings and
public hearings that spanned multiple locations around the state that were also scheduled
at convenient times. There were also two public comment periods in which commenters
could easily submit their comments online. Despite these participatory opportunities, the
stakeholder process was not as meaningful because the agenda had already been set far
before the rulemaking had begun.
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In contrast, in the case of California, the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) provided distinct participatory and inclusive opportunities for stakeholders: there
were multiple comment periods, over a dozen stakeholder meetings, access to the preproposal stage, stakeholder workshops, and policy linkages. Stakeholders who had the
capacity to remain engaged in the stakeholder process during this period were able to
shape the agenda from the beginning. There was time for stakeholder learning and
deliberation. In addition, the CPUC was genuinely interested in conducting a rulemaking
that included stakeholder input and expertise since California was the first state to
implement an energy storage program.
This dissertation also discovered that there are instances in which smaller
stakeholder frameworks can lead to more meaningful participation and thereby
opportunities to influence the process. PUC proceedings that emphasized consensus and
deliberation only included a select number of stakeholders. The size of the stakeholder
processes was likely reflective of the smaller sizes of the state and the PUC. Nonetheless,
it is during these smaller proceedings that environmental and clean energy groups have
been able to exert the highest level of influence over the final comments.
For example, there was only one environmental group in Nevada, Western
Resource Advocates (WRA). However, WRA took the lead during the energy storage
proceedings due to the group’s experience working at PUCs and its ability to have a staff
member on location. Similarly, a limited number of clean energy groups were involved in
Oregon’s energy storage proceeding. Renewable NW (RNW) was able to take the lead to
represent the interests of multiple environmental and clean energy groups. Therefore,
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facilitating smaller stakeholder proceedings may provide more meaningful opportunities
and time for stakeholders to participate than in stakeholder proceedings that have a large
number of stakeholder groups involved.
These findings highlight that while it is important to continue broadening
participatory opportunities for stakeholders, it is even more critical to provide inclusive
opportunities.

Issue Ambiguity, Learning, and the Role of Experts in Shaping the PUC Agenda
This dissertation revealed the role that issue ambiguity can play in shaping the
scope and context of the stakeholder process at PUCs. In addition, issue ambiguity
created an opportunity for environmental and clean energy interest groups to influence
the final rules. Energy storage was a new issue for each of the five states. Little was
known about energy storage regarding its multiple uses, how it would be valued, and how
it would be integrated into the traditional electric grid and the energy market. Each of the
PUCs sought to overcome energy storage’s issue ambiguity in different manners, which
ultimately shaped the stakeholder process and the following final rules.
First, the issue ambiguity around energy storage prevented the formation of
oppositional coalitions, which gave environmental and clean energy groups a greater
opportunity to influence the process. Since there was so much ambiguity around energy
storage, it was difficult for interest groups to coalesce around a common definition, set of
uses, and what its benefits were. Environmental and clean energy stakeholders were able
to capitalize on the uncertainty and diverse preferences of traditionally, more powerful
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groups (i.e., utilities). This is in line with Faulkner’s (2008), business conflict model
which advanced that conflict and discord among business and industry stakeholders can
weaken their power position, thus providing an opportunity for environmental policies to
develop independently of the full pressure of the opposing coalition. Similarly, Stokes
(2015) discovered that renewable energy policies have often been enacted during times of
crisis when opponents are either distracted or divided.
It is important to note that many environmental and clean energy groups also had
opposing views. These groups had a similar experience struggling to find common
understandings and preferences for energy storage just as much as utility and industry
interest groups. However, the traditionally powerful collaboration of utility and business
interests was not solidified as it has been for other issues that were more salient and
transparent. In addition, environmental and clean energy groups typically made up a
small proportion of the total stakeholders, thereby making it easier to avoid the group
discord and divisions of larger factions.
Some of the later energy storage proceedings (i.e., New York and Virginia) did
have interest group coalitions: environmental, utilities, energy storage industry, and
power producers. It is possible that the utility and industry coalitions were more
influential in these proceedings because they had a stronger, common understanding of
energy storage than the utilities involved in the first few energy storage proceedings. In
addition, the energy politics in each of these states imposed unique contexts that may
have empowered certain stakeholders more than others. Nonetheless, issue ambiguity
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continued to be a challenge even in Virginia in 2021, as stakeholders and the SCC were
still uncertain how it would be defined and managed.
Second, how each PUC chose to “learn” about energy storage ultimately impacted
the stakeholder process. State energy storage proceedings that primarily relied on thirdparty studies to frame the rulemaking were less stakeholder intensive than state energy
storage proceedings that facilitated stakeholder learning and deliberation. For example, in
New York, the New York Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA)
and the New York Department of Public Service (DPS) directed the framework of the
Energy Storage Roadmap with the help of consultant groups. The following energy
storage rulemaking was framed purely by the content of the Energy Storage Roadmap,
leaving little room for stakeholder input or deliberation.
Issue ambiguity had a large effect on how each of the five PUCs employed
experts to overcome this information challenge. Experts ranged from research
institutions, energy storage consultants, and energy storage developers. Given that energy
storage was such a new issue, the need for experts was integral to each of the energy
storage proceedings. Experts were utilized in two ways: to first inform stakeholders and
the commission, and secondly to craft the agenda and content of the final rules. Experts
were brought in during stakeholder meetings to encourage learning. Many stakeholders
had a rudimentary understanding of energy storage, especially in the case of California
and Oregon.
Experts were also brought in to help provide the technical knowledge to craft the
agenda and, in some cases, a large portion of the content for the final rules. There were

330

instances in which a couple of the PUCs relied on bureaucratic agencies to collect the
majority of the information in collaboration with research institutions and industry
groups. In other cases, the PUCs requested a third-party study conducted on their behalf.
In all of these cases, the PUC relied heavily on outside experts to inform the content of
the proceeding.
There are advantages to bringing in third-party experts at various phases of the
regulator process. First, third-party experts or consulting groups provide the commission
with legitimate information that can inform the process and content. The whole point of
stakeholder participation is to ensure that the commission receives diverse information
and perspectives to make the best possible determinations in the customer’s interest.
Second, a third-party consultant group or expert helps make the process more
transparent as often the study and models underpinning the report are open access. This is
in contrast to utility reports, which often include calculations based on proprietary
knowledge about their systems and practices. The lack of transparency was a common
complaint in the Oregon case with the utility, PGE. PGE used a production cost model
called the Resource Optimization Model (ROM) to simulate annual reviews of its system
and its annual IRP analysis. PGE utilized ROM to make forecasts of energy storage,
which often clashed with the models and assessments of other stakeholders. Stakeholders
were unable to access information about these modeling outcomes, which exacerbated the
uncertainty of energy storage.
Finally, the practice of turning to a third-party consultant or expert for
information provides a small window of opportunity for stakeholders to be there from the
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beginning to shape the agenda. This was the case in California with the California Energy
Storage Association (CESA). Given its superior knowledge of energy storage, CESA was
integral in shaping the scope and content of the rulemaking in which very few
stakeholders knew that much about the issue. These findings highlight an important
access point to influence the process, especially when there is little issue salience and
much issue ambiguity.
Issue ambiguity had a large role in shaping each state’s energy storage
proceedings. However, power dynamics may likely shift in future energy storage
proceedings as energy storage becomes more salient and common definitions and
practices become established. State PUCs may spend less time conducting stakeholderintensive processes as they gain greater knowledge of implementing energy storage
programs in their states.

Barriers to Participation
This dissertation discovered that there is a resource barrier for groups that do want
to participate at the PUC. There have been mixed results within the interest group and
regulatory literatures on the effects of finances on an interest group’s ability to be
influential. At the federal level, some studies have highlighted that an interest group’s
finances were ineffective on their ability to be influential over the outcome (Baumgartner
et al., 2009). In contrast, other findings that showed how finances were crucial to a
group’s ability to participate and thereby be influential in the process (Rosenthal 2001;
Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2019).
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While the fsQCA portion of the dissertation had mixed results on the relationship
that group capacity had on participation, the stakeholder interviews emphasized that
capacity was a determining factor for many stakeholders’ decision to participate in the
PUC proceeding or not. As previous literature has noted (Roundtree and Baldwin, 2018;
Albright, Crow, and Kobele, 2019, 2020), there is a major technical gap between
professional stakeholders and lay stakeholders. Interviews with key stakeholders and
interest groups that were not involved highlight that knowledge of the PUC is a crucial
barrier to many interest groups participating in the PUC. Many environmental and clean
energy groups are unaware of PUC procedures or even how to participate.
Many clean energy and environmental groups do not have the finances, time, and
staff to participate in all of the PUC dockets that they would want to participate in. These
groups must prioritize issues and only participate in PUC proceedings that they can
contribute the most value towards. In addition, some PUC proceedings require the
expertise of an attorney (e.g., rates cases and contested cases), which many groups do not
have the resources to maintain within their organization or even contract. Therefore,
many interest groups that might have a meaningful perspective or information to share
are unable to tackle the immense technical and resource barriers to participate at PUCs.
However, opening up intervenor compensation to advocacy and environmental
groups may help create a more level playing field for resource-strapped interest groups
that want to participate but do not have the resources. The case of California is a prime
example of how intervenor compensation could be used successfully to support
environmental and advocacy groups that would not have been able to participate
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otherwise. Some interviewees in California noted that additional funds enabled them to
contract out third parties to conduct studies, information gathering, or even hire
additional staff (e.g., environmental attorney) (CA Interview 3; CA Interview 4; CA
Interview 6). These additional resources helped support the group’s position and their
comments at the PUC.
Since its energy storage proceeding, Oregon, too, has opened its intervenor
program to environmental and environmental justice interest groups. Therefore, it will be
interesting to see whether intervenor compensation will positively impact participation at
the Oregon PUC and how that may impact a group’s level of influence.

Implicit Influence
Finally, this dissertation’s findings culminated with the model of implicit
influence. The model of implicit influence provides a compelling approach to
understanding how individuals construct their perceptions of others. The model of
implicit influence advances that individuals construct their perceptions of influence based
on five facets: expertise, experience, capacity, reputation, and network. Previous
literature has not addressed the concept of implicit influence because of its fluidity and
the difficulty in pinning down various facets of influence. Yet, these findings on implicit
influence are meaningful because they provide a deeper examination into the stakeholder
dynamics at state PUCs.
Implicit influence was an important finding in this dissertation because it
explained discrepancies between data on group influence over the final order and
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perceptions of influential groups by interview respondents. As this dissertation has
shown, an individual’s implicit influence can predispose other stakeholders’ actions
towards them, which can have beneficial (or harmful) consequences in later PUC
proceedings and interactions with other stakeholders. The perception of influence can be
almost more powerful than the actual act of influence.
The model of implicit influence is particularly important when explaining
stakeholder dynamics between insider stakeholders (individuals with high levels of
implicit influence) and outsider stakeholders (individuals with low levels of implicit
influence). As the state rulemaking literature has noted (Crow, Albright, and Koebele
2016; 2020; Roundtree and Baldwin, 2018), there is a stark difference in success between
insider and outsider stakeholders.
Insider stakeholders possess years of individual experience and expertise at the
PUC. In addition, insider stakeholders have nurtured professional relationships with other
stakeholders and agency members. All of these factors connect to an individual’s level of
implicit influence. Possessing a high level of implicit influence can give insider
stakeholders advantages with regards to,
(1) gaining information about the process and the positions of other stakeholders
(2) being invited to help shape the rules or the agenda by staff members,
(3) understanding the agency culture,
(4) having common norms of engagement,
(5) greater opportunities to collaborate with other stakeholders.
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In contrast, outsider stakeholders will have lower levels of implicit influence as they are
often newer to the process and have less experience with the PUC. Outsider stakeholders
will also have fewer network ties with other stakeholders. Many outsider stakeholders are
from non-profit, advocacy, or environmental and clean energy groups. These groups
traditionally have fewer resources (e.g., staff and finances), making it more difficult to
engage at the PUC as the PUC process is time, resource, and knowledge intensive.
Possessing a low level of implicit influence is a disadvantage as there may be
fewer informal opportunities to shape the rules and coordinate with other stakeholders. In
addition, individuals with a low level of implicit influence may not be perceived as
influential, even when they have achieved measurable successes. Therefore, a low level
of implicit influence is a major barrier to being influential during the regulatory process.
As PUCs continue to work to bring in diverse stakeholders, new stakeholders will
need to consider how to overcome these barriers to participate and influence the process
effectively. The stakeholder process will not be effective if insurmountable power
imbalances exist between insider stakeholders (high implicit influence) and outsider
stakeholders (low implicit influence).

Implications for Theory and Policy
Theoretical Implications
Much of this dissertation confirmed previous literature on federal and state
rulemaking regarding: the influence of industry groups in rulemakings (Baumgartner et
al. 2009; Golden, 1998; Rosenthal, 2001; Yackee and Yackee, 2006), issue definition
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(Kamieniecki, 2006)), the pre-proposal phase (Yackee, 2011, 2015; Rinfret, Cook, and
Pautz, 2014; Crow, Albright, and Koebele, 2016), the importance of the notice and
comment period (Yackee, 2005), and stakeholder motivations for participation (Golden,
1998; Furlong and Kerwin, 2004; Woods, 2009; Baldwin and Roundtree, 2018; Albright,
Crow, and Koebele, 2019, 2020).
However, this dissertation adds to this body of literature by examining these
phenomena across five state PUCs, in detailed case studies that analyzed the contexts
(i.e., legislative mandates and issue ambiguity) and the drivers (i.e., participatory and
inclusive access points for stakeholder engagement) that shaped each of the PUC
stakeholder frameworks.
First, the context of these cases is important for future theoretical work. Each of
the five state studies provides distinct information about the PUCs, procedures, and the
social dynamics with major stakeholders. These state studies can be a preliminary step
towards building a greater bank of knowledge on state PUCs and stakeholder frameworks
within the state regulatory literature.
Second, this dissertation’s fsQCA results provided a causal combination of
sufficient conditions that could be the basis for future theoretical work on regulatory
access points. The fsQCA results confirmed the importance of the pre-proposal and
comment phases at state PUCs. This is a meaningful theoretical contribution to the state
regulatory literature, as there has not been as much scholarship at this level.
Third, the findings on inclusive access points for stakeholder engagement are
notable contributions to theory. Most of the regulatory literature has focused primarily on
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participatory access points (e.g., notification and comment period and bringing in more
diverse participants). Inclusive opportunities are just as important, if not more so, than
participatory opportunities. The findings on inclusive access points should be applied to
other states and PUCs to understand better how inclusive stakeholder frameworks can
shape stakeholder relationships and processes.
Finally, this dissertation provides a novel approach to studying stakeholder
perceptions of influence through the model of implicit influence. This is an important
finding for the interest group and regulatory literatures because it highlights the heuristics
that individuals employ to assess other stakeholders. While the implicit influence model
is more conceptual than theoretical, the findings from the interviews provide a strong
foundation to apply it to future research studies in other disciplines such as sociology and
political science.
However, it is important to emphasize that caution should be used before
employing the model of implicit influence. Foremost, the model of implicit influence is
framed for individuals, not groups or countries. Therefore, in order to maintain the
model’s integrity, future research should just use it to examine interactions among just
individuals or groups of individuals. In addition, the model is bound by four other
requirements,
(1) Defined individuals and set of groups.
(2) Common issue or reason that brings these individuals together.
(3) Defined formal space or setting that these individuals meet with one another.
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(4) Consistent and iterative interactions within the formal settings (e.g., meetings,
hearings, conferences).
The first test of the model should be to see whether it is generalizable to other state PUCs
across other energy issues. If the model’s validity can be established across these similar
contexts, the model could then be applied to other issue areas and disciplines. The model
of implicit lays a promising theoretical foundation for analyzing the social dynamics of
individuals in group settings.

Policy Implications
There are a few policy implications that state PUCs and clean energy and
environmental interest groups should pay particular attention to from this dissertation.
Regarding state PUCs, if state PUCs are serious about opening up the stakeholder process
to new stakeholders, they will need to also consider including inclusive opportunities for
stakeholders to access. Broadening and diversifying participation is important, but the
emphasis on increasing participation in the PUC stakeholder processes is misplaced. This
statement does not mean to dispel the importance of participatory measures. Participatory
measures that seek to broaden participation, notification, and transparency remain at the
core of the stakeholder process.
However, there are implications from this dissertation that show that the addition
of more stakeholders is not always the most beneficial arrangement. As stakeholders
noted, the PUC process is about ensuring that the commission receives robust
information and facts about the policy issue. The commission does not want the same
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points to be brought up: the quality of each stakeholder’s contributions matters. If new
stakeholders do not find the process to be meaningful, they will likely not participate in
the future.
Thus, PUCs should work to provide more inclusive opportunities for stakeholders
to be involved in. In particular, the pre-proposal stage should be open to all stakeholders,
as this is the critical stage for framing and defining the agenda. If state PUCs truly care
about ensuring that the record and the content have the best information, they should
ensure that there is a diverse range of perspectives and facts represented at the preproposal stage.
In addition, there should be greater inclusive opportunities for stakeholder
workshops and meetings in which stakeholders can interact and deliberate with one
another. While hosting stakeholder meetings is time-consuming, the learning,
deliberation, and networking at these meetings are indispensable for future proceedings
and interactions among stakeholders.
When possible, state PUCs should emphasize the inclusive norm of consensus.
The norm of consensus compels stakeholders to actively work together to achieve a
satisfactory outcome for most parties involved. Informal negotiating and deliberation can
help stakeholders form greater relationships to come to a more advantageous outcome for
all groups. At a minimum, stakeholders become more familiar with other stakeholders’
perspectives and policy interests. The commission also benefits by overseeing a more
efficient, orderly, and collaborative proceeding.
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In addition to policy implications for state PUCs, this dissertation has several
implications for environmental and clean energy interest groups. This dissertation
discovered that traditional advocacy strategies by environmental groups and lay interest
groups will likely not be effective at state PUCs. Technical and resource barriers make
participation difficult for many of these lay interest groups. In particular, experience and
expertise were found to be integral factors for successful stakeholders at state PUCs.
It is important to include these environmental and advocacy positions. However,
the manner in which those perspectives are presented matters. State commissions are
looking for information that will inform the record and their final decision. Commissions
want analytical arguments that consider the economic impact that certain policies will
exact. While safety, health, and environmental factors may be taken into consideration in
commission decisions, there needs to be credible facts to support why certain policies
will be unsafe. Lay stakeholder comments that lack technical and expert opinions will
likely not be received with the same amount of attention as those by professional
stakeholders.
Therefore, advocating to broaden participation and make the process more
accessible to inexperienced interest groups is insufficient for stakeholder engagement
reforms at state PUCs. Environmental and clean energy groups will need to find other
ways to engage in the PUC process. Rather than remaining on the fringe, environmental
and clean energy groups may want to consider creating more formal network coalitions
that work consistently to support innovative policies at state PUCs. While there are
informal networks amongst environmental groups around PUC issues (i.e., Oregon and
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Virginia cases), there does not seem to be a formalized process or coalition in any of the
states. Many trade groups and some clean energy groups already have member
associations. However, it does not seem that local environmental groups have established
formal coalitions to advance a shared perspective at the PUC.
A formalized environmental coalition would provide a compelling force to
solidify the environmental perspective while mitigating the technical and resource
barriers that most groups face at state PUCs. It is important to note that this formal
coalition would not be the same type of coalition seen across some of the energy storage
proceedings in this dissertation (New York, Virginia, and California). Those coalitions
were loosely organized and mainly consisted of joint comments.
The distinguishing features of the formalized coalitions that I have advanced
would emphasize,
(1) an enduring coalition that would last longer than a few PUC proceedings
(2) a general fund that all groups would contribute to
(3) actively use funds to elevate the content and information of the comments they
submit to the PUC (e.g., hire consultants, experts, modelers, or attorneys).
There are obvious issues with the concept of a formalized environmental
coalition. Not all environmental or clean energy groups will have the same interests. As
the energy storage proceedings showed, there was a wide range of preferences across
environmental and clean energy groups. However, given that state PUCs will continue to
see an increase in environmental and clean energy issues in the near future, it is
advantageous for environmental groups to recognize that their efforts at the legislative
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phase are only good if they follow them through to the regulatory phase. As the case of
Virginia highlighted, the commission was able to greatly weaken the content and the
scope of the energy storage target program from what the original legislators had
intended. Therefore, the regulatory phase is crucial to ensuring that the rules and
regulations are not diminished due to opposing interests.

Future Research
This dissertation initially began as an examination of environmental and clean
energy stakeholder influence at PUCs. As I was able to gain a greater understanding of
the cases and the context, this dissertation grew into something more than I would have
predicted when I first started this process. Nevertheless, there is always more that can be
done to advance future research on stakeholder engagement at state PUCs.
In hindsight, there are a few methodological issues that I would have liked to have
approached differently. First, while there were obvious challenges to conducting
interview data from all five states, future research should work to bridge this interview
data gap. The insights from the interview data that I did collect from Oregon and
California were invaluable to understanding stakeholder actions and the culture of the
state PUCs. A more expansive interview data set across all types of stakeholders would
help build a more comprehensive understanding of PUCs across the country. In addition,
it is important to continue to include interviews of interest groups that did not participate
in order to understand the initial barriers to participation.
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Second, while this dissertation was concerned with explaining just environmental
and clean energy groups’ influence, future research should use the fsQCA model to
examine influence for all of the stakeholder groups across the five states. Broadening the
eligible cases would provide a more rigorous test of the model of stakeholder access
points. In addition, it would likely illuminate important differences among stakeholder
groups.
Third, future research should develop a more advanced method of calculating
influence. As this dissertation has shown, it is difficult to calculate influence as it is fluid
and varies over time. However, that does not mean it is impossible. The fsQCA
measurements of influence over the final rules were more detailed than previous literature
but were still rough measurements and relied heavily on the quality of the PUC record
and the staff responses to stakeholders. The measurements for influence were unable to
calculate influence during the pre-proposal phase. Future research should find a method
for calculating influence during the pre-proposal phase that finds a balance between
interview responses and content analysis of comments.
Fourth, it would be fruitful for future research to have a more rigorous method for
determining the scope of network connections. While I used participant responses to
construct a rough analysis of network relationships, it only skimmed the surface. A more
advanced network analysis model could explore stakeholder relationships and
interactions in finer detail.
Fifth, future research should test this dissertation’s models of stakeholder access
and influence and stakeholder implicit influence to see how they convey to other states.
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Energy storage policy has, until recently, received little mainstream attention. As more
states pass energy storage target legislation, there will be a greater amount of data and
cases to observe whether the contexts (legislative mandates and issue ambiguity) and
drivers (inclusive and participatory access points) of stakeholder influence change or
remain consistent.
Future studies on energy storage rulemakings should continue to examine how
state PUCs handle issues of ambiguity and whether the stakeholder process will change
as energy storage becomes an established technology. Environmental and clean energy
stakeholders may have less influence in future energy storage proceedings as PUCs take
less time to learn and deliberate about energy storage.
In addition, the model for stakeholder access points and influence is a useful
starting point for gaining a greater understanding of state PUCs. While there is an
emerging white paper literature on state PUCs, little is known about the culture, process,
and norms of state PUCs in the academic literature. Research on state PUCs is
particularly important given that PUCs are fast becoming the hub for renewable energy,
clean energy, and distributed energy policies.
Finally, the model of implicit influence is a promising approach for examining the
construction of stakeholder influence. While traditional interview methods have
highlighted the disadvantages of participant biases and inaccuracies, the model of implicit
influence embraces these heuristics and inaccuracies to explain stakeholder relationships
and power dynamics. The concept of implicit influence should not be perceived as
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detrimental to interview research methods but appreciated for explaining the complexity
of social interactions among stakeholders.

Final Thoughts: Addressing the Challenge of Climate Change
While most of this dissertation shifted to examine the stakeholder process at state
PUCs, one would be remiss not to address how this dissertation’s findings can exact
positive change for state and national climate change goals. The premise of this
dissertation noted the inactivity of meaningful climate change policies at the international
and national levels over the past decade. While international agreements such as the Paris
Agreement have been signed by most of the world’s countries, there have not been
substantial changes to national policies. Carbon emissions continue to rise despite these
international agreements and country leaders posturing on the importance of climate
change.
It is really at the state level that visible climate change goals are being
implemented through renewable and clean energy policies. Many of these policies are
related to transitioning states to renewable energy systems and to creating an updated,
resilient energy grid. Therefore, state PUCs must carry the onus of overseeing the
complete overhaul of the traditional electric grid.
The majority of state PUCs are coming to terms that their statutory authority to
oversee the economic regulation of utilities is insufficient to meet the policy demands of
the 21st century. For example, PUCs in Washington D.C. and Connecticut have made it
so that they will need to also take into account environmental considerations in addition
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to just economic ones. In addition (as is the focal point of this dissertation), state PUCs
are working to increase participatory and inclusive mechanisms to accommodate the
influx of new stakeholders. However, as this dissertation showed, not all stakeholder
frameworks are equal.
Inclusive mechanisms promoting multiple ways of knowing, coproduction, and
temporal openness can enable previously disenfranchised environmental and clean
energy groups to be more influential in shaping the final rules. Therefore, the findings
from this dissertation are important to ensure that groups that have environmental and
clean energy interests are being invited to the table continually and have equal
opportunities to shape the process and content of the proceeding. It is through these
institutional changes that environmental and clean energy groups can begin to advance
policy that supports climate change goals.
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Appendix A Codebook
Measuring Conditions
A. Outcome Condition: Measuring Stakeholder Influence
Analyze interest group comments at traditional notice and comment period.
In addition, it is important to note that each states addresses party comments in different
manners, in which the protocol for measuring influence has to be modified to
accommodate those differences. For example, in Oregon, the OPUC provides definitive
comments of the Commission’s concurrence or objection to stakeholder comments. In
other states, such as Virginia and California, the final decision provides a written
summary of stakeholder comments, but does not provide a definitive determination of the
Commission’s favor or disfavor of comments. One must examine the final decisions to
determine stakeholder positions and the final position of the document.
PUC response: Levels of influence will range from a negative (-2) to positive
(+2):
o (+2) Staff agrees and supports action (adopt, recommend)
o (+1) Staff agrees (recognizes, shares, etc.).
o (0) No objection or No response
o (-1) Staff disagrees, no action
o (-2) Staff disagrees and proposes to support the opposite
In cases in which the Commission or Staff do not directly indicate “agree” or “disagree”,
I will assess influence the following manner:
(1) If document does directly note the stakeholder (but does not indicate agree or
disagree), I will assess whether the final decision lined up with the position of the
stakeholder or not. This was the case with the majority of the documents in New
York.
In cases of concurrence, I will then afford them a (+1) unless they are the
only stakeholder mentioned in the section, in which case they will receive a (+2)
since their comment was the only one recorded. In cases in which the document
mentions multiple stakeholders with the same view, I will give them a (+1) as
their comments were helpful, but not unique to the final decisions. In cases in
which stakeholders submitted intervenor compensation forms, the onus of
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showing influence is on the stakeholder. The stakeholder must show that they
were able to provide a substantial contribution to the decision. I will determine the
level of influence based on the Commission’s notation of “verified” as being
highly influential (+2). In instances in which the Commission notes others
contributed to the decision, the stakeholder will receive a (+1).
In cases when the Commission disagrees with the stakeholder, I will give
them a score of (-2) if the Commission makes a decision counter to them. On
more miniscule points of discord, I will give them a score of (-1).
(2) If the document does not mention the stakeholder, the stakeholder will receive
a 0, as their comments (or lack thereof) did not receive enough attention by the
PUC for recognition in the documents.
1. Influence through submitted Comments
In cases in which interest groups are not mentioned directly in the Staff response to
comments, I will assess the comments and the key issues at stake for that specific interest
group. I will then analyze the final rules to determine whether the final rules changed in
favor of that interest group or not. The level of influence (as calibrated on a 4 scale, will
be relegated to a lower rung since the interest group was not directly mentioned in the
comments).
2. Rationale for not using weights on issues
I have decided not to use weights for each issue win. Given the complex and technical
nature of the dockets, it seemed like providing weights for each issue would impart too
much researcher bias. In addition, in some cases such as definitions, a simple change or
addition of a word might have larger implications than the researcher might be aware of
at the time. Therefore, assigning no weights to the issues saves the work from further
bias.
3. Calibration of scores into fuzzy scores
I calibrate influence by adding up the scores for each stakeholder. Since influence is a
relative concept, I assume that the highest score is the most influential and then calibrate
the rest of the scores relative to the maximum score, midpoint, and minimum scores. I set
the mid-point score as also being the midpoint for membership, in which the case is
neither fully in membership nor fully out of membership. Please see Table 1 on the next
page for the results of the score breakdown for each state.
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Appendix A. Table 1. State Influence Scores

California

Nevada

Verbal Score

Raw Score

Full Influence

16+

High

13 to 15

Moderate

Fuzzy Score

Raw Score

0.9

Verbal
Score
Full
Influence
High

1 to 3

0.9

8 to 12

0.6

Moderate

neg 2 to 0

0.6

A little

3 to 7

0.4

A little

neg 5 to neg 3

0.4

Not much

2- to 2

0.1

Not much

neg 8 to neg 6

0.1

No Influence

-3

0

No
Influence

no mention

1

Oregon

Fuzzy Score

4+

1

0

Virginia

Verbal Score

Raw Score

Full
Influence
High

8+
6 to 7

Moderate

Fuzzy Score

Verbal Score

Raw Score

Full Influence

5+

0.9

High

0 to 4

0.9

4 to 5

0.6

Moderate

neg 3 to 0

0.6

A little

2 to 3

0.4

A little

neg 7 to neg 4

0.4

Not much

0 to 1

0.1

Not much

neg 10 to neg 8

0.1

No Influence

-1

No Influence

no mention

1

0

New York
Verbal Score

Raw Score

Fuzzy Score

Full
Influence
High

14+
10 to 12

0.9

Moderate

6 to 9

0.6

A little

2 to 5

0.4

Not much

neg 1 to 1

0.1

No Influence

no mention

1

0
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Fuzzy
Score
1

0

B. Assessing Nevada’s Level of Influence
Nevada’s rulemaking is unique because it relied heavily on informal stakeholder sessions
and that there was a small number of stakeholders involved in the process. Another
interesting aspect of the stakeholder process was that there is a hearing officer involved
throughout the process.
The Commission expects the stakeholders to largely come to a consensus prior to
commission hearings. Therefore, stakeholders must work together to mitigate their
differences in formal and informal workshops and interactions.
Thus, there were few documents that I could rely upon to determine the level of influence
of the key stakeholders involved. The first order went through the key positions of the
stakeholders, but the final order did not. Therefore, I was able to discern the key issues at
stake for each order and use the reply comments to assess whether the stakeholder’s
position was reflected in the final order or not.
During the second half of the proceeding, stakeholders were able to come to consensus
on the majority of issues withstanding five issues:
(1) the definition of an energy storage target
(2) the final storage target amount
(3) the biennial target amounts
(4) requirements for sub-categories of the energy storage procurement target
(5) additional requirements for data and project solicitation
The utilities had the upper hand as they were the ones who wrote up the draft regulation.
Other stakeholders were able to contribute to the document and come to a consensus over
the key issues not listed above.
There were additional issues that were important to stakeholders that were also
introduced throughout the comments. During this comment period, there were issues of
greater consensus than others. The consensus for the targets, which was a major issue,
was generally agreed upon by most stakeholders. However, there was discord over the
strictness of some of the follow through mechanisms and the subcategories for the targets
(e.g., carveouts). While the influence scores are low, this does not accurately describe the
entire process and the level of influence throughout it.
Please contact the researcher for the full notes on the stakeholder positions and ensuing
influence score.
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C. Dichotomous Variables
For the majority of these variable, I just needed to research the context and history of
the energy storage legislation and regulatory process. The majority of these
conditions are dichotomous, in which it is either is ‘yes’ and fully in membership or
‘no’ and fully out of membership.
1. Target Mandate (TARMAN)
Some of the state legislation mandated specific energy storage targets whereas other
states did not. Including this condition seeks to examine whether participation was
more robust in states that did mandate a target or not. The rationale behind this is to
see whether participation increased when there was a greater opportunity to influence
the imposition of a mandate and to what level that mandate might aspire to.
(1) Energy storage target was mandated in the legislation
(0) Energy storage target was NOT mandated in the legislation
2. Rulemaking (RULEM)
The case type is important for participation because some cases such as rulemakings,
are less formal than other case types (i.e. contested case and evidentiary hearings).
More formal hearings often require that stakeholders hire attorneys to represent their
interests.
(1) Case was a rulemaking
(0) Case was NOT a rulemaking
3. Consumer Advocate (CONADV)
Berry (1984) noted the importance of a consumer intervenor in regulatory procedures.
This is important to this day given that consumer advocates represent the interests of
consumers, which weighs heavily with PUCs interests. A consumer advocate is an
institutional check on the PUC and is usually indicative that non-utility interests are
being considered. Not all states have a consumer advocate group. Some states have
non-profit consumer advocate groups (i.e. Oregon) and government consumer
advocate agencies (i.e. California).
(1) A consumer advocate participated in the proceeding
(2) A consumer advocate did not participate in the proceeding
4. Rule review (RView)
Sobel and Dove (2016) find some evidence that reviews done through legislative
branch, or an independent agency tend to be more effective than reviews conducted by
other entities such as state Executive Offices.
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Including conditions for review is important because it indicates that the content of the
rules is either pre-drafted or directed from external sources to the regulatory process.
Therefore, the ability of interest groups to influence the process is diminished,
especially for groups such as environmental groups that do not have greater power
coming to the table.
The condition of rule review therefore indicates whether the final rules were required
to be vetted by an independent agency or not.
(1) Final rules vetted by independent agency
(0) Final rules NOT vetted by an independent agency
5. Working Groups (WORKG)
This condition seeks to examine whether the pre-existing PUC working groups had a
relationship with stakeholder participation and influence over the final rules or orders.
The rationale behind this was that working groups would facilitate greater deliberation
and collaboration among stakeholders which would carry over into the energy storage
proceedings.
(1) There were working groups on energy storage or similar issues
(0) There was NOT a working group on energy storage or similar issue
6. Governor Led (GOV)
The rationale behind this condition is that the PUC stakeholder process would be
streamlined in states in which the governor was spearheading the energy storage
policies.
(1) Energy storage legislation was part of the state governor’s executive agenda
(0) Energy storage legislation was NOT part of the state governor’s executive
agenda
7. Framing Document
The rationale of a framing document is that the content and framework of the
regulatory rules had largely been established states by a framing document (e.g.,
roadmap, energy storage study). Therefore, the stakeholder process and deliberations
on the proposed rules would be scaled down since the rules had essentially already
been written by a third party or agency. In energy storage proceedings in which there
was NOT a framing document, the stakeholder process would be more robust since
there would be greater opportunities to create and modify the proposed rules and
framework. Given the directionality of the outcome variable (influence over the final
rules), I modified the direction of this condition to ensure its logical consistency.
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(1) Did NOT have a framing document
(0) Did have a framing document
8. Pre-proposal Period
States that had a distinct pre-proposal period would provide greater access for
stakeholders to influence the rules and process. State PUCs are not required to have a preproposal phase, so when there is a pre-proposal period, it is indicative that the PUC
welcomes stakeholder expertise and participation to help shape the content of the rules
and process.
(1) PUC proceeding did have a pre-proposal phase
(0) PUC proceeding did NOT have a pre-proposal phase
9. Stakeholder’s Presence Throughout Proceeding (PALL)
(1) Stakeholder was present throughout the entire proceeding, from beginning to
end
(0) Stakeholder was NOT present throughout the entire proceeding; they were
absent for some portion of the proceeding.
10. Intervenor Compensation
(1) Stakeholder received intervenor compensation during the proceeding
(0) Stakeholder did NOT receive intervenor compensation during the proceeding
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D. Fuzzy Variables
1. Access to Stakeholder Meetings
(1) 5 workshops or meetings led by agency
(.8) 4 workshops or meetings led by agency
(.6) 3 workshops or meetings led by agency
(.4) 2 workshops or meeting led by agency
(.1) 1 workshops or meeting led by agency
(0) No formal workshops or technical meetings
2. Opportunity for Stakeholder Comments
There are 4 main junctures that stakeholders could have the opportunity to comment: predraft regulation or the order instituting a rulemaking (OIR), Draft Proposal, Proposed
Decision, Final Order.
(1) More than 4 comment periods
(.67) 3 comment periods
(.33) 2 comment periods
(0) 1 comment periods
3. Stakeholder Participation During the Comment Period
(1) Commented for over 90 percent of the comment periods.
(.8) Commented for the majority (75 percent) of comment periods
(.6) Commented for at least half (50 percent) of comment periods
(.4) Commented for at least a quarter (25%) of the comment periods
(.1) Commented less than a quarter (25%) of the comment periods
(0) Did not make any comments
4. Group Financial Capacity
Total Net Revenue
I looked up groups on ProPublica and GuideStar’s website where I was able to find
their total net revenue on the groups’ 990 tax forms. I used GuideStar’s categorization of
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a non-profit’s revenue into small, medium, and large: (1) Grassroots, less than 1 million
(2) Small, 1-5 Million, (3) Mid-size, 5.1 to 10 Million, (4) Large, 10 to 50 Million, and
Economic Engine 50 Million to 5 Billion. I then took the average of total revenue over
the period of time of the PUC proceeding. I attempted to include the years preceding the
docket and the year thereafter to encompass the overall financial overview of the group.
In some cases, I was not able to find up to date financial information for the group. For
example, in Virginia, the proceeding occurred in the year 2020, but I was unable to
access the 990 forms for 2020.

Key
Category
Grassroots
Small
Mid-Size
Large
Economic
Engine

Raw Score
Less than 1
Million
1-5 Million
5.1 to 10 Million
10 to 50 Million
50 to 5 Billion

Fuzzy Score

Score
1
2
3
4

.2
.4
.6
.8

5

1

5. Employee Capacity
I originally looked up employee information on the groups’ 990 forms on ProPublica and
GuideStar’s website. I then calibrated cut-offs to distinguish between groups that had a
small, mid-size, and large number of staff: (1) Small, 10 and less full-time employees, (2)
Mid-size, 11-100 full-time employees, and (3) Large, 100 and more full-time employees.
However, the national or state levels for employees did not seem to be a consistent
indicator of how they prioritized or valued the proceeding. So I calibrated employee
strength based on the following two factors:
(1) how many employees were assigned to the proceedings
(2) whether an attorney from outside the organization was hired
First, the number of employees assigned to the proceeding highlights whether they had
enough capacity to have more than one on the case. If at least two employees were
assigned the case, that seemed like a stronger indicator of the prioritization they placed
for the case.
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Second, the presence of an outside attorney indicates two factors: that the organization
prioritized the case enough to hire legal representation and expertise, and second that the
organization had the financial capacity to contract an attorney.
Often rulemakings are very technical and require a strong understanding of legal issues
that are under the purvey of attorneys.
Employee Capacity fuzzy score
(1) Had five or more staff members assigned to the case (could include contracted
attorneys, consultants, or researchers).
(.67) Had at least three staff members assigned to the case (could include
contracted attorneys, consultants, or researchers).
(.33) Contracted an outside attorney OR had at least 2 fulltime staff members
assigned to the case
(.1) Had at least one fulltime staff member assigned to the case
(0) No staff or attorney assigned
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E. Conditions That Were Considered but Not Included
1. Age and Issue of Non-Profits:
This condition does not seem to convey well to QCA. Empirically, while it does seem
that some newer types of non-profits will be better suited to address clean energy issues
due to more niche focuses on renewables and clean energy, other non-profits can still
have a large presence, too. Some non-profits have been able to keep pace with renewable
issues more so than others. Again, the mission, board, and scope of the non-profits needs
to be considered, too. This was not included in the final QCA analysis, but it was
considered in the preliminary set up of the matrix.
(1) Historic
(2) Traditional
(3) Second Wave
(4) New
2. Determinants of Policy Adoption and Change
The policy histories and implementation of these states are varied. Initially, there are
not many factors that tie these states with one another. Geographically, these states are
dispersed, with differing energy resource mixes and renewable energy potentials. In
addition, most of these states are regulated by differing energy jurisdictions. However,
the majority of these states share similar state ideology and environmental activism,
which has been shown to be major determinants of climate change and renewable
energy policy adoption in the literature (Carley and Miller, 2012, Berry et al. 2015,
Trujillo et al. 2016).
I was originally thinking of analyzing state level data from datasets from the Database
for State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), the Energy Information
Administration EIA), and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data was extracted for
the years that the regulatory proceeding was occurring.
(1) Examine CO2 emissions per state capita (EPA) as a measure of fossil fuel
industry interest group strength
(2) average real state price of electricity (EIA)
(3) Total state renewable energy potential (DSIRE)
(4) Government and Citizen Ideology (Berry et al., 2015)
However, as I began to look at these factors, it became clear that this was not
necessary for the context of my research question and analysis. However, this is
something interesting to know more about for future research that may have a different
research design than mine.
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Appendix B NVivo Codebook
A. Interview Codes
1. Experience
2. Group Capacity
3. Participation
4. Barriers to Participation
5. Perceptions of Fairness During Proceeding
6. Formal and Informal Group Tactics
7. Interest Group Collaboration, Coalitions, and Conflict
8. Perceived Influence
9. Stage When Group Was Most Influential
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B. Definitions of Codes
Code

Definition

1. Influence of Group

A group’s noted ability to control or
shape the process, rules, specific point
in the proceeding, and person or
group.

2. Influence of Individual (self)

A group’s noted ability to control or
shape the process, rules, specific point
in the proceeding, and person or
group.

3. Expertise

Specific knowledge or observable
proficiency in an issue or topic.

4. Experience

Number of years and familiarity with
the process of specific agencies, policy
networks, or groups.

5. Group Reputation

A group’s perceived set of skills,
traits, and history.

6. Collaboration with Others

Working with other groups or
individuals in a formal or informal
alliance to achieve a mutual outcome.

7. Capacity

The financial, staffing, and timing
resources to participate.

8. Norms of Civility

Informal behavioral practices that are
recognized as being standards for
behavior in specific settings.

9. Network Contact

A professional relationship within an
individual’s line of work.

10. Staff Familiarity

An individual’s knowledge and
personal experience with agency staff
members.
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3. Data Driven Codes
Code
1. Influence of Group

Description
Respondent states groups
that were influential with
affirmations such as “yes”
or “they were influential”.

Example
“I think that we were
influential in the
development of the
stipulation terms”.

2. Influence of Individual
(self)

Respondent directly refers
to self or another
individual by name as
being influential.

“Have you talked to
[individual]? If I credit
anybody for really
keeping the fire lit on
this…I'd pin it on him”.

43. Expertise

Respondent makes
affirmations of their
familiarity or expertise
with energy storage or
clean energy topics.

“I feel that based on the
number of times I'm asked
to speak about it, I am
considered an expert…”

4. Experience

Respondent describes how
many years he/she has
been involved in line of
work makes specific
affirmations of familiarity
or experience with OPUC.

“So I've been practicing
for the PUC for 20 years.”

5. Group Reputation

Respondent directly refers
to a group’s standing,
reputation, or specific
characteristic of that group.

There are a couple of
NGOs who know how to
participate at that level.
[anonymous groups] can
do it when they're fully
staffed and their focused.

6. Collaboration with
Other

Respondent notes specific
collaborations or working
with another group or
individual (by name).

“We worked with them
and had a good
relationships with both of
those groups and continue
to on those sorts of things
possibly…we would've
sort of been sharing and
talking with those folks as
we are going through the
docket.”
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7. Capacity
a. General

a. General:
Respondent notes the
group’s level of resources
or overall status (e.g.,
strained, weak, strong,
full).

b. Financial

c. Staff

d. Participation

b. Financial:
Respondent addresses the
state of the group’s
financial resources (e.g.,
strained, weak, strong,
full).
c. Staff
Respondent notes the state
of the group’s staffing
(e.g., understaffed,
strained, did not have
enough staff to cover all of
their activities, was fully
funded).
d. Participation
Respondent notes that
group was unable to
participate because of lack
of resources or capacity.

“Sometimes it's given that
when timelines are very
ambitious, they often
overcome our ability to
participate because as
non-profits, we have very
limited resources…”

“PacifiCorp's procurement
was so small that we
couldn't really justify
dedicating much staff time
to it, but PGE's was a little
more significant and so
we fully staffed it.”
“Over the last three or
four years they have been
stretched to the breaking
point, I think.”

8. Norms of Civility

Respondent uses words
such as “tradition”,
“norm”, and “practice” to
depict an informal, but
recognized standards or
practices of behavior.

“…the culture in the
northwest is fight when
you have to but when you
don't have to, you don’t,
and you try to be more
collaborative.”

9. Network Contact

Respondent provides a
specific name of an
individual that they have
worked with or have great
familiarity with (e.g.,

“He and I were colleagues
at [interest group] for a
long time, and are still
friends.”
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recounts a story of a shared
experience).
10. Staff Familiarity

Respondent provides a
specific name of a staff
member that they have
worked with or have great
familiarity with (e.g.,
recounts a story of a shared
experience). Respondent
discusses past experiences
with the OPUC.
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“I mean, the problem with
commission staff is that,
um, they have, they have
turnover you know,
maybe more than, and so
you can get different
people involved. Um, the
commission staffer on that
one, I remember it was a
newer person at the time.
He actually works for
PGE now.”

Appendix C Oregon Interview: Notes and Interview Questions
Note on Interview Process: Response Rate and Issues with Interviews During the
COVID-19 Pandemic
The original intention of the interviews was to conduct a wide range of interviews
across all five states. However, there were major obstacles with potential participants
agreeing to be part of the dissertation from states such as New York, Virginia, and
Nevada. While the responses from California were more positive, it was difficult to track
down enough participants due to the passage of time. Surprisingly, Oregon responses
were more positive, and I was able to reach a high saturation point with regards to
content.
Response Rate
1. Case of Oregon
Active cases YES (response rate 61 percent out of eighteen requests)
2. Case of California
Active cases YES (response rate 57 percent out of fourteen requests)
3. Case of New York
Active cases (response rate 16 percent out of six requests)
4. Case of Nevada
Active cases YES (response rate 33 percent out of three requests)
5. Case of Virginia
Active cases YES (response rate 25 percent out of four requests)
6. Case of Massachusetts
Was unable to find a list of stakeholders that participated, and agencies involved were
unable to find requested documents (stakeholder documents and list serv)
associated with that proceeding. Was able to get in touch with one stakeholder
involved, but they did not have a list of other stakeholders.
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List of Interviews by State
Participant
Code
OR 001
OR 002
OR 003
OR 004
OR 005
OR 006
OR 007
OR 008
OR 009
OR 010
OR 011

Date
Interviewed
09/20/2019
08/27/2019
09/26/2019
10/03/2019
12/09/2019
02/21/2020
03/11/2020
02/18/2020
02/25/2020
11/06/2019
10/09/2020

In-person or
Telephone
Telephone
In-person
Telephone
In-person
In-person
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
In-person
In-person
Telephone

Signed
Consent
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Participant
Code
CA 001
CA 002
CA 003
CA 004
CA 005
CA 006
CA 007
CA 008

Date
Interviewed
11/24/2019
11/06/2019
11/20/2019
11/22/2019
12/04/2019
12/18/2019
01/10/2020
03/10/2020

In-person or
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone

Consent
Form
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Participant
Code
NY 001
NV 001
VA 001
MA 001

Date
Interviewed
03/06/2020
07/07/2021
07/19/2021
08/14/2021

In-person or
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone
Telephone

Consent
Form
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Oregon Interview Questions
I. Questions on Organization/Background Information
Q1. What type of organization do you represent?
Q2. How much work experience do you have relating to energy storage policy?
(1) none, (2), a little, (3) moderate, (4) high
Q3. How many full-time equivalent employees in your organization handle energy
storage policy?
Q4. To what level was your organization willing to devote time and resources
(financial, staffing, etc.) to the energy storage rulemaking? (1) none, (2), low amount,
(3) moderate amount, (4) high amount, and (5) number one priority.
Q5. What were your objectives/goals coming into the rulemaking?
(1) provide information, (2) shape policy, (3) other
Q6. Did those objectives/goals change at all throughout the process? If so, why?
Q7. How important is the rulemaking process for your organization in shaping
policy? (1) not at all, (2), low amount, (3) moderate amount, (4) high amount, and (5)
number one priority
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II. Institutional Participation: Perception of Agency Procedures for Stakeholder
Participation
Q11. Was your organization directly contacted by the agency to participate/be
informed of the proceedings?
Q12. Did you participate in any working groups or pre-draft workshops prior to the
advanced notice of the proceedings?
If Yes,
(a) How many of these meetings did you take part in?
(b) To what degree did you feel that you were able to influence the content
of the rules during these meetings? (1) none, (2) a little, (3) moderately,
(4) extremely, (5) unsure
(c) Do you consider pre-draft meetings to be more important that the
comment period?
Q13.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each
of the statements below?

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neither Agree
nor Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

I found that it was easy to participate during all
stages of the process.
I found that it was easy to participate just during the
notice and comment period.
I found that it was easy to participate during the
rulemaking just during the pre-draft meetings.
The process was inclusive to stakeholder groups
The OPUC was responsive to my comments and
participation.
The process was fair and open to all stakeholders.
The process helped create a greater level of trust
between my organization and the agency.

Q14. Do you feel that there were specific groups that were left out of the process that
should have been involved?
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III. Administrative Procedures: Perception of Regulatory Agency and Its Role
During Proceedings
Q8 (perception of regulatory procedures in rulemaking)
Were there any administrative constraints or procedures that negatively impacted
your participation throughout the proceedings?
(a) Lack of opportunities to participate?
(b) Poor communication with stakeholders of participation opportunities?
(c) Poor notice of meetings?
(d) Poor timing of meetings?
(e) Poor timelines/unrealistic timelines for rulemaking?
If Yes, How responsive was the regulatory agency in mitigating these concerns?
Q9 (perception of agency). Did the regulatory agency have sole discretion over the
procedures? (1) not at all, (2) a little, (3) somewhat, (4) very much, (5) extremely
Q10 (perception of agency).
Do you agree with the following statements and why?
a. The OPUC and Staff were receptive to outside influence by other
organizations or interest groups.
b. The OPUC and Staff were instrumental in shaping the content of the Final
Framework.
c. The OPUC and Staff had too much influence over the content of the Final
Framework.

387

IV. Group Tactics: Invisible and Visible Lobbying
Q15. Only Visible Lobbying:
(1) Please tell me whether or not you were involved with this rule in each of the
following ways. Did you testify at a hearing? Yes or No.
(2) Did you submit written comments to the agency? Yes or No”.
Q16. Invisible Lobbying: In addition to your participation through the hearing
testimony or formal written comments, did you have any contact with state agency
officials outside of the formal proceedings? Yes or No
Q17. Perceived Influence of Invisible Lobbying: How much, if any, did these contacts
influence the content of this rule? (1) not at all, (2) a little, (3) somewhat, (4) very
much, (5) extremely”
Q18. Both Visible and Invisible Lobbying:
How many of these contacts were face-to-face meetings? (1) none, (2), a few, (3)
some, (4) most, and (5) all.
How many of these contacts were telephone calls? (1) none, (2), a few, (3) some, (4)
most, and (5) all.
How many of these contacts were by email? (1) none, (2), a few, (3) some, (4) most,
and (5) all.
Q19. Effective Negotiation: Were there any times throughout the process that you felt
that you were personally able to negotiate a specific rule or stipulation that became
part of the Final Rule? Please give an example if possible.
Q20 (other group tactics). Did you employ another other tactics in your efforts to
influence the content or process of the rulemaking? (e.g., protests, letter writing
campaigns, etc.)
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V. Interest Group Interactions and Collaboration
Q21. What was the duration of your organization’s relationship with the following
stakeholders? Please indicate whether your organization has a collaborative
relationship with any of the stakeholders listed below.
Interest Groups
Renewable Northwest

1-2 Years

2-5 Years

5+ Years

None

Collaborator

Northwest Energy
Coalition
Energy Storage Association
NIPCC
Alliance of Western Energy
Consumers
Citizen’s Utility Board of
Oregon
Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL)
PacifiCorp
Portland General Electric
(PGE)
Oregon Department of
Energy

Q22. Repeated Interactions with Other Groups: Are there any groups that you have
had repeated interactions with before this rulemaking? (Yes or No)
If Yes,
(a) would you characterize your relationship with them as conflictual,
collaborative, or neutral?
(b)Can you describe an example to support your answer?
Q23. Coalition Building: Was there a time throughout the process that you sought to
build a coalition or collaborative network with any of the other stakeholders
involved?
Q24. Collaboration with Other Stakeholders: Did you have any other outside contact
with other stakeholders about this rule? Yes or No
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If Yes,
(a) Can you please elaborate on the frequency and type (informal or formal
meeting) of these interactions?
(b) Did these interactions with other stakeholders strengthen your organization’s
relationship with them? Please provide a relevant example.
(c) Did these interactions impact the content of the Final Rule?
(d) How likely will your organization be to interact with this stakeholder in the
future after this rulemaking?
Q25. Were there any stakeholders that your organization had an adversarial or
competitive relationship with?
If Yes, How did these groups constrain or aid your organization’s ability to influence
the rulemaking?
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VI. Perceived Influence
Q26. Below is a list of advocacy groups, industry groups, citizen groups, and NGOs
that have been identified as important to Oregon’s energy storage docket. Please rank
a minimum of five of the groups with the most influence over the rulemaking process
(1 being the most influential and 5 being less influential).
Interest Groups
Renewable Northwest

Ranking

Northwest Energy Coalition
CREA
Alliance of Western Energy Consumers
NIPCC
Citizen’s Utility Board of Oregon
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)
PacifiCorp
Portland General Electric (PGE)
Oregon Department of Energy
OPUC Staff

Q27. How influential do you feel that your organization was during the proceedings.
(1) strongly agree
(2) somewhat agree
(3) neither agree nor disagree
(4) somewhat disagree
(5) strongly disagree
Q28. At which stages do you feel that your organization’s influence was highest?
(1) pre-draft period
(2) draft period
(3) comment period
(4) none
Q29. Do you agree with the following statement: “Industry groups had an undue
influence on the process”.
(1) strongly agree
(2) somewhat agree
(3) neither agree nor disagree
(4) somewhat disagree
(5) strongly disagree
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Appendix D fsQCA 3.0 Steps
Five State fsQCA Analysis with Pictures
Step 1: Analyze the Truth Table Algorithms

2. Select variables
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Step 3: Edit the Truth Table. Threshold is <0.9 for raw consistency
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Step 4: Results after coding 1s or 0s on the output (INFL)

Step 5: Determine which prime implicants to keep if any exist.

Step 6: Determine when the conditions should contribute to the intermediate outcome if
they are present or absent.
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7. Output From the Truth Table Analysis
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8. Check Subset /Superset Analysis
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9. Check Set Coincidence
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10. fsQCA Truth Table Analysis without California
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